Mr Tony Blair has returned from his holiday in the Seychelles not a moment too soon. The tanned Prime Minister returned to storm-tossed Britain to find his Northern Secretary embattled and, more crucially, his peace strategy in jeopardy.
From Downing Street yesterday there came no hint of crisis. That meeting with Mr David Trimble, it was claimed, was arranged before Christmas, for one of the few dates available before Mr Blair's departure for Japan on Thursday. Other sources maintained it was arranged on Sunday night. In any event, we may expect further meetings with the Ulster Unionist leader hard on the heels of Mr Blair's return.
It is prudent for governments to play down talk of a crisis. Dr Mo Mowlam is clearly right when she asserts that to abandon hope of a permanent peace and inclusive settlement is to damn the people of Northern Ireland to a self-fulfilling nightmare.
But the crisis of confidence in the unionist community has assumed massive proportions and is now directly threatening Mr Trimble's position - and thus the whole talks process.
The temptation in London and Dublin may be to see Mr Trimble's "crisis" as a tactical manoeuvre; the posturing of the loyalist parties an attempt to increase their own, and Mr Trimble's, leverage in the negotiation process.
There is irritation at what is considered an exaggerated unionist and loyalist response to very limited British "concessions" to republicans on prisoner issues (if, also, some irritation with Dublin for moving the issue of early prisoner releases up the agenda so far ahead of an agreed settlement).
The loyalist parties directly contradict unionist charges about Dr Mowlam's conduct of affairs at the Maze Prison, insisting that it was Sir Patrick Mayhew who sanctioned further changes in the regime just two days before last May's general election.
Even as they demand her head (a demand which most commentators here agree is enough in itself to ensure her survival), unionist politicians have shown no evidence that Dr Mowlam is acting at variance with the wishes of the Prime Minister.
And as a matter of simple logic, she cannot get her head around the idea that political parties might withdraw from the talks in response to murders carried out by the INLA and the Loyalist Volunteer Force.
But perception, as Mr John Hume never tires of telling us, can be as important as reality. And the loyalist politicians still most committed to the process say the perception on the street corners is that the confidence-building business is proving a one-way street.
There may be more than a touch of chauvinism about their attitude to Dr Mowlam, and undue attention to her "touchy, feely" style, but unionists now insist Dr Mowlam's authority has been dented.
It isn't just that she smiles when describing serious developments (in marked contrast to an earlier Labour Secretary of State, Mr Roy Mason). There is deep suspicion that her recently-announced reforms of the RUC (although heavily discounted by republicans) may betoken a longer-term agenda focused on self-regulatory, community-style policing.
And unionists say they have no sense that, at times of crisis, she instinctively sides with the RUC and the British army. There is no evidence to suggest that Dr Mowlam is less supportive of the security forces than any of her predecessors. But against that, unionists fear that the RUC might eventually be sacrificed as part of an overall settlement.
Despite her best efforts, Dr Mowlam has not convinced leading unionists that she is firm on the principle of consent. This, in truth, has less to do with her than with their assessment of the republican movement.
For, in their hearts, the unionists cannot believe that the IRA will accept any settlement governed by that principle - and they fear that securing the agreement of the republicans is ultimately what drives British policy.
This - and not developments in the Maze or Dr Mowlam's "failure" to adequately consult the loyalist parties - is the essential context in which we should view the Christmas traumas. It was a context spelt out well before the holiday when four Ulster Unionist MPs advised Mr Trimble that they were opposed to his continued involvement in the talks process.
It has been fashionable, if foolish, to dismiss the Rev Ian Paisley and Mr Robert McCartney because they are not in the process. But Mr Trimble's colleagues handed the DUP and UK Unionist leaders an ace card - enabling them to say that a majority of the North's pro-Union MPs are against the process.
In addition to the four declared, two other UUP MPs are considered likely to jump ship at the right moment. Moreover, Mr Jeffrey Donaldson appears to have positioned himself between both camps, and Mr Ken Maginnis clearly considers a direct engagement with Sinn Fein would be one step too far for Mr Trimble.
Add to this Sunday's vote by the UDA prisoners, and the uncertainty about the Progressive Unionists, and Mr Trimble suddenly appears likely to be able to deliver less at precisely the point when the process demands more.
There is no good London and Dublin lamenting that Mr Trimble is author of some of his own misfortunes; that unionism is feeling the lack of a settled sense of his policy and objectives; or that his constituency has been better prepared for a game of blame avoidance than of constructive engagement. He is the only unionist leader the two governments have to deal with.
And his position may now be bolstered only by an urgent definition of the deal London and Dublin wish to see in place. The intention had been to do so over the coming five months of intensive negotiation. But Mr Blair and Mr Ahern would be well advised to revise that timetable.
If unionism is to be persuaded to accept the pain of modernisation, change and accommodation, it must also be persuaded that it has much to gain.
It is in that context that it may fall to the Prime Minister and Taoiseach to be the persuaders.