A tool that failed to do the job it was bought for

Analysis: Exactly a year ago the Department of Health and its junior minister Tim O'Malley were singing the praises of PPARs…

Analysis: Exactly a year ago the Department of Health and its junior minister Tim O'Malley were singing the praises of PPARs, claiming it was a key part of the reform of the health services.

PPARs was "a fundamental tool" for the health services, Mr O'Malley declared, and a key element in the planned transformation into one unified service under the HSE.

His press statement went as far as to "commend" those involved in the project, including the various consultants on the project.

Just eight months later, the secretary general of the Department of Health ordered that additional spending on the system be halted, pending a major re-evaluation of the project.

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The move was prompted following consultations with the Department of Finance computer experts, who said they had "serious concerns at the nature and cost" of services being provided by consultants on the project, Deloitte, and that it was not clear who was responsible for overseeing the system.

The saga of PPARs, now at the centre of a political row, dates back to the mid-1990s, when the chief executives of a number of health boards decided to work together to develop a common computerised payroll system.

The simple idea was to combine resources and save money and in 1998, a pilot project involving five health boards and St James's Hospital began.

It was christened PPARs - payroll, payment and related systems - with a budget of €8.8 million. Four years later there was still no PPARs in place and management consultants Hay were asked by the health board chief executives to identify the problems.

They found that the job was much more complicated than first envisaged and that payment rates and terms and conditions of various staff varied widely between health boards.

It recommended, however, that the project should proceed, but that if it was to be rolled out to all health boards and hospitals, it would cost an additional €90 million on top of the €17 million spent to date.

The money, it was claimed, would provide much more than a computer payroll system. It would be an entire system to manage the work and payment of more than 100,000 staff in the health services. It would also provide details of exactly how many people were employed in the health services, how much they were paid, and what their terms and conditions were.

The Department of Health agreed, and in 2002 an extra €100 million was allotted to the project. Responsibility was given to the North Western Health Board to implement it, with Deloitte consultants the main outside body charged with implementing the system.

By early 2004, the system had yet to be operational in any health board or hospital, despite rising expenditure on the scheme.The Department of Health sought a further report from international consultants Gartner, which provided a reassurance that costs were in line with similar projects.

Serious problems were emerging with the project, however. Essentially, it was discovered that each health board and hospital had various ways of doing things, from pay rates for staff to contracted hours, more than 2,500 differences in total.

IBM consultants were brought in to examine it. In September 2004 they returned a damning report, stating that there effectively was no central control or management of the system.

Put simply, they found there was no one in charge, an issue that was raised as late as June by the Department of Finance.