Even as the writing appeared to be on the wall for Hibernia Foods this week, chief executive Mr Oliver Murphy and finance director Mr Colm Delves were in court to try and stop the company from replacing them.

The drive for change at the top of the company appeared to be coming from one of its shareholders, the Pan European Food Fund, a Luxembourg-based venture capital operation. The fund wanted two of its directors, Mr Stuart Anderson and Mr Henrik Thufason, in the key posts on the board.

Mr Murphy's and Mr Delves's claim against Hibernia seems academic. Last weekend, General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), automotive giant General Motors' financial services arm, placed the company in receivership.

The most likely outcome of the receivership is that Hibernia will be sold off to new owners, who will then decide the shape of its future management. Accountancy firm KPMG is the receiver, both here and in Britain.

GMAC appointed the receiver to protect a £17.25 million sterling (€25 million) factoring facility. which it extended to Hibernia.

The court case looks like an example of history repeating itself. Hibernia Foods came into being as a result of a falling out between Mr Murphy and another continental investor, French meat business CED Viandes.

That company was a partner in Mr Murphy's Hibernia Meats, which he set up in 1977. However, in 1991, he and his French investor parted in what were described at the time as acrimonious circumstances. He retained the right to use the Hibernia name and was not bound by a non-compete clause.

So Mr Murphy turned around in 1991 and set up Hibernia Foods, which was established with the aim of processing prime Irish beef for sale to the European catering sector, a market where Mr Murphy felt there was plenty of scope to compete with existing players.

The company had auspicious beginnings. Its board included Mr Seán Donlon, then a former secretary-general of the Department of Industry and Commerce, who was subsequently Irish ambassador to the US. Its finance director was Mr Paul Connolly, now better known for his association with telecoms entrepreneur Mr Denis O'Brien and his own venture capital business, Connolly Corporate Finance.

Hibernia was also one of the first to go a route that was later trod by a range of high-profile Irish companies - it floated on the Nasdaq stock market in New York, now associated with technology but which then fulfilled a similar role to London's Alternative Investment Market (AIM).

It was a controversial time for the Irish meat industry. The beef tribunal was investigating the alleged abuse of State export credit insurance by a number of companies, including Hibernia Meats. Mr Murphy gave evidence but was not himself implicated in any wrong doing.

At the same time, the seeds for what would later become the "mad cow" scare were being sown. Scientists were beginning to suspect a connection between the deadly bovine neurological disorder BSE and a similar, equally fatal condition in humans.

The prospectus that was prepared to promote the company to investors before its flotation included a reference to Mr Murphy's tribunal appearance and the potential risks from BSE. However, this did not deter 800 American backers who stumped up $5.3 million to invest in the Irish meat company.

It began as a beef trader and, at the end of a first year during which its shares traded indifferently, Hibernia posted a pre-tax profit of £398,000, on the back of £21.3 million in sales.

Similar performances followed and the company built its own meat processing and storage facilities.

But, as this was going on, disaster struck in the shape of a full-blown BSE scare, which saw many countries banning beef imports from Britain and parts of Ireland. While the risk posed by Irish meat was very small, the country's industry suffered, and Hibernia along with it.

It was forced to reinvent itself. Hibernia began winding down its beef operations and moving into the higher-margin convenience foods sector. Its first step on this road was the £1.35 million sterling purchase of Majestic Foods in the UK in 1997. The company was Britain's third-largest seller of frozen desserts, with sidelines in savoury prepared meals.

In the wake of the deal's announcement, Mr Murphy declared that he wanted to turn Hibernia into a $250 million convenience foods company over the succeeding three to five years.

The following year it paid £10 million to US giant Bestfoods for two consumer food companies in Britain. They were the unlikely sounding Mr Brains savoury meats business, and a facility in Bristol with a licence to manufacture and sell the Entenmann's confectionary brand in Ireland and the UK. That became the exclusive European licence.

George Weston Bakeries in Toronto, Canada, is the ultimate owner of Entenmann's and its brands. At this side of the pond, all the leading supermarket multiples stock these products, which are aimed firmly at family shopping baskets.

Also in 1998, Hibernia declared a profit of $595,000 on the back of $56 million sales for its fiscal year (which ended in March). The acquisition of the smaller Freshbake confectionery business came next.

It followed this up in 2000 with the €10 million purchase of the Sara Lee bakery business. This is the the UK's leading supplier of chilled desserts. It increased Hibernian's size by 50 per cent. The brand is ultimately owned by the Sara Lee Corporation in Chicago, Illinois, US, and is again popular with consumers.

On top of this, Hibernia raised $33 million in early 2000. The Pan European Food Fund contributed $24 million, with BG Bank, Axa and GIMV investing the rest.

Hibernia said the money would be used to market the Entenmann's range in European markets, fund an organic and acquisition-based expansion in Europe, and to repay loan notes, saving $7 million a year in interest payments.

At this stage, Hibernia had moved from being an Irish beef processor to a Nasdaq-listed, Dublin-headquartered frozen and consumer foods business with operations in the UK and shareholders in the US and Europe.

It was a completely different company from the one promoted to potential investors nine years earlier.

The transformation looked complete, and it was close to becoming a $250 million convenience foods company. But it was not making a profit.

In 1999, it announced that it had lost €10 million in the 12 months to the end of March that year. Its balance sheet showed a €7 million fall in net assets.

At the same time on the Nasdaq, its shares were being quoted at less than $5, having reached highs of $8 in January of that year.

The following year, sales rose by 27 per cent, but net losses were £6.25 million sterling.

Two years ago, in the final months of 2001, the company predicted that it was set to move back into profit. It did in early 2002 but this was short-lived.

Hibernia's figures for the year to end of the March 2003 show it had operating losses of €6.7 million.

The figures were unaudited and it has yet to file more comprehensive numbers with the Securities & Exchange Commission.

At the time, Mr Murphy said that it was working on a number of transactions designed to reduce its debt.

It looks like he never got the chance. This month, the company announced that it was replacing Mr Murphy and Mr Delves. The two men got court orders halting this but, before the issue could be thrashed out any further, GMAC moved to appoint its receiver.

At this point, the game looks to be up.