It is inevitable in any administration that tension will develop between the pragmatists and the ideologues. And no bad thing. Indeed George Bush has invited his high-powered, strong-willed team of foreign policy advisers to disagree. "I hope there is disagreement between them," he has said, "because I know that this disagreement will be based on solid thought."
But when do such differences become qualitative? More than the necessary friction in any motor? Strategic?
In Washington commentators are already divining just such a chasm in the meagre evidence of a few weeks, before most of the main players have even installed all their staff in key positions. And, the story goes, Colin Powell, a hugely popular Secretary of State, is the loser, outgunned already by the ideological heavyweights, Vice-President Dick Cheney and Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz.
What is more, they say, such conflict presages major battles ahead for the support of the President. It all makes good copy, but before Democrats get ready to start celebrating they would be wise to hasten slowly.
The evidence? Apparent contradictions by the President of Powell comments and differences of emphasis between Mr Powell and the Secretary of Defence, Mr Donald Rumsfeld, assumed to be closer to the ideologues' camp.
Having seen his Secretary of State promise continuity in policy on North Korea, "constructive engagement" and dialogue, Mr Bush disappointed South Korea's Kim Dae-Jung with comments about the untrustworthiness of his Northern counterpart, Kim Jong-Il, that made clear dialogue was far from his mind.
But Mr Powell, State Department officials claimed, was unaware of how strongly Mr Bush felt about North Korea and its Communist government.
Mr Powell has had a similarly frosty response here to comments he made while in the Middle East suggesting a relaxation of sanctions on Iraq to target them more effectively, "smart sanctions". When he returned home, he heard complaints from conservatives in Congress asking why he had been so soft? Where was the policy to overthrow President Saddam Hussein?
Two weeks ago in Brussels, Mr Powell delighted NATO ministers with a declaration on Kosovo that the US and its allies had "gone in together" and would "come out together". Mr Rumsfeld avoided any such pledge at a Washington press conference with NATO secretary general Lord Robertson on Thursday last.
Commenting on Europe's new rapid reaction force, Mr Powell said he did not see it as a threat to NATO. But Mr Rumsfeld warned that he wanted to see the colour of the Europeans' money.
Case proven, they say. Hardly convincing - in the latter case, for example, the so-called contradictions reflect differing emphases on a single nuanced and evolving US position. And Mr Bush roundly endorsed Mr Powell's view of the rapid reaction force.
Foreign policy experts said it was well known that there were different voices in the administration. "I don't think there is a proven case of deep fissures," Leslie H. Gelb, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, told the New York Times. "The main reason you see the disputes in public is that senior people don't have their teams in place and they haven't had a chance to meet on a sustained basis to work out their policies."
Charles Kupchan at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington says the differences are more real and reflect an ideological division across the Republican Party and the new administration. "There is a significant split in the party as a whole between neo-conservatives and traditional conservatives," he says.
The conservatives reflect a cautious, pragmatic view of US engagement on the world stage perhaps epitomised by the lines from Thucydides Mr Powell used to have on his wall in the Pentagon: "Of all manifestations of power, restraint impresses men most." It was a maxim that led him to resist US involvement with troops in Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia. Where engaged, overwhelming force should be used, he argued - the "Powell doctrine".
The neo-conservatives - represented by Mr Cheney and Mr Wolfowitz, and perhaps Mr Rumsfeld - take a world view that seeks to preserve and prolong US domination. It is not isolationist but unilateralist, unashamed of using military power when clear US interests are at stake.
Some are already predicting clear winners. In the New Republic, Lawrence Kaplan argues: "Despite Powell's stature and Rice's close relationship with the President, most observers think that, ultimately, the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz troika will set administration policy on every major strategic issue."
But it is also possible that the differences of approach which undoubtedly exist may well lead both camps to come to the same conclusions about specific challenges.
Powell's reluctance to send troops abroad to conflict situations may well chime with Cheney's sense that the US should flex its muscles only when clear US interests demand it. On key issues like National Missile Defence they certainly appear to be marching in step.
The truth is it's too early to tell - perhaps commentators too, in their rush to judgment, should take their counsel from Thucydides.
psmyth@irish-times.ie
