The Supreme Court yesterday rejected an application to halt a trial next month of a man charged with the murder of journalist Veronica Guerin.
Mr Paul Ward (32), of Windmill Road, Crumlin, Dublin, is due before the non-jury Special Criminal Court on January 13th, charged with murdering Ms Guerin at Naas Road, Clondalkin, on June 26th last year.
In July, the High Court refused Mr Ward's application for permission to review judicially the DPP's decision to try him in the Special Criminal Court. He appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, which yesterday upheld the High Court order.
Mr Ward had sought leave to challenge the issuing by the DPP of a certificate under Section 47 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 to prosecute him before the Special Criminal Court.
In his judgment yesterday, Mr Justice Lynch said it had been conceded by Mr Ward that most of the grounds upon which he relied had already been decided against him by the Supreme Court in the case of Joseph Kavanagh, Benbulben Road, Crumlin, who is serving a 12-year sentence on offences connected with the kidnapping of the banker, Mr Jim Lacey.
Kavanagh had also contested the holding of his trial before the Special Criminal Court. The Supreme Court ruled against him and Kavanagh has initiated proceedings before the UN Human Rights Committee challenging the jurisdiction of the Special Criminal Court.
Mr Justice Lynch said Mr Ward had stated other grounds of appeal which had not been presented in the Kavanagh case.
Mr Ward had contended that the DPP acted in bad faith in issuing the certificate to try him before the Special Criminal Court. He also argued that there was no factual basis for the DPP's opinion that the ordinary courts were inadequate, in Mr Ward's case, to secure the effective administration of justice.
Mr Ward further claimed the DPP had, in issuing the certificate, acted in a quasi-judicial capacity, in breach of basic fairness of procedure and in breach of the principles of natural and constitutional justice because Mr Ward was given no opportunity to make submissions.
The DPP was also obliged to disclose his reasons for choosing to bring Mr Ward to trial before the Special Criminal Court and the certificate was invalid because of the failure to do so, it was submitted.
Mr Ward claimed that, as the DPP was a party to the prosecution, the DPP might be presumed to be biased in respect of matters relating to that prosecution.
It was claimed the DPP's certificate, and the legislation under which it was issued, deprived Mr Ward of the normal right of a citizen charged with serious offences to be tried by a jury and to avail of the procedure for a preliminary examination.
Mr Ward contended that the decision to prosecute him before the Special Criminal Court had been brought about in such a way that Mr Ward had not been informed of the factual basis for the decision and had been deprived of the normal rights of a citizen.
Mr Justice Lynch said the law on whether the courts could review decisions of the DPP concerning the maintenance or non-maintenance of prosecutions has been well settled. He said the Supreme Court had held that such decisions were reviewable only to a limited extent and, in the Kavanagh case, the High Court had held that the DPP's certificate was not reviewable in the absence of evidence of bad faith on the part of the DPP or evidence that he was influenced by an improper motive or improper policy.
Mr Justice Lynch said the High Court's decision was a correct statement of the law. There was also no evidence of bad faith or bias on the DPP's part.
He also rejected the claim that the DPP was acting in a quasijudicial capacity in issuing, under the 1939 Act, a certificate to prosecute Mr Ward before the Special Criminal Court.
The DPP was an officer of State, declared by the law creating his office to be independent in the performance of his duties. He must, therefore, be taken to be acting in a proper manner and with proper motives. The onus of proving the contrary rested on the person asserting the contrary.
He rejected all the grounds of appeal.