IRAQ:The strike at the geographic and political heart of the Green Zone showed that no one is safe in Baghdad, writes Michael Jansen
The bombings of the Iraqi parliament building in the fortified Green Zone and of one of the capital's nine bridges are regarded by many Iraqis as dramatic proof that the pacification campaign in the city is not working.
Two members of parliament, Muhammad Awad of the National Dialogue Front, and Asif Hussein Muhammad of the Islamic Union of Kurdistan, were killed and 23 people were wounded by a suicide bomber in the canteen near the debating chamber, and a large segment of al-Sarafiya bridge plunged into the Tigris when a lorry exploded at the centre of the structure.
The first attack demonstrated that 80,000 US and Iraqi troops cannot even guarantee the integrity of the walled zone containing government offices, parliament, and the US and British embassies.
While Iraqis were shocked by the strike, few have much sympathy for deputies who are seen as being more interested in securing privileges than solving Iraq's problems.
The strike at the geographic and political heart of the zone showed that no one can be safe in Baghdad.
The second attack was a heavy blow to Iraqi spirits. The choice of target demonstrates that not even a national monument is sacred. A handsome iron structure carrying both cars and trains opened by the British in the 1950s, al-Sarafiya bridge was a unifier of the capital.
It enabled inhabitants of Waziriya to cross to the Ataifiya district without descending to the river bank to book passage in one of coracles that ferried people from one side to the other.
The absence of al-Sarafiya means that Baghdad citizens who normally use this bridge will now have to recalculate their movements to avoid dangerous districts. The destruction of other bridges could divide Baghdad into a Sunni west and Shia east and destroy any chance of Iraq remaining one country.
The main objectives of the pacification effort, or "surge", launched in Baghdad in mid-February, were to halt sectarian violence and operations mounted by foreign fighters and Iraqi insurgents on US and Iraqi forces.
While security has improved in some districts, Iraqis have no assurance that this will continue. Although the level of sectarian kidnappings and killings has been reduced, this happened because radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr ordered his Mahdi Army militia to cease attacks on Sunnis and the Iraqi army.
In response, Sunni reprisals have fallen. But if Sadr were to tell his men to resume assaults on Sunnis, sectarian violence would soar.
Operations by foreign fighters and insurgents have risen. Casualties among US and Iraqi forces have increased. The US expectation that insurgents would pull out of the capital while boosting attacks elsewhere has not been borne out. They have done both.
Analysts say that the parliament bombing may make it more difficult for the Shia fundamentalist and Kurd dominated government of premier Nuri al-Maliki to perform the tasks set by the Bush administration.
These tasks include a halt to the de-Baathification campaign, which has driven Sunnis, secularists and non-fundamentalist Shias into the arms of the resistance, and adoption of a law for the equitable sharing of Iraq's oil revenues.
Unless these tasks are carried out, the government will not be able to close the chasms between itself and the resistance. Unless this gulf is bridged, opponents of the US presence will continue to clamour for a timetable for withdrawal.
This demand runs counter to the belief still held by a majority of Iraqis that the US must keep its forces in the country until it can end the violence and put in place a viable government representing all communities.