Iran restates intention to defend Syria in the event of any attack by Israel

MIDDLE EAST: A complex matrix of motives and interests lies behind the relationships between Iran, Syria and the Hizbullah, …

MIDDLE EAST: A complex matrix of motives and interests lies behind the relationships between Iran, Syria and the Hizbullah, writes Michael Jansen

Iran and Syria agreed yesterday that a ceasefire and prisoner exchange would be "an acceptable and fair" way to end Israel's offensive against Lebanon.

This recipe, put forward by Iranian foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki following a meeting in Damascus with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, reflects the stance of the Lebanese Shia Hizbullah movement.

All three parties want a three-way ceasefire involving Hizbullah, the Palestinian Hamas movement, and Israel. Hizbullah and Hamas, which hold three Is- raeli soldiers, seek to swap them for Palestinian female and elderly prisoners and three Lebanese detainees.

READ MORE

Israel has rejected any deal.

Mr Mottaki reaffirmed Tehran's pledge to defend Syria if attacked by Israel, which claims Tehran and Damascus are behind the Palestinian and Lebanese operations to seize Israeli soldiers. Syria and Iran, who became allies in 1980 during the Iran-Iraq war, have denied involvement and insist Hizbullah is an independent organisation.

Iran served as mid-wife at the birth of Hizbullah during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Tehran's Republican Guards trained and armed Hizbullah fighters, and Tehran has subsequently supplied funds and weaponry. Syria has facilitated the flow of money and arms to the group. Over the years, it gained a large degree of independence by raising funds from overseas Lebanese Shias and buying weapons on the international black market.

While Iran and Syria can influence Hizbullah, neither can dictate its actions. There is no indication that Hizbullah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah told Damascus or Tehran that he intended to capture Israeli troops at a time Israel was engaged in military operations in Gaza. Shaikh Nasrallah had proclaimed this intention many times.

It can be argued the destructive Israeli campaign in Lebanon does not suit either Damascus or Tehran. While seeking to keep up political pressure on Israel and US forces in Iraq, Tehran does not want a conflagration in Lebanon, Gaza or Iraq.

Iran's interest in Iraq is the same as that of the US: an end to sectarian warfare, Shia ascendancy, and reconstruction of the country. Since Iran has stated its readiness to talk about the package of incentives offered by Europe and the US as the price for suspension of nuclear programmes, Tehran does not really want the current explosion of hostilities to derail negotiations.

Syria has never wanted any regional player to be in a position to drag it into conflict with Israel at a time and place not of Damascus's choosing. This is why Syria drove the Palestinian Liberation Organisation out of northern Lebanon in 1983.

Syrian spokesmen counter the charge that Damascus manipulates Hizbullah by saying it has had little leverage over the movement since withdrawing Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005.

It can also be contended that a limited clash might serve the interests of Syria and Iran because they want to torpedo Israeli premier Ehud Olmert's unilateral policy of setting Israel's border in the West Bank, thereby finishing off negotiations on territorial settlements with the Arabs.

Iran and Syria seek a revival of the peace process on a regional basis with the aim of securing Israeli evacuation of Palestinian territory and the Syrian Golan.

If they encouraged Hizbullah to act with this objective in mind, both leaderships seriously misread the intentions of Israel.

Israeli analysts say Mr Olmert is determined to use the two-front offensive to re-establish Israel's deterrent power and secure Hizbullah's pull-back from its northern border as a prelude to annexing portions of the West Bank, all of east Jerusalem and the Golan.