Ireland's internal security was "moderate to poor by British standards", claimed a state of security assessment on the Irish state conducted by the British government in 1976.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office document, dated October 28th, 1976, after the Ewart Biggs murder in Dublin, suggested that the Irish people retained an "extreme sensitivity" towards the British government and army, "coupled with a friendly disposition towards the British people as individuals". On the one hand, the report acknowledged "very close" economic, geographic and personal links between the two countries.
"British newspapers circulate in the Republic", it was observed, "and British television services are enthusiastically received", particularly "in the eastern half of the country". On the other hand, this unique relationship was "complicated by keen distorted memories of Irish history, by Irish concern to assert their independence against an over-influential neighbour and by the problem of Northern Ireland".
The issue of national re-unification was described as "for the majority a pious hope" and certainly not an aim which justified violence. But extreme Republicans could still "exploit . . . a large section of the Irish population".
The extent of this support fluctuated "according to current popularity of the Republican paramilitaries and the degree to which Catholics in the North appear to be under threat".
The report noted that, since 1972, security co-operation had improved between London and Dublin, "stimulated by the fear that the situation in the North might get out of control or that violence on a large scale might be imported into the South". There were still a "number of Republican sympathisers" in the service of the State whose presence limited "the volume and sensitivity of information which can safely be handed to the Irish". But the position of the coalition government, containing men such as Conor Cruise O'Brien, was known to be one of "unambiguous hostility towards terrorism, though attitudes towards co-operation with Britain remain ambivalent".
The British embassy in Dublin also reported a generally favourable public reaction to the Irish government's decision to declare illegal a planned march in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the Easter Rising in April 1976. A letter from the embassy described how the march went ahead but "passed off quietly enough".
It was noted that there were less sellers of Easter lilies than normal because the Easter lily was "no longer a 'respectable' republican symbol and has now become associated with the IRA".
There was "no doubt" that the Provisionals could still "ensure wholescale disruption" in the country but it was felt that they would generally avoid embarking on this course because of "the need to sustain a climate of acquiescence in the Republic generally". Indeed, the "most serious non-violent threat" to the state was posed by Official Sinn Féin, the Marxist rump who lost out to the Provisionals in an internal power struggle in January 1970. The Officials had recently gained recognition from the PLO, "thus carrying on their bitter competition with the Provisionals on an international level" and maintained a "small but significant following in the unions, the universities and the media".
The British also expressed some concern about a recent increase in the number of diplomatic envoys in Dublin from countries from the Soviet Union. In particular, it was feared that these officials might be able to exploit the relatively easy passage that Irish citizens had to United Kingdom territory. Nevertheless, the fact that the Republic was "predominantly Catholic - and of old-fashioned kind" was deemed to be "a strong insurance against Communism".