IRA victim was anxious about crossing Border

Cory Report:  Chief Supt Harry Breen of the RUC was anxious about travelling to Dundalk on March 20th, 1989, to meet senior …

Cory Report: Chief Supt Harry Breen of the RUC was anxious about travelling to Dundalk on March 20th, 1989, to meet senior gardaí and feared for his life and that of his colleague, Supt Bob Buchanan.

He was worried that one of the Garda officers stationed there was linked to what Cory calls a member of "a notorious family from the area suspected of being a member of the PIRA and of carrying out smuggling activities".

That evening Harry Breen became the highest-ranking member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary to be killed by the IRA.

Chief Supt Breen, who held command of H Division, a swathe of south Armagh and south Down, travelled from Armagh city to Newry, arriving about lunchtime that day. He met his colleague and driver, Supt Bob Buchanan, and the pair left their Newry headquarters for Dundalk in Supt Buchanan's car.

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They had arranged a meeting about smuggling with their opposite numbers in Dundalk.

Cory refers to Breen as "a conscientious, talented and dedicated" officer who had been decorated and recommended on four occasions. He was a devoted father and husband and respected within his community.

Buchanan was what the RUC called "Border Superintendent" for the same division as his commanding officer. Responsibility fell to him for liaison with the Garda on cross-Border crime and paramilitary activity, a dangerous and demanding position.

Like his senior, he was a devoted husband and father of two. He was respected by police officers on both sides of the Border and referred to by Cory as "a man of absolute integrity, and a proud, dedicated and able" officer.

Both men, writes Cory, "demonstrated all the finest attributes required of policemen".

Border Superintendents met at least every month at venues which alternated between the North and the Republic. However, there was also the prospect that either police force could call additional meetings. The meeting in Dundalk on March 20th was one of the informal gatherings and was arranged by telephone only that morning.

Breen made regular visits South to meet his Garda opposite numbers. He crossed the Border 10 times in January and eight in February and had been six times already that March.

Cory believes that Breen's car, which he had owned since 1986, was readily identifiable and could have been easily spotted. He further reports that it might have been concluded that the best way of dispelling unwelcome attention was not to employ any personal security.

Buchanan, on the other hand, made relatively few trips South, although he had made a visit in February that year.

Chief Supt Nolan in Dundalk and Chief Supt Breen wished to meet on the afternoon of March 20th, and their inferiors made the necessary arrangements for the get-together at 2 p.m. that day.

There were no arrangements for secure telephone calls between the Newry and Dundalk stations, and open lines were normally used.

The meeting was to discuss smuggling operations, and Breen was anxious to hold talks to help him prepare a report which he wanted to submit to other senior RUC officers the following day.

Despite this he was uneasy about the arrangements to visit Dundalk.

According to Cory: "Chief Supt Breen told Sgt Mains (Breen's Staff Officer) that he felt that certain members of the gardaí were on [the IRA suspects'] payroll".

The Cory report continues: "In a later statement, Sgt Mains named a particular Garda officer about whom Chief Supt Breen had expressed concern."

Despite this, both senior RUC men left for Dundalk, and the meeting went ahead as planned. It was wrapped up after an hour or so, reports Cory, and the two made to leave without discussing their return route.

However, it was known they did use the Edenappa Road near Jonesboro, Co Armagh, away from the main Dublin-Belfast road.

Cory found that two cars were seen moving suspiciously near the Garda station while the meeting was in progress.

The judge cites a variety of intelligence, police and witness sources to draw up a picture of the IRA ambush in which the two officers lost their lives.

He reports that two armed men in "battle fatigues" took up a position on the Edenappa road and stopped three southbound vehicles, telling the occupants to pull in to the roadside, switch off their engines and lie on the ground with their heads covered.

It was then that the car carrying the two RUC men approached heading north.

A van that was following the men's car overtook them as they slowed and pulled into a laneway. Four armed men got out of the van, approached the officers' car and began firing. Both men were hit several times, Cory found.

Buchanan, the report says, was probably dead at the wheel by the time his car came to a halt. A later examination found the car still in reverse gear and the accelerator fully depressed. He was also shot, almost certainly, after he had already died.

His colleague's body was discovered outside the car. He, too, had suffered multiple gunshot wounds.

The vehicle, it was reported at the time, was searched and sensitive intelligence documents taken.

The report goes into detail about the nature of four of the firearms employed by the gunmen and the nature of the ballistic evidence linking them with other violent incidents. There is no evidence concerning the other two weapons.

The judge concludes that the killings were "brutal, cowardly, and demonstrate a callous insensitivity to both the suffering of individuals and to life itself".

Neither of the men was armed in accordance with agreements governing cross-Border visits by the two police forces. "This must have been known to the murderers," writes Cory, "who would probably have been aware of the regulation that prevented them bringing firearms into the Republic."

He refers to IRA claims that its members shot the two men in self-defence. "Although imaginative," writes Cory, "\ seems to have very little to do with either reality or veracity".