Factions struggle to maintain semblance of unity

As the war in Lebanon went into a second month yesterday, a ceasefire was as elusive as ever, with more bloodshed the only certainty…

As the war in Lebanon went into a second month yesterday, a ceasefire was as elusive as ever, with more bloodshed the only certainty.

What little optimism there was is based on Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora's proposal to send 15,000 soldiers to the south, in the context of a UN Security Council resolution demanding a ceasefire.

People here are waiting for the resolution as if it were Godot. But Lebanon and the Arab League rejected a draft resolution which would allow Israeli troops to stay in southern Lebanon, and the US and France started haggling all over again.

Even if a resolution is passed, it is far from certain that it will achieve a ceasefire. Israel is likely to ignore any demand that its troops pull out of southern Lebanon. Hizbullah will reject any resolution which does not achieve an Israeli departure.

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The deployment of the Lebanese army between the Litani River and the border has long been a demand of the US and Israel, but Mr Siniora's offer has had little effect. Israel's response was to hold a cabinet meeting to approve expanding the ground offensive.

If all of the parties involved were eager for a face-saving device, the deployment of the Lebanese army could work. But Israel wants to be able to claim it has disarmed Hizbullah and, aside from a few wishful-thinkers in Mr Siniora's camp, no one believes that the army deployment would achieve that.

"Based on interviews I've conducted with Hizbullah leaders, they have absolutely no intention of disarming," says Amal Saad-Ghoraieb, a professor at Beirut University College and the author of a book on Hizbullah.

Even if Hizbullah's three main demands - for an Israeli withdrawal, a prisoner exchange and the return of the "Shebaa farms" to Lebanon - were met, Saad-Ghoraieb doubts that Hizbullah would disarm. Not only is "resistance" against Israel the group's raison d'etre, the world has stood by while 1,000 Lebanese Shia Muslims were slaughtered. "This is never going to be forgotten," says Saad-Ghoraieb. "I really cannot see how the residents of the south would ever accept complete dependence on the army to defend them."

"Hizbullah," she continues, "is not a conventional military force that you can disarm . . . If Israel could not find Hizbullah's weapons stockpiles, how on earth could the Lebanese army?"

Negotiations among the Lebanese are almost as complex as those at UN headquarters. Two Hizbullah cabinet ministers agreed to Mr Siniora's proposal "only to maintain the appearance of national unity", says Anis Naccache, a founder of Islamic "resistance" movements 28 years ago. "As soon as they start entering into details, it falls apart."

Within Lebanon, there are two diametrically-opposed visions of this war. The "March 14" group - named after a million-strong protest demonstration following the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri - believe that Hizbullah, Iran and Syria have been weakened, that the central Lebanese government is in the ascendant and that a negotiated settlement possible.

Sources close to Hizbullah, and analysts such as Ms Saad-Ghoraieb, are pessimistic about a neat closure to the conflict. Whatever the outcome, they say, Hizbullah wins. If its goals are achieved, it will be emboldened. If Israel reoccupies part of Lebanon or the conflict drags on as a war of attrition, Hizbullah will thrive on popular resentment.

Hizbullah continues to wreak heavy casualties on Israel long after the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, said that he had destroyed the group's infrastructure. It has repeatedly moved back into villages which the Israelis claimed to have cleared.

The PLO fought Israel for two months in 1982. So, on its own, Hizbullah's month-long stand does not constitute a record. What is unprecedented is that, for the first time, an Arab army has made the Israeli government appear incapable of protecting its own citizens.

That is why this is an existential conflict for Israel. "If Hizbullah wins, it means that in the long term Israel is finished," says Samir Frangieh, a member of parliament elected on the "March 14" ticket. "If an armed group defeats the Israeli army, other Arabs will say it's doable. It will mean that Iran, Syria and Hizbullah beat the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt."

The Lebanese have lined up on either side of this divide and are conscious of the regional war being played out on their territory. "The US-led side wants to destroy the network of alliances woven by Iran," explains Walid Charara, the opinion page editor of al-Akbar newspaper and, like Saad-Ghoraieb, the author of a book on Hizbullah.

"They are starting with the weak links: Hamas, Hizbullah," Charara continues. "Syria is under pressure to renounce its alliance with Iran. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are offering rewards. If Iran is isolated, it can be more easily attacked."

Despite their divergent loyalties, Lebanese leaders struggle to maintain a semblance of unity. "Massacring and being massacred by the Israelis is better than massacring each other, among Lebanese," explains Samir Frangieh. "That's the madness of what is happening."

"Hizbullah are focused on war with Israel," says Saad-Ghoraieb. "They don't want to detract from that by creating an internal rift . . . It is crucial for Hizbullah to secure a sense of national unity, even if it is perceived to be compromising or making concessions."

Things could get much worse. There is widespread talk of Lebanon's Sunni Muslims joining forces with Hizbullah. If Israel bombs downtown Beirut, Hizbullah will attack Tel Aviv. Several sources here say that the Patriot missiles deployed around Israel's largest city would be ineffective against Hizbullah's rockets. Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the Iranian cleric who helped to found Hizbullah, last week boasted that the group had missiles with a 250km range, capable of striking almost anywhere in Israel.

"I believe this war is the starting point of unimaginable violence," predicts Walid Charara. "The 1991 Gulf War led to al-Qaeda. Now a lot of Arabs and Muslims are saying that the US brings war here, so we must take war to America. I'm tempted to say: 'If you liked Hamas and Hizbullah, you'll love al-Qaeda.' They have a Sunni al-Qaeda. They will have a Shia al-Qaeda."