Up until the change of government in Germany, there was little questioning or criticism of the way the European Central Bank (ECB) was shaping up. Its structure, objectives and perogatives were set in stone in the Maastricht Treaty six years ago an it had long been the assumption that the ECB would be a clone of the German Bundesbank in its outlook and operation - an impression reinforced by the location of the bank in Frankfurt.

Since the German election, however, both the Chancellor, Mr Schroeder, and the Finance Minister, Mr Lafontaine, have been calling for what seems tantamount to a change of remit for the ECB, urging it to take account of unemployment in setting monetary policy.

While this has been going on, the Italians have floated the idea of exempting government capital spending from the strictures of the EMU Stability Pact.

Though having no direct bearing on the ECB debate, the combination of the two events gave the impression that European governments - or, at least those of a social democratic persuasion which constitute the majority in the EU-15 - want to rewrite the fiscal and monetary rules. This has raised concerns about possible curbs on the independence of the ECB.

The first thing to be said is that these worries are overdone. The independence of the European System of Central Banks, of which the ECB is the decision-making authority, is enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, as well as in the domestic legislation of all countries participating in EMU.

Any change in the ECB's status would require a revision of the treaty and no one is looking for that. However, the debate has gone on long enough for it to be more than mere posturing.

European social democrats are trying to bring some influence to bear on monetary policy. There is, of course, a difference between seeking to influence the ECB's thinking and infringing its independence. The former is not an unreasonable objective and one that central bankers would not normally have a major problem with were it not being pursued so publicly and, at least from the bankers' viewpoint, at the wrong time.

The bad timing arises because the ECB's primary concern is to ensure that the changeover to the euro goes as smoothly as possible and that the currency starts its life with maximum credibility.

In this regard, the turmoil on international markets was something of a godsend. Through it all, the euro-zone currencies were rocksteady while others were volatile. The markets were giving the protoeuro the accolade of safe-haven status.

Now, with only five weeks to go, the last thing the central bankers want is for the status to be questioned, hence their ire with the new German government.

Despite the bankers' discomfort, however, the questioning of the ECB's remit implicit in the Schroeder-Lafontaine position is legitimate. One has the sense that the adaptation of the Bundesbank model for the ECB was driven significantly by a desire to assuage German worries about surrendering the deutschmark for the euro.

The pre-eminence of the Bundesbank in setting monetary policy in Europe, especially in recent years, and its tough reputation undoubtely contributed as well. The Bundesbank is not, however, the only model for an effective and credible central bank.

The US Federal Reserve, with a mandate that sets the goal of price stability in the context of maximising employment, has built a strong reputation, especially under Mr Alan Greenspan.

The idea of taking a wider view when setting monetary policy is not actually outside the ECB's legal scope. While Article 105 of the Maastricht Treaty says that "the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability", it also says that, without prejudice to price stability, the ESCB shall support economic policies aimed at achieving the objectives of the community (among which the treaty includes "sustainable and non-inflationary growth. . ." and "a high level of employment").

There is, in fact, a similar provision in the law under which the Bundesbank operates, so the difference in style between Bundesbank and Fed seems more one of attitude than legal requirement.

There is some reason to believe that the ECB will develop a style that might not ape that of the Bundesbank. Speaking in Dublin recently, the ECB president, Mr Duisenberg, went to some lengths to emphasise the pragmatic, non-mechanistic approach the ECB will take to policymaking, not guided by any single indicator or target variable, but taking account of a wide variety of factors. This implies a degree of, dare one say non-Germanic, flexibility that might see the second element of the ECB mandate more actively pursued, especially in periods when the main objective is secure, as it certainly is now.

In addition, the fact that the heads of the eleven euro-zone national central banks sit on the ECB governing board, each with a equal vote, might also be an influence, since it will give them more say in setting European monetary policy than they have had in recent years when the Bundesbank was effectively calling the shots.

Maybe Oskar Lafontaine has less reason for kicking up a fuss than he thinks.

Dermot O'Brien is chief economist at NCB Stockbrokers