Paying the price for a weak and incompetent Lisbon campaign

WORLD VIEW:An emerging ad-hoc approach to solving EU problems is relegating Ireland to the margins, writes Paul Gillespie.

IRELAND'S IMAGE elsewhere in Europe has changed profoundly after rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in last month's referendum, especially among new and prospective members of the European Union.

Political elites in central and eastern Europe have regarded Ireland as a role model to emulate politically and economically and assumed good will towards their ambitions from here. The No vote has jolted those assumptions and left a bewildered and curious set of attitudes in its wake.

We need to be aware of such costs and consequences as the result is analysed and evaluated over the next three months.

The result is felt most keenly in states that aspire to join the EU but worry about new barriers being placed in their way. At a seminar this week in Krakow, I was asked about it by Borys Tarasyuk, a former Ukrainian foreign minister and member of parliament. Was it not a selfish decision, he asked, given the consequences for states like his, which now face supplementary objections from France and Germany to further EU enlargement without the Lisbon rules. How could Ireland, which benefited so much from the EU, block its development like this?

It is difficult to explain that such considerations probably played a minimal role in the voting, at least explicitly. Research shows attitudes to EU enlargement did not loom that large in the No vote, although Irish opinion is only moderately in favour of it. Economic uncertainty and worries about unemployment in the face of large-scale immigration from central and eastern Europe were factors in the large working-class vote against the treaty, but there is little evidence of a racist effect. While the Government's eye was off the developing economic crisis during the campaign, it is not surprising that its portents should have affected ordinary voters, many of whom have rational fears about exposure to globalisation and insufficient reason to believe the EU will protect them. That is obviously one assurance required in any revisiting of the issue.

All this was news to Tarasyuk, who heard it sympathetically, even if he remains puzzled by Ireland's decision. He finds dealing with Brussels a frustrating business because he can never get a straight answer about Ukraine's potential accession. The European Neighbourhood Policy fails to address this central question. Largely it has to do with Ukraine's scale and absorbability, alongside Turkey, and the disruptive effect such an enlargement would have on existing political and demographic balances.

Ukraine will continue to rely on such neighbouring EU states as Poland to press its case. Imposition of Schengen borders plays havoc with regional economic integration. But Poland is gradually developing coalitions with neighbouring states within a wider EU framework, having recently launched an eastern initiative with Sweden. Poland will help Ukraine and Moldova as much as possible, and wants to see them continue the reform programmes that will eventually facilitate any applications to join the EU.

Explaining this policy, Witold Sobkow, political director of the foreign ministry and former ambassador to Ireland, interpreted the Irish No as a vote for less Europe and an affirmation of continuing attachment to the nation-state. That chimes with several currents in central and eastern Europe, a commonality over-riding the initial shock of the No vote there. Such foreign policy differentiation is probably a growing feature of an enlarged EU, in which ad hoc multi-speed initiatives will multiply, he believes. That would happen irrespective of whether the increased foreign policy co-ordination promised by Lisbon actually comes to pass. In that sense, the Irish vote is probably something of a watershed.

The same applies to the issue of unanimity. The Irish vote is raising this question throughout the EU. In Poland and the Czech Republic it is associated with presidential opposition to Lisbon, cutting across governmental approval. In neither case is presidential disapproval expected to succeed, leaving Ireland alone to respond.

This rationale was put well during the week by France's ambassador to Bulgaria, Etienne de Poncins. "The important thing is that the problem came from Ireland so the solution must come from Ireland," he told the Sofia Times. President Sarkozy's address to the European Parliament laid out this approach very clearly.

The possible scenarios have been well rehearsed by now. If Ireland votes again in favour of Lisbon next year on the basis of some changes and assurances, unanimity is preserved. But if that is decided against, or in the event of a second No, the other states are likely to go ahead anyway, using existing or new legal mechanisms.

Such a transition beyond unanimity would be traumatic, and could leave us on the margins of the developing system much more rapidly than is commonly realised. That would be all the more the case were we to share that space in a continuing recession with a resurgent Eurosceptic Britain led by the Conservatives after the 2010 general election there, as the Economist warns sharply.

Ireland's decision has also been received with shock and bewilderment in Croatia and the western Balkans. Croatian leaders were confidently expecting to conclude their accession negotiations next year and accede by 2011. The Irish No is being used by France and Germany to block that timetable.

Even though that legal case is disputed there is no doubt that the clear run they expected is now under question. Support for EU membership has been declining and the opposition challenges the government to explain its strategy. There are obvious knock-on effects for Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia.

Ireland's referendum campaign was introverted and self-regarding, conducted without much regard for these larger economic costs and political consequences. A common theme of international commentary is that the Government ran a weak and incompetent campaign. As it is revisited in very different economic circumstances we should remember Tolstoy's words, made more famous by Trotsky: "You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you."