ELEMENTS within the IRA leadership seen as being opposed to the ceasefire almost from the outset may now be controlling the organisation, security sources on both sides of the Border seem to agree.
These are the members who almost provoked a split in the organisation late last year. According to security sources in the North, when faced with a destructive split the more politicised leadership of the republican movement gave in and the militarist elements are now reported to be again in the ascendant.
The situation within the Provisional republican movement has, it appears, turned full circle from the period of the "peace process" in 1994, when there was talk of an IRA ceasefire holding in all circumstances. Security sources say the IRA is now restrained only by lack of experienced personnel and by the RUC's recent string of successes against it.
There are some worrying signs in the past few days that the IRA campaign is spreading to nationalist areas of the North which had been quiet up to now.
When the IRA returned to violence on February 9th last year, there was considerable speculation - much of it prompted by Sinn Fein and its supporters - that the IRA campaign would be restricted to attacks in England. After the bomb attacks in London, and in Manchester in June, no IRA attacks were mounted inside Northern Ireland until the bombing of the Lisburn army barracks on October 7th.
However, there were still no attacks on the indigenous security forces, the RUC and RIR. Even by late summer, republican sources were telling journalists the campaign was still of a restricted nature and there was still hope the ceasefire could be renewed.
There was strong pressure from US officials, who hoped to see an IRA ceasefire back in place before the presidential election. Some US sources also continued to tell journalists that a ceasefire could. come about if certain criteria were met for Sinn Fein's entry into talks.
Indeed, there were no attacks on the local security sources until almost the end of the year. During the loyalist disturbances last summer, IRA units were on stand by but were not put into action. This situation pertained until almost the end of the year.
Security sources in Belfast say until late autumn, the IRA units in Northern Ireland were instructed to operate on a "defence and retaliation" basis. They were to prepare for military activity but not to take action unless there was an attack on their area by loyalists or some form of offensive incursive action by the security forces.
Republican sources in Belfast say by November the more militant membership of the IRA was threatening to leave and form its own organisation if it was not allowed to step up its activity. At about this point, the Sinn Fein leadership began to concede privately to journalists that it saw little or no hope of a ceasefire coming about.
Before December, the first of a series of attacks involving the use of improvised grenade launchers and horizontal mortars began.
Some efforts to negotiate a ceasefire through contacts between the Sinn Fein leadership and Government officials in Dublin continued until almost the end of the year, but bore no fruit.
According to sources close to the negotiations, Sinn Fein leaders were constantly expressing concern about opposition to them from within the hardline elements of the "republican movement".
Two leading IRA militants, who have been close to the organisation's leadership almost since it split from the Official IRA in the 1970s, were identified as the principal opponents to a renewed ceasefire.
Two other powerful anti ceasefire figures have been identified. One is a Co Down man associated with the bombings in England and, before the ceasefire in Belfast.
The other figure is believed to be living in the Monaghan/Fermanagh area. Originally from Co Derry, this man had been very active in the IRA but disappeared in the late 1980s. He re emerged last year and is said by some people to be one of the most powerful and uncompromising figures in the organisation.
A further indication of the increasingly militant mood of the organisation was the reported elevation to the head of the "Northern command" of a Belfast man who had been openly opposed to the ceasefire and critical of the political leadership of Mr Gerry Adams during the ceasefire.
This man, who was released from prison in the late 1980s, has little to do with the political side of the organisation, although he is a well known figure in republican areas of west Belfast. He is said to have appointed a man in his early 30s from a well known republican family in the Markets area as officer commanding (OC) of the Belfast brigade.
The new OC is suspected of killing two of the seven alleged drug dealers murdered by the IRA in Belfast during the ceasefire, acting at the behest of the man who is now the new Northern commander.
Under their command, the IRA campaign has been marked by a succession of errors and near misses. Older republicans say the new membership lacks both skill and determination. The number of attacks that have been abandoned or botched has led others to conclude that the IRA is deliberately choosing not to cause casualties.
However, some have come very close to causing casualties. The RUC was badly shaken by the landmine near Belfast Castle at the new year and by the double mortar attack on an RUC car outside Downpatrick, Co Down, two weeks ago.
Either could have caused multiple injuries. The Downpatrick rockets left scorch marks across the roof of the RUC car.
The fact that east Tyrone and south Armagh - two formerly most active IRA areas - are now seem to be mobilising after a period of inactivity is a discouraging sign.
It is believed that the Armagh and Tyrone IRA, seeing the RUC successes against the IRA in Belfast and Derry, have simply been biding their time before launching any attacks.
Security sources say there is nothing to indicate that these areas are in any way opposed to a return to violence. They are simply too experienced to rush back into activities which could result in losses of members through arrest and the seizure of weapons, it is felt.
The major concern among the security forces is that the more professional and dangerous elements within the IRA might be waiting until the summer, when the RUC is stretched to capacity to deal with loyalist demonstrations, before carrying out any attacks. This prospect has led some senior RUC officers to warn of a serious upturn of violence during the Orange marching season.