THE bombs in Thiepval Barracks were like a double exclamation mark standing alone without words. For those who planned and executed the attack, the simultaneous addition of words would be regarded as superfluous and even distracting. The message was in the medium.
It was a grim message indeed, and it will have been well taken if publicly unacknowledged by those to whom it was primarily directed the spin doctors of British policy on Ireland.
The bluff and the bluster, the recriminations, appeals to reason and reassert ions of resolve, will continue to emanate from Sinn Fein, Sir Patrick Mayhew, unionist and nationalist politicians and everyone else who can command media time and space.
But the IRA pending their belated acceptance of responsibility last night had simply and wordlessly inquired. "Are you ready to listen yet?"
We are back, it appears, to the old and deadly game of playing political poker with people's lives. It should be a familiar game to a British legal and media establishment which, for example, purveyed the notion (not yet formally abrogated) that there were no innocent victims in Derry on Bloody Sunday.
The IRA has signally reaffirmed its ability (well demonstrated over the years) to be as cold blooded as any government in discounting collateral damage in its determination to pursue political objectives.
Because we tend to forget the most disturbing and distasteful lessons of the past, it is still possible to be shocked at the breathtaking disregard for human life and suffering involved in the high stake political power game.
There could as easily have been 20 or 30 fatalities caused by the Lisburn attack. The perpetrators were plainly willing to cope with that and its immeasurable consequences for the Northern situation (never mind the humane or moral considerations it would have raised).
As it is, the consequences of this "master stroke" by republican military strategists are impossible to assess with certainty.
The unpredictability of the outcome is very much part of the purpose. It addresses directly the British government and particularly the Tory Party conference in Bournemouth this week.
It states, as plainly, bluntly and simply as could be "We have done this." Ft implies. "We can do it again." It further adds. "You cannot forecast that we will do it again or that we will not do it again. You cannot know what else we might be capable of doing. You cannot assume anything."
Most ominously, the Lisburn action displays a pragmatic one might almost say contemptuous disregard for the backlash it may trigger in the ranks of extreme loyalism and the possible consequences for the broader population, North and South.
The more intelligent echelons of loyalism will recognise well that the message was not directed at them that the IRA argument is with the British establishment. But the loyalists will also acutely note the side message that if they choose to become involved the IRA has taken account of this and is willing to cope with it.
There is thus a totally cynical and amoral IRA attitude displayed in regard to the lives and security of the nationalist (and non nationalist) Catholic population not to mention the Protestant and unionist community.
The dilemma for the loyalist leadership is that a return to violence by them implies (as Mr Gerry Adams remarked yesterday) the wholesale assassination of uninvolved Catholics.
Another strong possibility would be attacks in the Republic.
They will be keenly aware that in the present circumstances either option could play into the hands of their ruthless opponents. Atrocities by loyalists would not only destabilise the local situation, with unpredictable and possibly cataclysmic consequences, but would also intensify international pressure for political movement along lines which, on balance, would probably suit republicans.
Loyalist violence would swiftly divert the moral pressure of national and international public opinion from the IRA to them or at least to the imperative of political movement and genuine negotiation by the "constitutional" politicians.
The loyalist political representatives, of course, have repeatedly argued for inclusive and real talks, involving all parties and detouring the unrealistic precondition of decommissioning.
They have unequivocally asserted that they, at least, are not afraid to engage with the political representatives of republicanism under the multi-party talks umbrella although they appear unwilling to take such an initiative unilaterally, outside of that forum.
There is both conviction and convincing logic in the argument of Mr David Ervine and other loyalist spokesmen that they could "handle" any attempts at deviousness or coercion by republicans in the course of such contacts.
At first sight and according to the "false moral" principles invoked by unionists it might appear that to concede such an unconditional inclusion of Sinn Fein would be yielding to blackmail, rewarding wanton violence and submitting to negotiation under threat.
In reality, as the loyalist spokesmen recognise, it might be the sole, and most effective counter to the relentless power play of the republican movement.
In the course of genuine talks and, most importantly, provided there was total openness to public scrutiny of the conduct of the participants the IRA's bluff could be called, particularly on the crucial issue of consent.
The only effective answer to coercion, or the threat of coercion, is to expose it fully to the tribunal of public opinion, at home and abroad.
Arguably, to shirk this either through fear or contrived moral qualms is to concede the moral argument by default. It allows those who would use force the useful ploy of blaming those who refuse to face the core issues.
The alternative answer, of course, is the simplistic policy advocated by Mr David Trimble that the governments should initiate a sweeping and hard line security crackdown.
That has the advantage, from the unionist point of view, of placing the responsibility for action outside their own ranks while reserving for them the right to criticise and chivvy at will.
The reality is that this crude instrument has been tried and simply does not work. It has heightened rather than diminished the disaffection of the nationalist community it has accentuated divisions and brought more recruitment for the extreme groups on both sides.
The loyalist political leaders see this clearly. They know that the status quo of the Union, by common consent of the vast majority of people North and South, is secure against direct coercion if not, eventually, against possible majority decision.
The trouble, at this critical point, is that the loyalists may not be able to control their more headstrong followers. They may even, at the level of the Combined Loyalist Military Command, find themselves unable to tolerate the constant raising of the ante by the IRA.
It will certainly be argued, in that equally cruel conclave, that if they do not respond in kind now their bluff will be called again and yet again in the future. But if they succumb to that reasoning, the future for everybody is indeed bleak.