Refusal of legal aid did not breach fair procedure

THE SUPREME Court has ruled that the Legal Aid Board did not breach fair procedures or natural and constitutional justice in refusing private legal aid to a woman for her action against the board itself and a firm of solicitors.

The three-judge court said yesterday that it was in “complete and precise agreement” with a High Court decision dismissing the proceedings by Dolores Mannion, with an address in Dublin 8, against the board.

Mr Justice Adrian Hardiman said the court particularly agreed with the High Court view, given the statutory and procedural safeguards put in place by the board to deal with cases, including cases against itself, that there was no failure by the board to meet the requirements of natural or constitutional justice nor any breach of the principle a party should not be a judge in its own cause.

The court awarded appeal costs to the board against Ms Mannion. Representing herself, she had opposed the costs order, saying she had been “through hell”.

Ms Mannion claimed she was entitled to have the board assign a solicitor in private practice to her, rather than a solicitor employed by the board, on grounds that her action was against the board itself and one of its own solicitors could have a conflict of interest.

Brian O’Moore SC, for the board, argued that the board had a discretion under the Civil Legal Aid Act 1995 whether to provide legal aid services and had procedures in place to deal with situations such as this.

Mr Justice Hardiman said the proceedings had “a long and tortuous history” and arose after Ms Mannion alleged serious problems arose from her purchase of an apartment in Co Kerry in 1989.

She instructed solicitors to act for her about those problems, became dissatisfied with them and then instructed another firm of solicitors to act for her against the seller of the apartment and the first firm.

Unhappy with the second firm, she sought the services of the board, but later alleged it had acted negligently and sought a third legal firm, which issued proceedings against the board and second firm in March 2001.

The third firm later ceased to act and a fourth firm was then instructed by Ms Mannion. This fourth firm, after some years, also applied to cease acting for her. She objected, but the High Court allowed the fourth firm to come off record. A fifth firm, also later ceased to act.

In 2005, she sought services from the board for her action against the second firm and the board, but objected when the board assigned her one of its solicitors. She took judicial review proceedings on that point and appealed after Mr Justice Brian McGovern dismissed her case in 2007.

Mr Justice Hardiman noted yesterday that Ms Mannion was represented by “eminent” junior and senior counsel in the High Court but decided to conduct her appeal herself and complained of “abysmal treatment” by the board.

While it was unusual that a public body such as the board was making legal services available to sue itself and another defendant, the board had considerable experience acting for both sides in civil proceedings, usually matrimonial, and had procedures to deal with that, he said.

While acting for both parties in a freestanding action was not the same as acting against one’s own organisation, it was in the nature of the board’s constitution and procedures that it might be asked to do so and it had “specific guidelines” for such a situation.

The court was satisfied the board made its services available through a solicitor of the board itself and not otherwise, he said. There was no panel of private solicitors used by the board to conduct High Court litigation and no requirement there should be such a panel. That was a matter within the board’s discretion.

There were procedures under which Ms Mannion could ask the board to assign her another of its solicitors rather than the one assigned to her but she “wisely” had not done this as the solicitor assigned to her had to date “doughtily” fought her case, the judge observed.