Government needs to clarify stance on Kosovo crisis and PfP

European security and defence arrangements have been thrown into turmoil by the Kosovo crisis, which poses sharply the question of how they should be developed. The choice would seem to lie between an incremental, evolutionary and medium- to long-term change, or one that happens much more rapidly.

The outcome of the Kosovo crisis will probably determine which prevails. It is now seen as a crucial test of NATO's credibility and cohesion. A failure to win the conflict convincingly could signal the rapid demise of the alliance and the development much more quickly than expected of alternative European arrangements.

That is why political discussion and debate of these issues has become such a pressing matter in Ireland where we are not used to considering them with the seriousness and sophistication they deserve.

The NATO summit in Washington this weekend is set to agree a new definition of the European Security and Defence Identity under negotiation since it was first put forward in detailed form three years ago in Berlin, but under discussion for nearly a decade. It would allow the EU to conduct military missions with command structures normally assigned to NATO.

Under the new Treaty of Amsterdam arrangements coming into effect next week the EU would do this through the Western European Union, a defence club of 10 EU members also in NATO. The treaty defines them as including "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking". They are known as the Petersberg tasks, after a WEU meeting at Petersberg, near Bonn, in 1992.

Although the EU treaty refers to the "progressive framing of a common defence policy which might in time become a common defence", it stops well short of the collective defence of each others' territories arising from mutual assistance guarantees.

Movement in that direction would require unanimous agreement by the European Council and national adoption of the decision by each member-state "in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements", which successive Irish governments agree means a referendum.

The treaty also develops the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy further by introducing majority voting for decisions concerning the implementation of policies agreed by unanimity; "constructive abstention" allowing a government to dissociate itself from a decision without vetoing it; a central policy-planning unit enabling foreign ministries to develop common analyses, and the post of high representative for foreign policy to act as spokesman or spokeswoman and interlocutor for third parties.

Even before the Kosovo crisis several developments combined to speed up this agenda. Most important was Tony Blair's decision to reach an agreement with France at St Malo last December on the development of the EU's international role, especially "the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises".

Discussion on the initiative has proceeded steadily since then sustained by the British commitment to participate in core EU functions in compensation for its absence from monetary union. A crucial aspect is the British proposal to abolish the WEU and absorb its functions and resources into the EU. They include intelligence and analysis functions, but also a collective security commitment under Article V of the Paris Treaty which founded the WEU.

While the British might be willing to abandon it in deference to the much more important similar Article 5 of the NATO treaty the French would see that as abandoning their long-standing commitment to a full-blooded EU common defence.

Assuming the medium- to long-term evolutionary scenario for European security this proposal to absorb the WEU into the EU is in its early stages and would almost certainly need another treaty-changing Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC), probably in four or five years' time.

The British would prefer to see a minor and rapid IGC on several of the institutional issues left outstanding in the Amsterdam Treaty, including representation on the Commission and re-weighting of votes, so as to avoid the coincidence of more ambitious discussion with their referendum on joining the euro, expected in 2001.

Meanwhile, the Americans and Europeans would continue their discussions in NATO about sharing the financial burden of defence costs and transferring autonomy to the EU for carrying out these Petersberg tasks. Neuralgic points include the reorganisation of European defence forces, whether the US would maintain an effective veto on the use of NATO assets which they have largely financed, and the need to mandate any actions by the UN Security Council. There is also increasing friction over Russia's role, as anti-Western sentiment gathers real pace.

But if Kosovo goes seriously wrong events will go much faster than that. A genuine European defence initiative, which would result eventually in American troops returning home, would confront all concerned, including the Irish Government and electorate, with strategic choices in the short to medium term. This would also be costly, given the differences between European and US defence expenditures. But it would surely be in keeping with the long-term commitments to reconstruct the Balkans region and include it in European political and economic structures over the next generation.

This is the context in which the Government's decision to join the NATO-associated Partnership for Peace is being debated politically. PfP is not involved in the Kosovo actions and contains many states which have criticised it. But the context confronts the Government with the need to clarify its attitude towards that crisis as well as the case for PfP membership.