Lessons to be learned from Iraq-US tussle

The Iraqi crisis is over - perhaps. Exaggerated claims by Baghdad or its supporters might revive it

The Iraqi crisis is over - perhaps. Exaggerated claims by Baghdad or its supporters might revive it. United States forces are now in position, so Saddam Hussein should be careful. This time he stopped before provoking a disaster on the scale of 1990-91. However, the political and propaganda stakes are such that assessing the settlement details is difficult.

Attention has been focused on the uncertainties in the conditions for ending UN sanctions against Iraq. These conditions seem Saddam's only real gains. But they depend on US approval. Madeleine Albright has reminded the world of the US Security Council veto if "premature" attempts are made to end sanctions. Saddam decided he could see light at the end of the tunnel, but that light is vague and depends on the success of future Russian diplomatic efforts. The Anglo-Americans say there have been no concessions. We must wait and see. The crisis may well have healthy results all around.

Verifications - inspections to ascertain that agreements are being carried out - can be tense affairs. No one likes foreigners poking around their turf; national pride may be prickly, even without hidden violations. If there are violations, offence may be taken on irrelevant grounds, with obstruction, harassment and attempts to divert the inspectors. There can be an almost childish resentment at being found out. Some or all of these reactions seem to have arisen in Iraq.

In their day-to-day work inspection teams need patience, courtesy and a steely firmness. The field command or management must keep the inspectors on a level keel and check personality clashes and unnecessary offences. Reports must be objective. To ensure all this, the commander or manager must stay close to the action.

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At the higher levels, right up to the Security Council, rapid action is needed on reports. Problems must be tackled early or they fester.

One point of great concern to small countries has fortuitously emerged from this crisis. Many believe the UN provides a forum where a small country is entitled to give its side of a dispute. Two comforting UN Charter articles ensure this - or so we thought.

Last week, the Daily Telegraph reported that Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, had asked for a "fair hearing" of his country's grievances by the Security Council. But the council declined to invite Aziz to address its members.

Article 31 of the UN Charter states: "Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected."

Article 32 continues: "Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council . . . if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote in the discussion relating to the dispute."

The rationale seems clear: an accused state should get a hearing. Obviously small countries have a vital stake in these Articles. However, The Rules of Procedure of the Security Council show there are problems with Article 31. Despite the charter wording, Iraq needed nine votes of the council members to get the opportunity to be heard.

In the preliminary discussions it became clear that Iraq had less than nine votes, so there was no point in seeking a hearing.

It does seem, however, to this commentator that the "shall be invited" statement in Article 32 is not qualified by the council's Rules of Procedure. In fact, rule 38 specifically and separately mentions Article 32 and does not modify the "shall be invited" stipulation. So, it seems that we cannot count on Articles 31 and 32 after all. (Perhaps some international lawyer will correct this impression.)

To express concern about this is not to support Iraq, which has broken the provisions of the UN Charter on several occasions. But every small country must be concerned to find that it could be condemned without a hearing before the Security Council. This could be a bleak fate for a country the size of Ireland and with our record of supporting the UN. Was this the intention of those who drew up the charter?

An outstanding point about the Gulf War was America's scrupulous adherence to the requirements of the UN Charter, despite its immense power and the clearcut case arising from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Washington stuck to the legalities and went through the charter step by step, in spirit and letter. This great moral precedent is important for the future.

Iraq's request that the five permanent members of the Security Council should be represented in the Unscom inspection teams may be self-serving; but must it be dismissed out of hand?

In my view, it must: the Security Council cannot have the composition of its teams laid down from outside.

However, in such matters perceptions count. Representation from all the permanent members would help create the image of impartiality. Compromise on this may now be possible.