It says much about the Amsterdam Treaty that as it at last comes into force tomorrow, talks are already under way about its successor, Paris.
Unfinished business, notably in the area of institutional reforms, needs to be addressed well ahead of enlargement.
So the majority of member-states are now likely to back proposals at the Cologne summit in June that a new treaty-changing Inter-Governmental Conference be convened in the middle of next year and that the work would be completed by the Paris summit the following December.
In theory, if confined to the items specifically mentioned in Amsterdam as requiring to be dealt with, the agenda should be considerably more manageable than was the broad sweep of its forerunner.
In essence that means brokering a deal under which the large member-states would exchange their right to a second commissioner for a change in their favour in the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers.
Nothing, of course, is ever that simple. The Belgians and Italians have already indicated they would like to discuss broadening the range of issues decided by qualified majority.
And the Parliament will certainly want to press the case for commissioners to be individually accountable to MEPs, potentially a subject of significant conflict between institutions.
The next president of the Commission, Mr Romano Prodi, is expected to make it clear to MEPs that he does not want to see the delicate institutional balance upset to that degree. Nor are member-states likely to be keen to see the Commission hostage to the whims of a Parliament they do not yet trust.
Indeed, the Parliament has already suggested that an IGC should be preceded by the establishment of a committee of wise men to recommend what needs to be done.
This is likely to be a recipe for an ambitious federalising agenda that would certainly go well beyond the aspirations of most member-states.
And then, in the wake of the Kosovo war, there are likely to be demands that the EU give a treaty base to the evolving European Security Identity.
That would mean a revisiting of the Amsterdam commitment to "the progressive framing of a common defence policy . . . which might lead to a common defence should the European Council so decide" - and an interesting dilemma for Ireland.
Some insist that the reference to "should the Council so decide" means that legally a common defence policy would not require a new treaty and hence not an IGC.
A unanimous vote of the member-states, meeting at head-of-state level, would, however, be necessary.
Amsterdam's breadth concealed its lack of depth. The treaty had been meant to complement the Maastricht Treaty's preparations for the single currency with the changes needed to pave the way for the dramatic and qualitatively different enlargement to the east.
But instead of the substantial erosion of the veto, the drafters of the treaty's institutionalised "flexibility" mechanisms, by which recalcitrant member-states could be by-passed by a majority, has given rise to some fears of the emergence of a two-speed EU.
These cumbersome mechanisms are unlikely to be used often, but are significant in two areas of particular concern to Ireland: the provisions of the Schengen Treaty on passport-free travel (incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty with an opt-out for Ireland and the UK) and the development of a defence dimension.
Many observers feel that the momentum in that direction is now so strong that Ireland's only realistic choice would be another opt-out or participation.
There can be no doubt that a defence dimension is coming.
The Amsterdam Treaty took a major step in that direction by giving the EU for the first time a military capability, although confined to the so-called "Petersberg Tasks" of humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions.
It also enhanced the EU's foreign policy capacity by creating a new foreign and security policy unit with a high-level boss (to be appointed at Cologne).
To the surprise of many observers, the treaty does improve decision-making in some controversial areas of justice and home affairs policy by bringing discussions on issues such as immigration, visas and asylum into the EU framework. And it does advance the rights of MEPs by extending the number of areas in which they share the ultimate legislative power with ministers.
But the much-vaunted great leaps forward in areas such as employment, social policy and the environment are largely cosmetic presentations of existing policies and have had little effect in practice or in turning the tide of euro-scepticism.
The result overall is to raise the high-water mark of European integration, but not by far, and to beg questions about the future.
But if Amsterdam must be revised, Ireland will hope for a rapid new IGC of very limited scope. The day when real questions must be answered about the automatic rights of small states to their own commissioners will be put off. The same would be true of defence, but may not be possible.
