On October 25th, David Trimble will face his annual party conference and will have a considerable task reassuring the party base about his strategy: criticism will be inevitable. The speed of events in recent months has been unsettling for many ordinary unionists. For most of them, the embrace of sincerity thrown around the republican movement by both governments is deeply traumatising, especially those with a security background and those who have lost loved ones or been injured in the course of the Troubles. More deeply, there is tangible unease about the future of relations between Northern Ireland and the Republic.
The UUP conference in Ballymena in 1996 seems a distant memory. The most quoted line from David Trimble's address was: "There is no compromise between unionism and nationalism". For many it was a hurtful truth. However, it is questionable that the basic thrust of the Ulster Unionist approach to North-South relations is totally incompatible with Sean Lemass's declaration in 1959 that, "quite apart from any views one may hold about the eventual reunification of Ireland, is it not common sense that the two existing communities in our small island should seek every opportunity of working together in practical matters for their mutual and common good".
The unionist approach to Strand Two will be guided by the "three Rs" recognition, respect and reciprocation. Naturally, Articles 2 and 3 of Bunreacht na hEireann remain the largest obstacle to co-operative relations. Unfortunately, Fianna Fail has not taken the bold step of drafting a new version of these Articles to remove the territorial and jurisdictional claims over Northern Ireland. Such claims are intolerable in the sight of unionism and militate against the new more broadly-based agreement to replace the 1985 Diktat and its opaque machinery which both governments are supposedly committed to. At the same time, insufficient attention has been paid to other arcane sections of the 1937 Constitution which act as a barrier to goodwill. The preamble is a model of bad history and clericalism, and serves no useful purpose. Articles 1 and 9.2, dealing with "the nation", are similarly confrontational.
BERTIE Ahern has said: "Irredentism is dead." He must now proceed to make the necessary constitutional changes, preferably immediately, but if not, concurrently with a referendum in Northern Ireland on a new settlement which, if it is to pass, will have to be seen to be a true settlement and not a staging post to some uncertain constitutional future.
There is a fundamental onus upon the Irish Government to make clear its intentions with regard to Northern Ireland policy. If it seeks a settlement sufficient to make nationalists comfortable within the United Kingdom so long as that constitutional arrangement has the support of the greater number in Northern Ireland, it should say so unambiguously. If policy is, on the contrary, to create a mechanism to a different destiny, this process will come to an abrupt halt. Policy currently is clouded with obscurity, notwithstanding Ray Burke's and David Andrews' realistic comments on Irish unity.
Respect and recognition are closely linked concepts. It appears incongruous that the politicians of a state which revels in its self-image as not only increasingly prosperous but modern, confident and outgoing, still refuses linguistically to respect Northern Ireland's name and, thereby, its status. If the SDLP leader can refrain from obscure references to "the North" and "the Six Counties", cannot the Taoiseach reissue Lemass's direction to ministers on the subject insisting on the proper title of "Northern Ireland".
It is a matter of regret that the Irish Government did not apply itself over the summer to confidencebuilding measures aimed at the unionist community. John Bruton devoted much time to the subject of symbolic moves which, while uncostly in political and financial terms, served to reassure unionists about his government's objectives. The restoration of Islandbridge is an earlier example but much symbolic work could be done with relation to Williamite battle sites, for example.
The Republic's pluralism must demonstrate that it can withstand the culture of its northern neighbours. Is it not time that schoolchildren in the Republic are actually educated about the unionist minority on the island? It has not gone unnoticed either that Lord Carson's home at 4 Harcourt Street continues to deteriorate.
One of Sir James Craig's motivations in meeting Michael Collins was to secure the position of unionists caught on the southern side of the Border. It is a depressing indictment that Northern unionists in 1997 are still not reassured on this point. The reconstituted Forum for Peace and Reconciliation must open itself to a submission from this community and the Taoiseach must make himself available to hear the particular concerns of the elected representatives of Protestants in Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan about the lack of equitable treatment in the provision of public services.
IT WAS the received wisdom in the Haughey era that apparent concessions to unionism were pointless since they were not met with more openness to Irish unity. This shibboleth must be ditched in the postHaughey era for such measures are essential if an atmosphere of partnership and reconciliation is to prevail. In that vein, unionists question the Republic's urging of a new inquiry into Bloody Sunday without any reciprocal willingness to set up a tribunal looking into the events of 1969-70.
It would be a mistake, however, to deride all of Charlie Haughey's legacies. The 1965 Free Trade Agreement and the Anglo-Irish Inter governmental Council are both positive testaments to the importance of a good understanding between the United Kingdom and the Republic and serve as a reminder that the two states have a particular relationship, acknowledged in the Republic of Ireland Act of 1949. It follows that unionists will argue at the talks for agreed structures embracing these islands, believing them to be the natural unit for co-operation. Already, at the EU level, the United Kingdom and the Republic have considerable common interests.
While unionists will critically examine measures along the Border aimed at minimising any economic or social dysfunction which results from partition, nationalists continue to insist that a Strand Two structure involves an all-Ireland body or bodies with executive and harmonising functions in wide-ranging policy areas. Unionists cannot accept this although they can seriously consider co-operation based on genuine mutual benefit and democratic accountability to representative institutions in Northern Ireland. Those such as Mo Mowlam and the SDLP who talk of investment, with all its repercussions for taxation, coming within such a remit are clearly insufficiently familiar with stated government policy, while even limited cross-Borderism has been dealt a blow by the inept handling of Tourism Brand Ireland.
Unionists are anxious to have established the principles which will guide any Strand Two discussions. They will not be holding up matters by discussion of the Republic rejoining the UK, even though that outcome has more support in Ireland as a whole than the Sinn Fein position that Northern Ireland should be incorporated in the Republic against the clearly stated wishes of the people of Northern Ireland.
As Albert Reynolds said in 1994 in defence of the so-called unionist veto, "it would be tragic if the peace process were to be blocked because of basic misunderstandings about how self-determination operates in international law and international politics, and because something unattainable was being sought that was not consistent with international law". Meanwhile, the off-stage voices are getting louder.
