IRAQ/Commentary: Iraq's Ayatollah Sistani showed himself to be the country's most powerful cleric by negotiating a peaceful end to the crisis in Najaf, writes Michael Jansen
Ayatollah Ali Sistani has demonstrated that he is the main power-broker in Iraq when, 24 hours after returning to the country, he dictated an end to the violent three-week stand-off in Najaf.
The ayatollah had no choice but to intervene once US tanks deployed at the edge of the broad plaza opposite the heavy wooden doors of the Imam Ali Shrine and the government threatened to send Iraqi national guardsmen in to flush out Mahdi army militiamen loyal to the rebel cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr. An all-out assault would have devastated the 1,000-year-old mausoleum erected over the grave of Ali, the adopted son of the prophet Muhammad and first imam of the Shia sect.
By stepping in to halt the destruction and carnage at the critical moment, the ayatollah recouped credibility he had lost by staying away during the confrontation at Najaf.
Ayatollah Sistani (73,) the most senior cleric in the Shia hierarchy in Iraq, ended the crisis by negotiating terms with Mr Sadr (31), an upstart junior cleric whose militia had taken up arms against the foreign occupation forces. Mr Sadr had no option but to agree to terms designed to win his acceptance.
By adopting this approach, the ayatollah turned the confrontation between Mr al-Sadr, on one hand, and the Iraqi government and US troops, on the other, into a Shia communal affair. This approach maintained Shia unity. Ayatollah Sistani also preserved Iraqi unity by preventing a battle which would have pitted Iraqi against Iraqi.
Ayatollah Sistani also halted the slaughter and capture of Mr Sadr's militiamen by arranging for them to lay down their arms and depart from the shrine and Najaf along with thousands of supporters who flooded into the city and mosque on the ayatollah's command. While earning the gratitude of the families of the militiamen, he boosted his nationalist credentials.
Mr Sadr also gained a great deal from the confrontation. He emerged as the chief resistance figure. The government declared that he was free to go wherever he wished. This suggests that the arrest warrant issued by the US for his alleged involvement in the murder of another cleric in 2003 has been dropped.
His followers exited the shrine without disbanding, leaving their weapons. They live to fight another day. Since Iraq is awash with arms of all kinds, they can obtain fresh weapons at any time.
Mr Sadr remains a force to reckon with on the Iraqi scene whether or not he agrees to participate in the January 2005 elections.
The interim government and the US were the biggest losers in this contest. The Najaf events undermined the credibility of the government and increased Iraqi distrust and dislike of the US. Ayatollah Sistani did not negotiate his five-point plan with them but imposed it. Not only did the government and US agree but they promptly began to carry out the ayatollah's demands. They had no choice. Attacking the Imam Ali Shrine was politically risky while the continuation of the stand-off was politically impossible.
The government revealed its lack of sovereignty when it relied on US muscle to take on the rag- tag Mahdi army. Ayatollah Sistani, who like Mr al-Sadr opposes the occupation, shamed the government by calling for the removal of US forces allegedly acting under government orders, as well as Iraqi army troops.
Government ministers did not present a solid front. For instance, the Prime Minister, Dr Ayad Allawi, a secular Shia, took a tough line while the vice president, Dr Ibrahim Jafari, a religious Shia, sought a peaceful end to the conflict. This produced flip-flops in policy. One day a minister would declare a deadline for the surrender of the militia, the next another minister would retreat from this stand.
By contrast, the newly appointed interim National Assembly genuinely tried and failed to achieve a peaceful settlement, gaining a certain amount of respect and support for making the attempt.
The ayatollah made it clear that he held the government responsible for the destruction of homes, hotels and shops in Najaf by demanding compensation for its citizens.
Finally, he put the government on notice when he demanded that a census should be conducted ahead of the election, which he does not want postponed.