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What is the risk of the conflict in Gaza escalating?

None of the key actors has an interest in an all-out war. But an escalation cannot be ruled out

A mass protest in Yemen's capital Sanaa on Friday (January 12th) after the US and Britain launched strikes across Yemen overnight in retaliation against Houthi forces for attacks on Red Sea shipping.

Vincent Durac
Mon Jan 15 2024 - 06:00

Until recently, the consensus of most commentators has been that the war in Gaza would not escalate into a broader regional conflict. However, events over the past two weeks have made escalation more likely.

On January 2nd, Israel assassinated Saleh al-Arouri, the deputy leader of Hamas, in a drone strike in Beirut, crossing what had been considered a “red line” for Hizbullah – the targeting of a figure under its protection in Lebanon. Hizbullah retaliated by launching 62 rockets into northern Israel in what it termed a preliminary response.

Israel, in turn, assassinated a senior Hizbullah commander, Wissam al-Tawil, in southern Lebanon. On January 4th, the United States killed a senior commander of the Iran-linked Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in the heart of Baghdad in retaliation for a series of attacks by the PMF on US personnel in Iraq, prompted by Israel’s war in Gaza. Then, on Thursday last, the US and UK launched a series of air strikes on Yemen in response to attacks by the Yemeni group, Ansar Allah (better known as the Houthi movement) on shipping in the Red Sea, through which a significant proportion of global oil and gas supplies travelled before the war.

The Houthi attacks, according to the group, are motivated by a desire to place pressure on Israel to cease its onslaught on Gaza and allow humanitarian aid to enter the enclave. Houthi forces have attacked 25 ships at the time of writing. Given this escalation across the region, it is hardly surprising that fears of a broader regional conflict are intensifying.

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Hizbullah is not merely a paramilitary organisation, it is also one of the key players in Lebanon’s domestic political system

Despite this, none of the key actors has an interest in all-out war in the Middle East. Hassan Nasrallah, secretary-general of Hizbullah, stated explicitly that the assassination of al-Arouri, embarrassing as it has been for the group, would not alter its strategic calculations in terms of the conflict, although he promised a response at some point. In recent speeches, Nasrallah has talked up the significance of the actions already undertaken by Hizbullah and their cost to Israel, including some 670 attacks on nearly 500 Israeli targets near the Israeli-Lebanese border. He claimed that Hizbullah has forced the evacuation of over 200,000 Israelis from the north of Israel while Hizbullah’s border operations have drawn significant Israeli military resources to the northern front, thus limiting its operations in Gaza.

Hizbullah is not merely a paramilitary organisation, it is also one of the key players in Lebanon’s domestic political system. Given the dire economic and political crisis which has characterised public life there for years, conflict with Israel would be catastrophic. Nasrallah has acknowledged that embroiling Lebanon in another war would be in nobody’s interest. Finally, the Hizbullah leadership is fully aware of Israel’s capacity to hurt the organisation not only in its stronghold in the south of Lebanon but also in the densely populated southern suburbs of Beirut.

For Israel, outright conflict with Hizbullah is undesirable. War in the north would clearly place significant strain on the country’s military capacity. The economic cost of the war in Gaza has been estimated at $18 billion (€16.4 billion) to the end of 2023, or $229 million (€209 million) per day. The calling up of 360,000 reservists for military duty has placed additional strain on the country’s economy. More significant is the question of what all-out war with Hizbullah would achieve.

Israel last engaged in outright conflict with Hizbullah in 2006, following which an official Israel commission of inquiry concluded that a semi-military organisation of a few thousand men had resisted the strongest army in the Middle East for several weeks. Today, the organisation is much better resourced. Nasrallah claims that it has a membership of 100,000 fighters, although others suggest the figure is half that. It is estimated to possess between 100,000 and 150,000 missiles and rockets and has the capacity to launch thousands of rockets a day into Israel.

Elsewhere, fears of an escalation have focused on Yemen. The Houthi movement, although frequently referred to as “rebels”, constitutes one of the most significant political and military actors in that country. The Houthis (named after the organisation’s leadership) emerged under the authoritarian regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, which dominated Yemeni political life until a popular uprising in 2011. The movement emerged in the north of the country to defend the interests of Yemen’s Shia Zaydi community, some 40 per cent of the population. In doing so, it aroused the hostility of Saleh’s regime, resulting in sporadic violent conflict between the Houthis and the regime between 2004 and 2010.

Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Houthis adopted the slogan ‘Death to the US, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, and victory to Islam’

Following the fall of Saleh’s regime, the Houthis expanded their control over the north of the country and entered the capital, Sanaa, in 2014, displacing a transitional government which had the support of the international community. This was followed by a full-scale war against the group, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with the support of the US and UK, which quickly developed into a stalemate, lasted far longer than had been expected and proved extremely costly for the Saudis.

In the meantime, the movement has become the closest thing to a functioning government that Yemen possesses. The Houthis have a long-standing hostility to both Israel and the United States. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the group adopted the slogan “Death to the US, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, and victory to Islam”. The attacks on shipping in the Red Sea are consistent with this position. However, the Houthis also have little interest in a wider conflict in the region and their objectives are not merely ideological. Engagement in hostility with Israel, however remote – the two countries are nearly 1,400 miles apart – is also motivated by domestic concerns. Facing internal dissent and charges of corruption and mismanagement, the Houthi leadership calculates that its position on Gaza will bolster its support at both the domestic and regional levels.

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While it is in the interest of key actors to avoid escalation, this is by no means an impossible outcome. The Houthis have condemned the most recent US and UK attacks on Yemen, vowing retaliation. The attacks have increased the popularity of the movement in the Middle East and it is unlikely that they will deter the Houthis from further action in the Red Sea. A critical question will be how the US and UK respond, but a further escalation of violence seems likely.

There is some evidence of a belief in the Israeli leadership that a short bout of all-out conflict with Hizbullah is inevitable. Unlikely as it now seems, should Iran become directly involved in defence of its regional allies, the result could be catastrophic.

Dr Vincent Durac lectures in Middle East politics in the UCD school of politics and international relations

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