Newton Emerson: DUP wants cover for its Brexit retreat

An air of absurdity and exhaustion hangs over the idea that Stormont is the solution to Brexit. The northern institutions have collapsed, the British government is collapsing and London's sincerity in seeking a deal remains in question. These are shaky grounds on which to place the contention and complexity of Stormont input into the backstop, or some backstop-like arrangement. A new layer of accountability can be imagined and Northern Ireland is hardly a stranger to arcane government systems. But where would the energy come from to make this work, when only the DUP wants it and most nationalists would see Stormont administering Brexit as adding insult to injury?

It is not as if the DUP's need is fundamental – it merely wants a fig leaf to cover its retreat. When then British prime minister Theresa May unveiled the so-called Stormont lock in January this year, DUP deputy leader Nigel Dodds dismissed it as "cosmetic and meaningless".

May’s proposals were stronger than anything now likely to be agreed.

Most of the straws in the wind for Stormont input are the straw man arguments being offered against it.

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Consider this statement last week from Minister for Foreign Affairs Simon Coveney.

“There’s certainly a concern at an EU level that a devolved institution in Northern Ireland could have a veto about how the single market operates or a border on the single market operates.”

Nobody has ever proposed that Stormont has a veto over anything – British government proposals admit its role would ultimately be consultative.

Nobody has proposed that Stormont has a say, let alone a veto, over the operation of the single market. It would only be consulted on the application of new single-market regulations within Northern Ireland, which would be a territory outside the EU.

Border open

There would be implications for the Border if Northern Ireland withheld “consent” for new EU regulations, as British government sources describe it.

In practice, this is most likely to be resolved by new checks across the Irish Sea to keep the Border open. Would unionists consent to that?

Coveney's statement, and similar remarks from others in the Irish Government, create scope to give the DUP what it wants without appearing to give way.

EU officials are conceding the backstop needs democratic oversight and is not compromised in principle by Stormont input

Some backstop supporters in Northern Ireland have gone further, implying a Stormont lock would mean the DUP regulating French farmers, although such claims must be due more to confusion and pot-stirring than cunning attempts to reframe the argument.

EU officials have taken a slightly different approach to the Irish Government over the past week, as revealed in statements and through media briefings. They have begun highlighting the withdrawal agreement’s oversight mechanisms, to counter British government and DUP claims the backstop is undemocratic.

Those mechanisms would require a diagram to explain but as a rough guide there is a line of accountability leading back to Stormont via EU-UK committees and North-South bodies of the Belfast Agreement.

At first sight, EU officials appear to be arguing this makes further Stormont input unnecessary. On closer inspection, they are conceding the backstop needs democratic oversight and is not compromised in principle by Stormont input. As with Coveney’s statement, this marks out a landing zone.

Managing Brexit

Sinn Féin has consistently objected to Stormont or the DUP having “a veto over the backstop”.

As no such veto is proposed, this leaves plenty of wiggle room. The party is leaving similar space in its pledges not to administer a post-Brexit border.

However, the main sign Sinn Féin might humour the Stormont lock is that it is re-emphasising the DUP-Conservative confidence-and-supply agreement as the key obstacle to restoring devolution, although that agreement expired with the prorogation of parliament last week and will almost certainly never be renewed.

Why would Sinn Féin risk being drawn into managing Brexit?

A perception its supporters do not want Stormont revived was debunked in recent elections, as the party subsequently confirmed.

If London, Dublin and Brussels come to see Stormont input as a trivial tweak that can get a withdrawal agreement passed, then pressure to revive devolution will be intense.

Sinn Féin could find itself suddenly portrayed as the obstacle, with its Stormont agenda – in particular, an Irish language Act – downgraded to an incidental concern.

Better to position itself to make demands using the considerable leverage it will have at that moment.

Precedent suggests Sinn Féin would pursue procedural changes and guarantees, most obviously on Stormont’s cross-community veto mechanism, so it could tell its voters it was managing the Border in nationalism’s interest.

This looks like a necessary minimum requirement but it would be a mistake to make too much of it. Sinn Féin has proved poor at working such arrangements before, with the DUP adept at running rings around it.

Republicans should learn from the confidence-and-supply agreement and ask for more money for Northern Ireland, on the clear understanding Sinn Féin delivered it. There seems little doubt more money would be forthcoming.