'With political pressure for internment intensifying, the GOC in the North, Gen Sir Harry Tuzo, recommended regularly arrest ing and interrogating IRA activists instead of introducing internment, which he said would have "a harmful effect" on the security situation, according to documents released by the Public Record Office yesterday.
On July 21st, 1971, defence secretary Lord Carrington wrote to Downing Street advising against internment. Gen Tuzo, the note said, believed the arguments to introduce internment "remained very strong".
A week before Northern Ireland prime minister Brian Faulkner's internment orders and the round-up of suspects, Gen Tuzo and the cabinet secretary, Sir Burke Trend, were still advising Heath against internment. On August 2nd, Heath met the home secretary, Mr Reginald Maudling, and Lord Carrington at the House of Commons, where the defence secretary said Gen Tuzo believed internment would have a "harmful" effect.
In a briefing note written on the same day, Trend told Heath that internment "would also lead to retaliation, not only in the form of rioting, but also by way of taking hostages both in Northern Ireland and in Great Britain".
By August 5th, Lord Carrington told the cabinet that 500 people were on the list of potential internees and that the GOC in Northern Ireland hoped it would be possible to apprehend 300 in the first wave of arrests.
The next day, Trend informed Heath's principal private secretary, Mr Robert Armstrong, that Heath had made it clear to Faulkner that if internment failed, "the next step, and the only remaining step, would be direct rule".
Two days after the internment orders were signed, the minister for external affairs, Dr Patrick Hillery, told Maudling that current British policies would lead to war in Ireland and destroy relations between the two countries. The British note of the meeting on August 11th stated that Dr Hillery suggested internment had not been entirely ruled out in the Republic, but there was no intention of introducing the policy unless it could be presented as part of a move toward a united Ireland.
At a cabinet meeting in London on October 18th, the interrogation of detainees was discussed. Lord Carrington said he had been told on August 10th of the principles governing the proposed methods of interrogation advanced by the Joint Services Interrogation Wing.
The techniques, regarded as "proper", were designed to isolate detainees subject to interrogation. They were prevented from obtaining any exact sense of time and location and exposed to insistent and disturbing noise, known as white sound. In a subsequent discussion, the cabinet was told that RUC officers were reluctant to use the methods. However, they were given an assurance that so long as they observed the instructions for the conduct of interrogations, they would not be held responsible if their methods were criticised.
The cabinet notes of the discussion continued: "It was felt that to make the detainees wear hoods continuously and to subject them to long periods of standing in uncomfortable postures 'spreadeagled' against a wall was unnecessarily harsh . . . While it was important that methods of interrogation should not overstep proper bounds . . . we were dealing with an enemy who had no scruples and we should not be unduly squeamish over methods of interrogation in these circumstances."
Talks on introducing internment had been under way as early as February 1971. The previous Northern prime minister, Maj James Chichester-Clark, told Heath at Chequers on February 13th, 1971, that he was against internment and that the RUC shared his reservations.
A secret note on a Home Office contingency plan for internment, dated February 12th, suggested there would be "considerable practical difficulties" if internment were introduced. The advice from the security forces was that 350 to 450 people would be detained.
When taoiseach Jack Lynch met Heath in London on December 6th, the taoiseach informed him that he had been pressed to refer allegations of ill-treatment of internees to the Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg.
The British note of the meeting reported that Lynch stated he was being "lambasted" by the opposition, and sympathy for the IRA was growing. Pointing to the conclusions of the Compton inquiry into the allegations, which found no evidence of physical brutality but acknowledged there were examples of physical ill-treatment, Heath said he would regret any such action by the Irish.
A review of interrogation techniques had been established, Heath said, and a decision to go to Strasbourg "would be unfortunate" given the complexity of the Northern Ireland problem and the need for both countries to remain friendly, the report stated. After the introduction of internment, Whitehall officials advised the prime minister to "play down" the existence of a second list of potential internees ahead of talks with Lynch and Faulkner in September 1971, the documents indicate.
Trend advised Heath to avoid any reference to the prospect of a further round of detentions during the visit of the taoiseach and prime minister to Chequers on September 26th-28th. Trend told Heath: "In this connection I have told Sir Harold Black (UK representative to the Northern Ireland cabinet) that, while we are not asking the Government of Northern Ireland to stop pulling people in, they should keep very quiet about the existence of a further list with as many as 200 names on it. Typically, he did not even know that the list existed!"
In a Home Office memo to Armstrong, the official reported Maudling's discussions early in September about the timing of internment orders following the first round of arrests. It had been hoped that the orders would be formally issued after the Chequers meeting, but Maudling felt it was undesirable to delay for another two weeks. The official reported Maudling as saying it was "increasingly difficult" to maintain the position that London did not know the identity of those who should be interned and those who would be released. Maudling also wanted the announcement to coincide with details of who would sit on the board of an appeals tribunal.
On the internment orders, the official continued: "It is thought that this will account for 200 of the 220 presently detained. The remaining 20 will be released. I understand that of the 220, 100 are clearly deserving of internment but the other 100 are more doubtful. After some discussion it was thought that the right course was to issue orders in respect of the full 200. This would mean that all the 200 would have recourse to the Appeals Tribunal and it could be that the more doubtful ones could be released later."
The secret note of the Chequers talks revealed that Heath informed Faulkner that by agreeing to attend the discussions, Lynch had implicitly accorded him the status of prime minister, something he previously refused to do.
Indeed, British officials observed that Lynch considered Faulkner was the leader of a subsidiary government and that the SDLP should also attend the Chequers talks. After these difficulties were smoothed over, Lynch informed Faulkner at the talks that signing the internment orders had aggravated an already serious situation.
Lynch, referred to throughout the note as "John Lynch", believed that neither Catholics nor internees would take account of the appeals tribunal or of the Compton inquiry.