IN RECENT days, some commentators have alleged, with the benefits of hindsight, that mistakes have been made in the handling of the peace process. I reject this. The Taoiseach has taken risks for peace and I believe he is absolutely right to do so.
The media critics of the Taoiseach make three basic claims.
1. The Taoiseach was wrong last March to ask the IRA to start decommissioning its arms.
The Taoiseach did indeed support substantive movement on the decommissioning issue last March. He did not prescribe the precise terms of such movement but stressed that it should be a confidence building measure.
Are commentators suggesting that the head of the Irish Government, when asked about illegal arms, should not have dared suggest that there should be some movement on decommissioning? It is hardly credible that they should be so intellectually paralysed by the IRA agenda that they would suggest that this was error of judgment.
The ceasefire was, as promised, to hold in all circumstances. So what was the need for weapons? Movement on that issue would have meant that all party talks would now be well under way.
While the Taoiseach did not pursue this once it was refused last March by the IRA, he had a right and an obligation, as leader of this democratic state, to seek movement on decommissioning at the time. Not to have done so would have left's the Government open to the charge that it condoned the holding of arms as a political bargaining counter.
Commentators should reflect on the impact on loyalist opinion of an Irish government adopting such a position.
2. That it was wrong to be open to consideration of the unionist elections suggestion when it was put forward first.
At a time when all sides were vigorously pursuing real dialogue, it was important that the Government display an open minded approach.
If the Taoiseach had rejected the unionist suggestion of elections out of hand, he would have confirmed the unionist stereotype of the South as always being against them no matter what they did. To have followed the policy of either ignoring or automatically rejecting unionist views would have been a reversion to an approach from Dublin that was tried, and failed, over 150 years in dealing with unionists.
The Taoiseach's approach was consistently fair minded. The election idea could be considered during talks between the governments and parties any such proposal would have to be acceptable to all sides, and it would have to be firmly anchored in an approach which involved North/South arrangements, and London and Dublin, i.e. the "three stranded" approach.
3. The third criticism is that, in some way, the Government should have stopped John Major suggesting elections as the sole alternative to a decommissioning gesture in his House of Commons response to the Mitchell report.
THIS criticism is even more unreal. The Taoiseach took the precaution of asking for a copy of the British response to the Mitchell report but did not get it until minutes before he went into the Dail for questions leaving no time for serious consideration and Irish Government input.
The Taoiseach had made it clear to the Prime Minister the previous evening that an election could only flow from all party talks and he had obtained an undertaking that the Northern Secretary would go through the British response before it was given in the Commons. This was to allow for detailed Irish political inputs based on the text. This was never done and the Taoiseach's views on that are a matter of record.
It is important for commentators, in seriously analysing these events, to take into account the voting situation in the House of Commons when apportioning blame for British government actions. The situation has materially changed since 1993/94. (The Irish Government can do little to influence the present voting situation there.
The Taoiseach made it clear he disagreed with the approach taken by the Prime Minister in the Commons to the Mitchell report. He had warned Mr Major of the risks of such an approach. He subsequently explained those risks eloquently and fully to British public opinion in a series of interviews.
All of the above three charges are mistaken. The critics all have had one theme in common. They are, consciously or unconsciously, following a largely Sinn Fein agenda. They feel the Taoiseach should have been more sympathetic to the Sinn Fein viewpoint. Given that Sinn Fein is associated with the IRA, such an approach by a Taoiseach would have associated the State more closely than is prudent with the cause of an illegal organisation, which retains the right to kill for political objectives.
The Government indeed, any democratic government must keep its distance from any organisation that still retains the violent option. This is the approach that the Taoiseach is following. It is the safest course to follow from the point of view of the security of our own citizens.
