THE 30lb Semtex device which partially detonated at London's Hammersmith

Bridge a potential media "spectacular" for the 80th anniversary of 1916 bore chilling testimony to the determination of republicans to plumb the historical depths of their fundamentalist ideology and to abjure political negotiations except on their own terms. The bomb, part of the renewed IRA campaign, thankfully, did not achieve its intended dramatic effect. But it surely shook the increasingly tenuous strategy of the two governments that "all party talks", beginning on June 10th, will result in a "comprehensive political accommodation.

Look at the omens. The last two rounds of inter party talks could not even reach heads of agreement. And the prospective line up on June 10th looks remarkably similar (bar the presence of the minor loyalist parties) to those previous talks as both Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party now choose to exclude themselves. Yet agreement would be even harder to reach if they both fulfilled the requirements of attendance.

As for the unionist leadership, it could not even bring itself to attend the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation, despite the forum's non threatening character. And SF could not even agree with the other forum parties in the absence of unreasoning unionism.

Moreover, in the talks about talks in March, the parties were unable to agree even on the procedural matters of elections, a Northern forum and negotiations life and death having been left for later. And even though an assembly with legislative and executive powers was at the heart of the British section of last year's framework documents, every enticement to recalcitrant nationalists to join the forum has been on the premise that it will be none of those things.

So, after all the recent upheavals, we have a "peace process" that has ended up in a very familiar "talks process".

The new strategy has shown just the same frankly sectarian acceptance of Northern political polarisation as that which it replaced. Indeed, in the embrace of a euphemistic "nationalist consensus", the new approach was even less squeamish about it. And far from challenging the absurd length to which deference to adversarial Northern politicians had been allowed to go, in the new order that deference was also extended to paramilitary leaders.

Thus, not only has the centre not held the cross sectarian consensus" but there has been precious little effort to build one. Not only have sectarian politicians and paramilitaries not come to behave more responsibly but their unbending ideologies have been so indulged that they have had absolutely no incentive to do other than repeat their traditional mantras.

Conversely, what both the "talks" and "peace" processes failed to do was to capitalise on the critical mass among the live, social forces in modern Ireland in favour of a political settlement. Just look at the scale of the rallies across the country after the ending of the IRA ceasefire calling for peace and dialogue.

Yet it can be guaranteed that the elections on May 30th will not give vent to these aspirations. Far from the people being offered the rational choices that a carefully crafted referendum (or, indeed, a preferendum) might excite, the usual closed, partisan agendas will be paraded before a passive citizenry and, doubtless, will get the usual grudging endorsements.

Far from the two governments being thus mandated for a modernising approach, the parties will emerge secure in their own certitudes, offering up their "mandates".

A referendum or preferendum before talks, offering broad choices on what kind of Northern Ireland people want could immensely add to the power of the two governments and the international community. They could ensure that they, rather than each political leader armed with his or her veto, force the pace towards a settlement.

By contrast, the traditional approach of envisaging a referendum after a deal could entail a long wait.

It is, fundamentally, a matter of what kind of Northern Ireland people want because there can now surely be no doubt that something called Northern Ireland will continue to exist.

If it is to be run democratically it will require institutions which conform to liberal democratic norms and which allow expression of cultural diversity.

It will, thus, require an electoral system which encourages accommodation. The system bizarrely put together for May 30th, thankfully, won't be repeated. But a key goal of politics in the North, if it is ever to have its apron strings loosened from London and Dublin, has to be that the electoral system favours sustained cross sectarian coalition a building reconciliation rather than entrenched oppositionalism.

It is disturbing that no thought has been given to that or to how equally necessary party realignments might be favoured in either government.

Any instinctive Northern pessimist realist? hopes his or her fears will not be realised on June 10th and in succeeding weeks. But the conflicts already building up around the "marching season" not only threaten a cacophony of noises but also represent a microcosm of a problem conceived as a zero sum game.

What is at issue, as a recent report from Democratic Dialogue details, is the reconstitution of Northern politics. It is about establishing a clear and compelling goal a multi cultural, multi religious, multi ethnic Northern Ireland and setting out a feasible strategy for getting there.