If there was little hint in economic commentary a decade ago that a Celtic Tiger was about to roar, there was little sense either in the late 1990s that the experience might prove temporary. It was as if the Republic single-handedly had discovered the key to rapid and lasting growth. So much so that for a few years policymakers from far and near sought the answer to their problems here. It became the turn of IDA personnel and Irish economists to travel abroad offering rather than seeking advice.

A more historical perspective on the Tiger suggests a less dramatic spin. Treating the post-1945 period as a block suggests that the Irish economy has been "on track", in the sense that it has grown as fast as expected of an economy with its initial income level. This, and signs that the economy is now returning to more modest growth rates, suggest that the Tiger's main achievement was catching up with the rest.

Better late than never, but the delayed convergence exacted a heavy price: the consumption loss incurred by the Republic for not following the slightly slower but much steadier growth path pursued by, say, Italy over the half-century was substantial - nearly 30 per cent of real output.

So what produced the Tiger? The factors usually highlighted include fiscal restraint, generous tax incentives to multinationals, EU largesse, plentiful human capital, social partnership and the US economic boom. Some elements in this package of factors have been oversold; others were geared to delivering catch-up, not endless growth at the rates achieved in the 1990s.

Much has been made of the role of fiscal policy in jump-starting Irish recovery. Fiscal probity is a precondition for economic growth but does not guarantee it. Unquestionably, without the unpleasant fiscal corrections of the 1982-1987 period, the Tiger would not have roared. In other words, fiscal stabilisation was about making up lost ground not achieving a new steady state.

Moreover, the timing suggests that the Republic's current status as a low-tax, low public-debt economy is a product of the Celtic Tiger, not its cause. And while the transfers from Brussels under Delors I and II arguably eased the challenge of fiscal stabilisation, macroeconomic simulations suggest, in accounting for the Celtic Tiger, they were an "also ran".

The claims for education have also been overdone, for two broad reasons. The first is theoretical: education does not grow on trees, but comes at the expense of spending on telecommunications, roads and hospitals. In the 1970s and 1980s, when the main benefits of the Republic's investments in higher education were being realised abroad, the right investments in infrastructure might have yielded higher social returns. The second is fact: recent international comparisons show the quality of our labour force has been exaggerated.

Social partnership Irish-style also helped convergence but is not a recipe for long-run growth. The commitment to wage moderation made sense when unemployment was high, and was a boon to the public finances. However, in the Republic today, wage moderation simply leads to excess demand for labour and loss of credibility for trade unions. If social partnership is to have a future in the State, it needs to re-invent itself.

For a long time, the Republic paid a high price for how it exercised its economic sovereignty. Only now is it reaping sovereignty's benefits. The Republic can get away with low corporate taxes because it is a small economy, producing about 1 per cent of EU GDP and because it was the first to offer foreign investors such tax concessions. If Germany decided unilaterally to reduce its corporate taxation level to Irish levels, it would risk breaking up the EU.

The Republic's position in this near-to-zero sum game depends on others - or too many others - not following suit. Whether aspirant EU members are likely to compete effectively on this front remains to be seen.

The increasing sensitivity of multinationals to tax rates helps explain the State's increased share of US foreign direct investment in Europe, but also its vulnerability to tax harmonisation. The issue is worth urgent attention. The Republic's tax incentives also explain its ability to capitalise on the long-lasting US economic boom and the single European market in ways that other "peripheral" regions such as Northern Ireland and south Wales could not.

The mild downturn in the global economy has merely hastened the slowdown that was inevitable at home. Most likely, the Tiger years will soon be remembered as an interlude when the State made up the ground it had lost and became a "normal" European economy.

Prof Cormac Ó Gráda is a member of the department of economics, UCD. This is a summary of "Is the Celtic Tiger a Paper Tiger?", published in the current ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary.