Sarkozy rocks the EU power relations boat

WORLD VIEW:FRANCE AND Germany have been strategic allies for so long within the EU that they are conventionally seen as the principal motor of its effective functioning and deeper integration.

All the more reason to pay close attention to the recent tension, amounting to deterioration, in their relationship. It combines policy disagreements with contrasting personalities and is exemplified in French president Nicolas Sarkozy's failure to convince German chancellor Angela Merkel that his proposed Union for the Mediterranean has merit.

The plan was one of Sarkozy's main foreign-policy platforms when he won the presidential election last year. He proposed a tighter union of states bordering the sea in place of the dysfunctional EuroMed/ Barcelona Process linking EU states with north African and Middle Eastern states. France, he assumed, would be its natural leader, while Turkey would find a more natural home there than in the EU.

German leaders were shocked that Sarkozy pursued the plan so seriously in office. For it would exclude Germany and other non-Mediterranean EU states from a process in which they had been fully involved and for which they meet most of the bills.

The incorporation from 2004 of the EuroMed process into the wider European Neighbourhood Policy (NPA) towards all adjoining states reinforced this sense of exclusion. This is very much a work in progress, but most member states believe it needs to be deepened and better resourced rather than fragmented.

That would herald reversion to 19th-century spheres of influence dominated by major powers, precisely what the EU is meant to avoid. It seems to represent a trade-off between France's Mediterranean hegemony and Germany's growing power in central and eastern Europe after the end of the cold war, compensating for France's long-standing hesitation about the EU's enlargement by legitimising a new role to its south.

Sarkozy was equally nonplussed by the German refusal to accept his plan. Coming to terms with that rejection has seen him compensate in ways that further infuriated Merkel and her ministerial team.

Sarkozy claimed credit for the simplified Lisbon Treaty, which the German EU presidency had patiently negotiated. His refusal to cut his budget deficit rankled, as did a more general failure to practise the prior consultation which has been such a hallmark of Franco-German co-operation within the EU. His impulsive, hyperactive and over-familiar style contrasted with Merkel's cooler, analytical caution.

Following a couple of cancelled meetings, the two met at Hanover ahead of last week's European Council in Brussels. Sarkozy was advised by his own officials that unless he compromised on the Mediterranean plan his EU presidency from July would be jeopardised. He agreed to do so, accepting that all 27 EU members will be involved and EuroMed will remain part of the NPA. But it will be able to create new structures, which the council asked the European Commission to formulate for an EU-Mediterranean summit this summer.

In Brussels, Sarkozy boasted that he got his way. His rejection of Turkey's EU membership has certainly gained ground.

Foreign-policy activism appeals to leaders partly because it takes attention away from domestic failings. Sarkozy has had these aplenty. Last weekend's setback in local elections reveals disappointment over his delivery of economic and social reforms, together with overexposure of his personal life. Compensatory initiatives on European defence, common agricultural policy reform and climate change may help restore his standing.

The defence issue looms largest. Next week Sarkozy meets British prime minister Gordon Brown to discuss what would be involved if France fully rejoins Nato's military structures, which it left in 1966. Sarkozy proposes a major renegotiation in which the US would recognise much greater European military autonomy in a reaffirmed transatlantic alliance. He sees much more scope for that with the British and the US than the Germans.

There is speculation he is ready to deploy French troops in Afghanistan under US command, releasing US troops to fight with British and Canadians in the hardpressed south of the country.

Germany has famously refused to provide more troops there. It may well suit Brown to go along with Sarkozy at the Nato summit in Bulgaria next month. Any renegotiation of Nato's role will be with a new US president.

There is also speculation Sarkozy wants to see the largest EU states form a hard core on defence, including a commitment to put 10,000 troops apiece at its disposal and raise military spending to at least 2 per cent of their budgets (Germany's is currently 1.2 per cent).

Effective EU presidencies require different skills to Sarkozy's powerladen ones. The impartiality, neutrality and mediation that make for success are often better deployed by smaller states with fewer interests at stake, than by large ones with their own axes to grind.

Aside from this is the potential effect of Sarkozy's inter- governmental methods on the emerging balance of influence in a much larger EU, especially if he works more closely with the UK than Germany. Hardcore groups appeal to larger, more powerful states than smaller ones. That would certainly be reinforced if the Lisbon Treaty is not ratified.

This factor should be borne in mind in the referendum campaign here. The treaty contains rules to prevent the abuse of such power as well as new voting rules to reassure the populations of large states they can maintain influence.