WORLD VIEW: Such a catastrophe makes a nonsense of the political boundaries dividing the EU and its neighbours Stereotypes do not reflectthe diversity of the 15 EU member-states and the 13 candidate countries, writes Paul Gillespie.
The catastrophic flooding in central Europe, the worst for up to 150 years, reminds us that a number of the states affected are shortly to become Ireland's full partners in the European Union. That may become more immediately understood following the dramatic reportage from Prague, Bratislava, Dresden and other cities along the Vltava, Elbe and Danube rivers. It may help to humanise their image during what can be an arid discussion about EU enlargement in Ireland's Nice referendum debate. It may - or may not - help to dispel some of the stereotypes we have of these prospective new partners and their peoples.
This great shock is going to be costly for states already making real sacrifices to fulfil the criteria for EU accession in the enlargement negotiations. It is calculated, for example, that adhering to the environmental criteria alone will cost them about two per cent of their GDP over 15 years. A summit meeting will be held tomorrow in Berlin to coordinate relief efforts and aid from the EU and neighbouring states for those most badly affected.
Interestingly, it will be attended by Germany and Austria as well as by the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Such a natural catastrophe makes nonsense of the political boundaries dividing the EU and its neighbours; until 1989 these were encased in a much deeper divide, between the two contending systems in the Cold War. As a result, we work with stereotypes and prejudices of backwardness and development which do not match the real diversity of both the 15 EU states and the 13 candidates for entry (including Turkey).
In fact recent political research indicates there is as much diversity within each of these blocs as between them; further, it finds there are as many similarities as differences between groups of countries across the blocs, upsetting the idea there is a pattern of political, cultural, economic or social uniformity within western or eastern Europe.* Rather is heterogeneity affirmed as a reality with which future European integration will have to come to terms. Unification of the continent must accommodate this diversity.
As is clear from the photographs and films of the flood, the towns and cities are not only historic but well developed in terms of contemporary architecture and physical infrastructure. That reminds us they were among the most developed European states in the 1920s, when they achieved independence after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire at the same time as Ireland emerged from the British one.
As Daniel Gros argues, we must be careful not to assume that bringing such economies into the EU will automatically create major problems of adjustment, or trigger labour migration on a large scale. Thus Austria's GDP is double Portugal's, which is on the same level as Slovenia's; in turn Slovenia may be grouped with Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland as on a roughly comparable stage of economic development.
Gros says the economic health rather than the current wealth of these states is what really matters when evaluating them as future EU partners. They are in a relatively good position to benefit from membership. Their growth rates put them on a long-term path of catch-up similar to Ireland's over the last three decades. Although the total GDP of the 10 central and eastern European states at current prices amounts to only 4 per cent of the EU's, there is substantial variation between them in terms of industrial structure, the importance of agriculture and political management of the economy.
The same applies to their political and popular cultures. Indeed David Laitan finds that the cultural practices of the current applicant states are in many respects closer to those of the original six EEC members than are those of the nine later entrants.
When account is taken of real incomes, including the sizeable shadow economy, actual living standards are more closely aligned east and west, about 50 per cent among the richer group. Social provision can also help to close the gap, with better family allowances in several countries and comparable levels of unemployment to Spain or Germany. Labour migration has been low, even within Hungary and the Czech Republic, putting a different perspective on alarmist talk of mass movements of people fleeing altogether backward or collapsed states.
That is misleading and mischievous. It recalls similar fears when Spain, Portugal and Greece joined the EEC in the 1980s.
It is instructive to compare the size of the coming EU enlargement to previous ones. Thus Ireland, the UK and Denmark increased the then EEC 6 population by 33.5 per cent in 1973, compared to 17.5 per cent for Spain and Portugal joining the EEC 10 in the mid-1980s and an estimated 28 per cent for the 10 central and eastern European states joining the current EU 15. In GDP terms, the comparable figures are 27.9, 8.3 and 4.1 per cent; for trade they are 13.1, 4.7 and 10.9 per cent.
ON the basis of these figures, there should be comparatively little difficulty absorbing the new members economically. Politically it is a different matter. That is why the Amsterdam and Nice treaties concentrate so much on agreeing ways to represent these states in an enlarged EU.
These include new provisions endorsing flexibility or closer co-operation between groups of member-states smaller than the total EU membership. There are still stringent rules protecting the EU's core competences and giving equal access to states that wish to join them later.
Another stereotype affirms that flexibility will inevitably usher in a two-tier Europe in which the accession states will be second-class members. That view does not survive a detailed examination of these patterns of diversity. Slovenia, for example, will be a net contributor to the EU budget on entry.
The national leaderships have different political motivations to join flexibility schemes and often the resources to do so. They are participating in the debates at the Convention on the Future of Europe, where they display a range of views on federal or inter-governmental ways of governing the EU. They have no intention of being put in a second-class category and have sufficient political weight to resist any such move.
*Peter Mair and Jan Zielonka (eds.), The Enlarged European Union, Diversity and Adaptation, London: Frank Cass, 2002.