Israel's aerial and ground attack on the Gaza Strip is disproportionate to the badly-equipped resistance it is meeting, writes Michael Jansen
A ROCKET fired from Gaza at Israel yesterday flew deep into the eastern Negev, the furthest point reached by the 10,000-odd Palestinian missiles fired at random since 2001.
During this period, a dozen people have been killed in Israel, including Thai and Palestinian labourers.
A source in Gaza said the record shows that Palestinian rocketry is in its infancy and exposes the weaknesses of armed groups now being targeted by Israel's massive offensive: "Homemade Hamas rockets cannot win the war."
The source, who observed at close quarters a recent Israeli army incursion into Gaza, said, "This was a practice raid, to test Hamas . . . Hamas does not have a proper army.
"Its lightly-armed fighters cannot defend Gaza from Israeli planes, troops and tanks. Hamas's men will stand under fire [if Israel invades] and shoot at the Israelis, who will hit homes, mosques, and hospitals. [Hamas fighters] will be unable to do anything. Hamas's capacities and weaponry have been exaggerated by Israel to justify its action."
Hamas's military wing and other armed factions are not under a single command as were the fighters led by the Hizbullah movement during Israel's 2006 war on Lebanon.
There is little co-ordination. Hamas has had no access to anti-tank guns, Hizbullah's most effective weapon, or to large numbers of medium-range rockets like those fired at northern Israel by Hizbullah.
Only small arms have been smuggled into Gaza or confiscated by Hamas from stores which belonged to Fatah's security apparatus.
After 2006, Hizbullah, seen by Arabs as victorious, could concentrate on building up its arsenal, training recruits for its seasoned and disciplined armed forces, and carrying out development projects benefiting poor Lebanese.
By contrast, since Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian legislature in January 2006, the movement, which did not expect to triumph decisively, has had to contend with attempts by Fatah rivals to oust it from power, as well as a boycott and blockade by Israel and western governments.
Since Hamas seized control of Gaza in June 2007, it has had to impose order, govern and try to mitigate the impact of Israel's tightened siege and blockade on the Strip's 1.5 million citizens.
If Israel decides to implement a proposed 48-hour truce, Hamas could find it difficult to prevent its own men and those from smaller groups from firing missiles into Israel in revenge for Israel's heavy bombing of Gaza, which killed many comrades and civilians.