PROFILE MUSTAFA ABDUL JALIL: His failure to account for the killing of his military commander is undermining the authority of Libya's probable new leader just as he is on the brink of victory, writes
CHRIS STEPHENin Misrata
TWO TELEVISION moments encapsulate the short political career of Libya’s rebel leader Mustafa Abdul Jalil, who, with Col Muammar Gadafy’s regime seemingly on the ropes, may be catapulted to power within days – although the situation is volatile and the outcome is far from clear. The first moment made him; the second may yet break him.
The first moment unfolded one January evening last year when he made a live broadcast to the nation. Back then, Jalil, known as a critic of the Gadafy regime, had the post of justice minister, an appointment Gadafy hoped would show the outside world that he was serious about promises of reform. But instead of using the live broadcast to toast his leader, Jalil helped bury him.
He told the Libyan people that Gadafy’s reforms were a sham, that political prisoners were still not free and that, as a result, he was resigning. Libyan rebels still talk of that moment when they stared in disbelief at their TV screens. In a country where everything was tightly controlled here was a man who dared to defy and humiliate its leader in public.
That one speech carved Jalil a place in the hearts of Libya’s rebels, making him an inevitable choice as chairman of the National Transitional Council (NTC) when it was formed by rebels in Benghazi’s courthouse in February.
But it is a second totemic TV moment that may come back to haunt him: the one, three weeks ago, when Jalil broke the news that Abdul Fatah Younes, commander of the rebel armed forces, had been murdered in Benghazi.
In a rambling, incoherent statement, Jalil gave few details of the killing beyond hinting that it was probably the work of Gadafy agents. Gone was the self-assurance of a year ago, replaced by a nervousness and an evasiveness that were capped by his refusal to answer key questions. It was an uninspiring performance for a man at the helm of a revolutionary movement, and what followed was worse.
Younes was hardly a sympathetic figure, having been Gadafy’s primary enforcer for years as his interior minister. Younes’s performance as a general after he changed sides, early in the revolution, was also unimpressive. Nevertheless the murder of so senior a figure was a shock to the NTC’s key backers, Britain, France, the US and Qatar.
In the days that followed, Jalil, never a confident communicator, simply vanished from the scene. So, too, did the NTC prime minister, Mahmoud Jibril, and its vice chairman, Abdul Hafez Ghoga, leaving the finance minister Ali Tarhouni, formerly an exile in the US, to make the shattering announcement that the authorities themselves had arrested Younes hours before his death.
Tarhouni put the blame on an obscure Islamic brigade based in Benghazi – a convenient story, according to Younes’s supporters. A day after the announcement, loyalist troops raided the brigade’s base, killing four people and spiriting the rest away. Many in Benghazi remain convinced that the NTC had a hand in Younes’s assassination, and the bickering continues.
Jalil’s political stature has been diminished by the affair, a development that was sealed when he failed to show up, along with the rest of the cabinet, for Younes’s funeral.
Earlier this month, keen to deflect blame for his failure to provide a public explanation for the murder, he sacked his entire 14-strong cabinet, blaming them for “administrative mistakes” in dealing with the assassination. As of yesterday the NTC remains without an executive, and Libyans remain without an explanation for Younes’s death.
A NATIVE of Al-Baida, east of Benghazi, one of the first towns to rise in revolt, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, who is 59, studied law and Islamic jurisprudence at university and has spent most of his career as a lawyer. He is known as a devout Muslim but not as a radical Islamist. He wears the shanna, a wine-coloured cap traditionally worn by Libyan men.
Jalil made his name as the nearest thing the totalitarian Gadafy regime permitted to an opponent, using the letter of the law to try to curb the excesses of a regime that made a habit of flouting it. As a judge he enjoyed success in freeing political prisoners, but he was careful not to incur the wrath of Gadafy while pushing for greater tolerance.
In 2007 Gadafy struck a deal with the West, which was keen to have another ally in the war on terror. Western oil companies wanted Libyan oil, and Gadafy wanted sanctions lifted so that he could import their expertise. Part of the price was a promise that Libya would reform. To show the world that he was serious, Gadafy made Jalil his justice minister.
Jalil’s decision in 2010 to go public with his denunciation of the regime showed courage and cemented his high reputation among Libyans. Yet he lacks experience in politics, administration or military affairs, a prerequisite, some would say, for any revolutionary leader.
Even his admirers concede that Jalil lacks charisma. His few television appearances have shown him to be a wooden, awkward and frail performer. Moreover, his six months in power have been studded with clumsy mistakes. For example, there was the issue of who exactly commanded the army, with Younes and a rival, Khalifa Heftar, each claiming leadership. For a while both men insisted that they were the boss, but Jalil preferred to leave it to the NTC to decide finally that Younes should have the job.
He dithered again when it came to choosing his cabinet in May. He was simply unable to decide who should do which job, and postponed the official announcement four times.
Then, in July, with the war apparently a stalemate, he announced that Gadafy would be allowed to live freely in Libya if he stepped down from power. This announcement caused an outcry, and Jalil made an unconvincing U-turn, insisting that he had meant to add that the offer had a deadline, one that had now expired.
Defenders of Jalil insist he faces a mountainous task, starting with the problem all revolutionaries face in filling the power vacuum left by the collapse of the regime that went before. Throw in the perils of fighting a war with an untrained militia, built from scratch, and a certain level of chaos is to be expected.
Then there is the tribal dimension. Although almost everyone in Libya is Sunni Muslim and there are no obvious sectarian divisions, tribal politics remains a powerful factor. Most rebels think that Younes’s replacement as commander in chief, Suleiman Mahmoud al-Obeidi, was appointed because he is from the same Obeidi tribe as his slain predecessor.
The failure of Jalil to impose himself has dismayed many foreign backers and has led to the irony that the rebel army has reached the brink of victory just as its political leadership becomes ever more dysfunctional.
It seems increasingly likely that Jalil will lead Libya sooner rather than later. Rebel units have almost completed an encirclement of Gadafy’s forces in Tripoli, and government forces are disintegrating under the weight of Nato bombing.
The loss of the regime’s last oil refinery, at Zawiya, robs Gadafy of the means to continue the war, and speculation is rife that he will either be toppled by a coup or be overwhelmed by rebel forces closing in from every side. All of which means that Jalil, a man who has struggled to assert his authority over Benghazi’s bickering clans, may shortly need to deal with the remnants of the Tripoli power structure too.
Curriculum vitae
Who is he?Jalil is the soft-spoken 59-year-old former Libyan justice minister who switched sides to lead the rebel National Transitional Council.
Why is he in the news?With rebel forces closing in on the capital, Tripoli, Jalil may be about to depose Col Muammar Gadafy and become Libya's new leader.
Most appealing characteristic?Integrity. Under the Gadafy regime, Jalil had a reputation for using the law to protect the innocent against the whims of the dictator.
Most unappealing characteristic?Indecisiveness. The burden of power sits uneasily on his frail shoulders, and he struggles to impose himself on Libya's bickering, faction-riven opposition.
Most likely to say"Muammar, how do you plead?"
Least likely to say "Muammar, all is forgiven."
