The post-Arafat climate in the Occupied Territories will fashion the Israeli response, writes Peter Hirschberg.
The Israeli army has long had a contingency plan for contending with the immediate aftermath of Yasser Arafat's death. Called "New Leaf," it deals with the possibility of massive street demonstrations, how to contend with grieving protesters, and the highly sensitive issue of where the Palestinian leader will be buried.
The name chosen for the day-after operation contains an element of optimism - the hope, on the Israeli side, that a pragmatic Palestinian leader, ready to curtail armed groups, will replace Mr Arafat, who is viewed as untrustworthy by most Israelis.
There are no guarantees, of course, as to how a post-Arafat era might unfold. In the worst-case scenario, Israeli officials fear a descent into internecine warfare in the Occupied Territories as a power vacuum created by the departure of the 75-year-old Mr Arafat sparks battles between armed groups. That could lead to a situation in which the West Bank is controlled by several militant organisations, without any centralised Palestinian authority, and with Palestinian moderates even becoming targets.
Mr Arafat, viewed by his own people as the most potent symbol of their national aspirations - even if criticism of him grew during the intifada uprising - was able to prevent any major confrontation between opposing Palestinian groups like his own Fatah movement and the Islamic fundamentalist Hamas.
Extended chaos in the territories could also stall Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plan to withdraw unilaterally next year from all 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and four in the northern West Bank. Even though the Israeli leader has refused to negotiate a withdrawal with the Palestinians - he has long dismissed Mr Arafat as a credible negotiating partner - there have been indirect contacts via American interlocutors and efforts by Israel to persuade the Egyptians to play a role in Gaza after a pull-out. But if no clear leader emerges after Mr Arafat, then it is highly doubtful that the Egyptians, who are already hesitant to play a role in the Strip, will agree to be sucked in. If violence worsens on the ground, it is also questionable whether Mr Sharon will be able to order a withdrawal.
The Palestinians, though, might confound the doomsday predictions. Prime Minister Ahmed Qurie and his predecessor, Mahmoud Abbas, have been playing caretaker roles ever since Mr Arafat's health deteriorated suddenly last week. Both appear to see themselves as leadership candidates once Mr Arafat is no longer around.
That was evident in comments Mr Qurie made earlier this week to foreign envoys in the West Bank: don't "embrace" us, he pleaded with them, referring to himself and Mr Abbas, and don't make statements that could provide fodder for our opponents in the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinian prime minister is said to have asked the foreign diplomats to learn from past mistakes, particularly from the term of Mr Abbas, when foreign support for him, especially during a prolonged showdown with Mr Arafat, eroded his authority.
The departure of Mr Arafat will certainly impact on US policy, especially if a Palestinian leader emerges who is ready to confront armed groups - even if not immediately - and engage Israel around the negotiating table. Through his first term, Mr Bush essentially adopted Mr Sharon's view of Mr Arafat - that he was not a viable partner and should be isolated, not embraced.
If the violence continues in Mr Arafat's aftermath, the US position is unlikely to change. But if it ceases, or even diminishes substantially, Mr Sharon may find himself subject to diplomatic pressure from Washington. Mr Bush is already unhappy with the Israeli leader's failure to live up to his pledge to dismantle dozens of illegal settlement outposts in the West Bank, and the two sides have yet to agree on a formula for the expansion of settlements.
Mr Bush is already being pressed by his main ally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, to become more actively involved in trying to unlock the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in the form of reviving the moribund road map.
The Americans will be cautious not to embrace any specific Palestinian leader - as Mr Qurie has requested - for fear he would be seen as a tainted implant, which would undermine his legitimacy among the Palestinians. So will Israel. Not that Mr Sharon was particularly generous to Mr Abbas when he was in office. In a bold declaration shortly after taking office, Mr Abbas called for an end to the "militarisation" of the intifada uprising - a declaration that made him the target of intense criticism among his own people, who demanded to know what concessions Israel was making in return.
Mr Sharon's response was miserly: he refused to make any significant concessions to the Palestinians, and when he did, as in the case of the release of security prisoners, it left a bitter taste in Palestinian mouths. Many of the several hundred prisoners released from Israeli jails were criminals, or inmates whose terms were about to expire, and not senior militants who are viewed as heroes on the Palestinian street. The absence of meaningful gestures by Israel, in the face of ongoing violence, was one of the main ingredients in Mr Abbas's demise. He resigned after only several months.
If Mr Abbas does return to a formal leadership role, there will be pressure on Israel to make far more generous concessions than during his first term. US officials would like to see Mr Abbas succeed Mr Arafat, and they might pressure Israel into making concessions to a new Palestinian leader in an effort to solidify his legitimacy among his own people.
While Mr Sharon successfully disqualified Mr Arafat as a viable partner, the departure of the Palestinian leader might actually complicate matters for the Israeli leader, who has built his Gaza withdrawal plan on the basis that there is no-one to talk to on the Palestinian side and the only remaining option is unilateral action. If a Palestinian leader does emerge after Mr Arafat who is able to win world support, Mr Sharon may encounter growing international pressure to abandon the unilateral dimension of his plan and to negotiate.
The Israeli leader will also be aware that Mr Bush, in his second term, will not be looking toward re-election, but rather toward his place in history. The US leader might believe that an achievement that has until now eluded his predecessors - an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement - might secure this for him.