Ruairi Quinn makes no secret of his moderation or his ambition. Within hours of facing an election for the leadership of the Labour Party, he went on RTE to excoriate Charlie McCreevy for indulging in creative accounting on the Government Estimates and for breaching spending targets. Then he proceeded to win the leadership race by 10 votes.

It spoke volumes about the changes that have taken place within the party over the past 10 years. The days when Labour could be dismissed as a feckless "tax and spend" party were over. Responsibility, prudence and social justice were the new catch-cries and Ruairi Quinn was the non-threatening, avuncular figure who would appeal to the widest possible audience.

Political power was the name of the game and the new party leader and his followers made no bones about it. Opposition was for wimps. Labour's task was to win the greatest possible number of seats in the next Dail and then enter government to implement its policies.

Mr Quinn had no hang-up on doing business with either Fianna Fail or Fine Gael. What mattered was the acceptance of Labour values and the solving of social problems.

It was an utterly pragmatic approach, far removed from the emotional intensity and the impassioned left/right ideological disputes of the 1970s and 1980s.

The new leader took time out to reassure his followers about the extent of his political opportunism. He would not, he said, recommend forming a government with Fianna Fail, if the present Coalition collapsed. A general election would be required to give Labour a fresh mandate.

Mr Quinn went so far as to borrow the British expression, "New Labour", when talking about the future of his party. And while there were lessons to be learned from sister parties in France and Spain, any policy decisions would be based on Irish experience and on a vision of Ireland's potential.

Vision, organisation and leadership were the themes on which Ruairi Quinn fought, and comfortably won, the leadership. An electorate of 64, drawn from the parliamentary party and the general council, voted by 37 to 27 in his favour.

In his canvass of voters, he had promised a campaigning party, with a strong passionate voice and a sense of outrage, denouncing social injustice and demanding change. New policies and the application of party values and ideas in changing circumstances would chart the way. As for the organisation, it was old, tired and in need of transformation. A campaigning organisation, which confronted the complacency of the Celtic Tiger and addressed serious social problems, was imperative.

As leader, he would become the voice of New Labour, able to mobilise and re-enthuse supporters, while reaching out and engaging the wider electorate. It was a non-threatening pitch and it worked. Apart from his considerable experience in government, Mr Quinn promised a safe pair of hands. Taken in tandem with his "face on the posters" campaign, in which he argued the benefits of a familiar, local face if ground was to be recovered in Dublin, it was the clincher.

His experience and interest in Northern Ireland affairs hardly rated a mention during the campaign. But Mr Quinn has been a delegate to SDLP conferences for the past 20 years and he is well-placed to succeed Mr Spring as a thoughtful and passionate advocate of an agreed settlement.

Elements of an urban/rural divide emerged during the campaign, with Dublin TDs supporting Mr Quinn en bloc. But it would be wrong to conclude his support is limited to the capital. Both the parliamentary party and the general council have a majority of rural members, but Mr Quinn won handsomely.

The role of political advisers and programme managers never became a public issue. But the fact that Mr Quinn appeared the least encumbered of the two men in that regard almost certainly cost Brendan Howlin votes. Elected representatives didn't want anyone to get between them and the new leader.

The Dublin factor was crucial. Having lost eight seats there in the general election, party activists were determined to build on the five seats they now hold. And time wasn't on their side. The minority Fianna Fail/Progres sive Democrats Government was quite unstable and it might last for four months or for four years.

There was a huge amount of work to be done. Mr Quinn had facilitated the party's 1992 breakthrough in Dublin by his planning and reorganisation in advance of the 1991 local elections. Many of the councillors elected on that occasion won Dail seats the following year. It was a question of repeating the medicine.

Local elections are scheduled for next year and Labour planners hope the exercise will breathe life and vitality into the organisation in Dublin.

Before then, two by-elections will test both the mettle of the Coalition and the leadership of Mr Quinn. In Dublin North, the resignation of Ray Burke has created an opportunity for Sean Ryan, a former Labour Party TD, to recover his seat. In Limerick East, the death of Jim Kemmy has created a vacancy which may eventually benefit Fianna Fail.

By-election writs are expected to be moved early in 1998. The immediate election of Brendan Howlin as deputy leader, on the nomination of Dick Spring, displayed a cavalier attitude towards the party's rules, which provide for due process. But the initiative certainly created a powerful impression of party unity which Mr Howlin immediately underlined by pledging support for Mr Quinn.

In the circumstances, it was probably the best result for the party: Mr Quinn's experience, ability and urban appeal as leader, combined with Mr Howlin's unslaked ambition and a desire to prove himself in terms of party rejuvenation.