In his opinion column of August 19th, Vincent Browne expresses his own particular experience of anger and frustration at the murder and maiming of innocent people in Omagh last Saturday. Many, including myself, will identify with his feelings and with much of what he says. But it is very difficult to understand his attempt to link the thought processes of the bombers with traditional Catholic morality, in the form of the principle of double effect. Such a forced linkage betrays an inadequate understanding of Catholic moral philosophy.
Browne argues that the principle of double effect would absolve the bombers from moral culpability for the deaths of 28 people on the grounds that there was no direct intention to cause such deaths. This is a totally inaccurate reading of the principle of double effect, which states that if a course of action has two effects, one good and one evil, this course of action may be taken provided that:
the evil effect is not directly intended, albeit foreseeable;
the evil effect is not out of proportion with the good;
the good effect does not result directly from the evil.
Far from being condoned, therefore, the Omagh bombing immediately stands condemned by this principle on the grounds that the evil effect is way out of proportion to any possible good. Indeed, it is hardly possible to talk meaningfully of any good which could come from the killing and maiming of so many innocent people.
The principle of double effect is classically applied to conflicts of values which arise, for example, in the area of health care. In the case of terminal illness, assuming that the above-mentioned criteria are applied, it is considered ethically acceptable to administer necessary pain-relieving drugs even when it is clear that these drugs have the side-effect of shortening a patient's life. There is no question here of denying the patient's right to life or the unique value of that life. What is involved is simply an honest acceptance of the fact that this person is dying and that respect for her life must be thought of in qualitative (i.e. she needs pain relief) as well as quantitative terms (i.e. her life needs to be sustained). This is vastly different from the situation in Omagh, where the interests of those who were killed or injured were simply never taken into account. Neither could it realistically be said that the bombers were on the horns of a dilemma, such as is normally envisaged in cases where the double effect principle applies.
Browne rejects the principle of double effect as another piece of poison that has entered our moral language. He argues that our criminal law has it right: that we should be presumed to intend the foreseeable consequences of our actions. He is correct on this latter point, but he doesn't seem to realise that this view is shared by St Thomas Aquinas, on whose philosophical thought Catholic teaching on the morality of human acts is based. St Thomas argues that the two factors which ultimately determine goodness or evil in an action are the will of the agent and the nature of the action itself. He goes on to state that if evil consequences are foreseen it is evident that they increase the malice of the action. For when a man foresees that many evils may follow from his action, and yet does not desist from it, this shows his will to be all the more inordinate (Summa Theologiae, I.II, 20, 5).
Insofar as Browne suggests that the same moral logic (Catholic moral philosophy) might be used to justify the blanket-bombing of Iraq or Libya (or indeed the latest US bombing mission) without regard to the loss of innocent life, it may be worth referring to the classic moral criteria sometimes referred to collectively as "just war theory". According to St Thomas, in exercising their responsibility for the common good, rulers in some cases may justly make war. He outlines the criteria for such an undertaking. War must only be waged on the command of a lawful authority, for a just cause, and with the intention of doing good (cf Summa Theologiae, II.II, Q40).
It is worth noting, to begin with, that a just cause is not of itself sufficient justification for going to war. Lawful authority must be invoked, and in a democratic society this authority comes from the people. It is arguable that at no time in the past 700 years has lawful authority been more clearly expressed in Ireland than in the recent referendums on the Belfast Agreement. Furthermore, as indicated above, the intention of doing good presupposes an honest appraisal of the foreseeable consequences and the exclusion of any action which, by virtue of its evil consequences, is disproportionate. As far back as 600 years ago, Thomas Aquinas recognised that the nature of warfare changes with the times. We might now ask whether modern warfare, and particularly the use of weapons of mass destruction, can ever serve the common good.
Vincent Browne may not share the socio-moral analysis proposed by the Catholic Church. That is his right. But a closer examination of the double effect principle makes it clear that there is nothing in Catholic moral philosophy which would even remotely justify last Saturday's bombing in Omagh.
Dr Kevin Doran is a priest of the Dublin Diocese and lectures in Philosophy at the Mater Dei Institute.
