Allegations of corruption against a former assistant Dublin city and county manager should be heard in public by the Flood tribunal when it sits next Tuesday, the Supreme Court decided yesterday.
In a reserved judgment, five members of the court unanimously held there were no grounds on which it could be argued the tribunal had either exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to observe fair procedures in deciding to determine the issues at full public inquiry.
The Chief Justice, Mr Justice Hamilton, and Mr Justice O'Flaherty, Mrs Justice Denham, Mr Justice Barrington and Mr Justice Murphy dismissed an appeal by Mr George Redmond against a decision of the High Court refusing to grant a full judicial review of the decision of tribunal chairman, Mr Justice Flood.
Mr Redmond (74), who retired from Dublin County Council 10 years ago, had in court described as "untrue" and "absurd" an unproven assertion made by a tribunal witness, Mr James Gogarty, of his allegedly having received a £15,000 payment for services rendered to a development group.
The Supreme Court held there was no doubt but that an inquiry by the tribunal into the allegations made by Mr Gogarty necessarily exposed Mr Redmond and other citizens to the risk of having aspects of their private lives uncovered which would otherwise remain private and to the risk of having baseless allegations made against them.
This might cause distress and injury to their reputations and might interfere with his constitutional right to privacy which was, however, not an absolute one. The exigencies of the common good might outweigh the constitutional right to privacy.
"The exigencies of the common good require that matters considered by both Houses of the Oireachtas to be of urgent public importance be inquired into, particularly when such inquiries are necessary to preserve the purity and integrity of public life," he court held.
The presumption of constitutionality attached to the decisions of both Houses in setting up the tribunal. Fair procedures and the principles of constitutional justice did not require that the proceedings of the tribunal be conducted in private. It was of the essence of such inquiries that they be held in public for the purpose of allaying the public disquiet that had led to their appointment.
The tribunal had decided it was entitled to inquire into and report on any acts associated with the planning process which might in its opinion amount to corruption or which involved attempts to influence by threats or deception or inducement or otherwise to compromise the disinterested performance of public duties and in particular the allegations made by Mr Gogarty involving Mr Redmond.
The court considered it was hard to see what alternative interpretation could be placed on the tribunal's terms of reference and held that Mr Redmond had not established an arguable case that the tribunal's interpretation was incorrect.
It also held he had not established that the tribunal had acted ultra vires the provisions of the Tribunals of Inquiry Evidence Act.
The court held the tribunal was not obliged to hold a private inquiry before proceeding with its public one.
The allegations against Mr Redmond could be false, they simply did not know. But they were grounded on a sworn affidavit and it appeared the tribunal was entitled to decide they were of sufficient substance to warrant investigation at a public inquiry. It would have been surprising if the tribunal had decided otherwise.