BOOK OF THE DAY: The Downfall of the Spanish Armada in IrelandBy Ken Douglas Gill and Macmillan 244 pp, €24.99
A KEY reason behind the failure of the Spanish Armada in 1588 was a problem which many will recognise today: a culture of glorifying administrators and giving them responsibility beyond their expertise. In his wisdom, the King of Spain decided to make the Seventh Duke of Medina Sidonia the leader of the expedition to conquer England and overthrow Queen Elizabeth I on the basis of his noble rank and reputation as a conscientious administrator. It was a disastrous choice, and Medina Sidonia, at least, had the good sense to recognise that a different person should be chosen. He admitted he had no experience of seafaring or of war; he possessed “neither the talents nor the strength necessary”; he had “no knowledge of the Armada or the persons taking part in it”; and, to round it off, travelling by sea made him sick. The king ignored these complaints, insisting that since God had ordained the result it did not matter who was in charge.
Popular movies and conventional wisdom would have us believe that the Spanish Armada was defeated by a combination of swashbuckling privateers and an inspirational speech by Elizabeth. But the reality was that only six of the great ships were destroyed in battle, leaving roughly 120 ships and close to 30,000 soldiers to return home. After defeat in the naval battle of Gravelines, off the coast of Flanders, the Spanish fleet attempted to return home by going around the coast of Ireland. The cliffs were easily avoided but the Spanish ships were wrecked by a combination of bad weather at sea and bad fortune onshore.
For example, La Trinidad Valencerasought refuge at Kinnagoe Bay in Co Donegal. A party of Spanish soldiers landed under Don Alonso de Luzon, and appealed to the local Irish chieftain, Sir John O'Doherty, for protection. But the locals seized the opportunity to plunder the ship. It was believed the Spanish fleet carried gold, and many were interested in getting their hands on it. At Illagh Castle, the Spanish were stripped and forced to sleep outdoors, and the next day the officers were led away while the rest were taken out to be killed. The officers were marched to Dublin, but few survived and only two made it safely to London to be repatriated.
This treatment soon became official policy. The Lord Deputy, William Fitzwilliam, sent instructions that it was the duty of loyalists “to apprehend and execute all Spaniards found”. Likewise, Sir Richard Bingham, the governor of Connaught, issued a proclamation declaring that anyone who sheltered survivors was guilty of treason and liable to be executed. As a result many Spanish soldiers were massacred, while their ships were destroyed by a freak hurricane.
In total, 24 ships were lost in Ireland and about 5,000 men were killed. As the author suggests on the dust-jacket: “the English navy inflicted a narrow defeat on the Armada, but it was the Irish coast that encompassed its downfall”.
On December 26th, 1796, reflecting on the failure to land a French invasion force at Bantry Bay, Theobald Wolfe Tone noted “England has not had such an escape since the Spanish Armada.” Bad weather, incompetent seamanship, and bad luck had thwarted his gamble. If Tone had been able to read this engrossing study, he might have recalculated the odds and taken a punt on something else.
Patrick M Geoghegan teaches history at Trinity College Dublin and is the presenter of
Talking History
on Newstalk
