The terrible irony of the North's deepening political impasse is that the agreement intended to take the gun out of Irish politics is now being prevented by the gun from achieving that objective.

Decommissioning, the process by which arms would be put beyond use, instead of being the servant of the agreement has become, if not its master, then at least its jailer. Political progress has been arrested because of preoccupations with decommissioning and because paramilitaries have been reluctant to support the agreement fully in the manner expected.

Given several failures to achieve progress on decommissioning, a successful resolution of the present impasse clearly faces considerable difficulties. While progress has been slow in implementing some other aspects of the agreement, until the institutions were suspended nothing had been lost. Suspension of the political institutions has seen the first loss in the implementation process, and a very significant loss at that. To the deep sense of demoralisation now felt within the North's communities is added considerable bitterness that it was ever allowed to happen.

Consequently, a resolution of the impasse is unlikely to be achieved without a more comprehensive and explicit understanding on the future manner and timetabling of the agreement's implementation. In other words, while decommissioning remains a key issue, it is unlikely that a resolution will be found without clear understandings on reform of the police and of the criminal justice system, and on how any crisis affecting the political institutions should be dealt with.

On decommissioning, clarity is the first requirement, not just on whether it will happen but, more fundamentally, on its central objective which has been all but ignored. With regard to that objective, is it not the case that however decommissioning is described, e.g., as "putting weapons beyond use" or as "taking the gun out of Irish politics", what is really meant is removing the threat which the possession of weapons is seen to pose to our communities?

If removing this threat is the central objective, is it not the case that what happens to the arms is essentially an important consequence, not a primary objective?

Also, if removing that threat is the primary objective, then in the context of the Belfast Agreement, does this not require clear indications that political violence is finally over, done with and gone forever?

Is it not also the case that for an end to political violence to be comprehensively declared, that fully operational, inclusive political institutions need to be in place together with progress on all of the other confidence-building measures prescribed by the agreement?

If this is what is really meant by decommissioning, it can only be achieved within a political context that demonstrates the primacy of democratic institutions and their capacity to deal with our problems. No other context has this potential. No other context will suffice. That is why re-establishing these institutions is a priority.

BUT restoring these institutions also requires parallel commitments that the threat perceived to persist in the possession of arms is being removed. Paramilitaries need, therefore, to clarify that political violence is a thing of the past. Secondly, they need to make clear that they will co-operate with the International Commission under Gen de Chastelain in order to maximise confidence.

Practically, therefore, decommissioning could be addressed through a number of steps. To begin with, positive declarations by the paramilitaries that they have ended their "wars" and that they truly want to see the Belfast Agreement fully implemented should be made.

Previous statements from both loyalist and republican paramilitaries have come quite close to making these points. But they have tended to be negatively rather than positively phrased, stating that there is no threat rather than removing it, stating they will not make the first strike. Stated positively, such declarations would have considerable impact and would maximise public confidence that the fundamental objective of decommissioning was being achieved. Backed up by commitments to put weapons beyond use in ways designed to strengthen that confidence, the conviction would quickly grow that a new era of peace and democracy was being entered.

THEREAFTER, the whole process should be left to Gen de Chastelain and his colleagues in the international commission to deal with in the manner set down by the Belfast Agreement and in accordance with practical arrangements made in that context.

Any need for timetable changes or other adjustments should also be left for assessment by the commission.

Alongside such developments further progress on demilitarisation and on the normalisation of security arrangements should be timetabled. If the "wars" are over the need to maintain army installations and to conduct army patrols, etc no longer has any justification.

Such progress would strengthen confidence that a truly peaceful and democratic context was being advanced throughout Northern Ireland.

The re-establishment of the political institutions should be accompanied by firm guarantees that they would be fully maintained and that any crisis affecting these institutions would be jointly addressed by all pro-agreement parties and both governments.

Precipitate action such as unilateral suspension must be ruled out.

A great deal is at stake, and given the pressures which exist in politics and on the streets in the North, the window of opportunity for breaking the impasse is unlikely to last much beyond Easter. In this period, there is a need for a very determined approach not just by both governments, but by all seven pro-agreement parties as well.

All are custodians of the agreement on behalf of the people of Ireland, North and South, whose will must, ultimately, be respected.

Sean Farren is a member of the suspended Northern Ireland assembly for the SDLP