Memo records `shooting on sight' request

In January 1972 when Derry's major shopping areas were threatened with extinction by bombers, a deputation of traders asked Gen…

In January 1972 when Derry's major shopping areas were threatened with extinction by bombers, a deputation of traders asked Gen. Robert Ford, the Commander of Land Forces in Northern Ireland, to introduce curfews and shooting on sight.

This is asserted in a confidential memo from Gen. Ford to his superior officer, the British army GOC, Gen. Tuzo, revealed at the Bloody Sunday inquiry yesterday.

In his memo, Gen. Ford himself recommended that selected rioters should be shot with "less lethal" .22 ammunition. He wrote to Gen. Tuzo: "I am coming to the conclusion that the minimum force necessary to achieve a restoration of law and order is to shoot selected ring leaders amongst the DYH (Derry Young Hooligans), after clear warnings have been issued.

"I believe we would be justified in using 7.62 mm but in view of the devastating effects of this weapon and the danger of rounds killing more than the person aimed at, I believe we must consider issuing rifles adapted to fire HV (high velocity) .22 inch ammunition to sufficient members of the unit dealing with this problem to enable ring leaders to be engaged with this less lethal ammunition. Thirty of these weapons have been sent to 8 Brigade this weekend for zeroing and familiarisation training.

READ MORE

"They, of course, will not be used operationally without authorisation."

Elsewhere in the memo, Gen. Ford describes a meeting in Derry on January 7th with a "Mr Ferris and three of his colleagues who represent the traders of Strand Road, who produced the usual pessimistic message".

Gen. Ford writes that he discussed tightening security measures to deter bombers, and he adds: "They were reasonably satisfied because they had got more than they had expected - although they stressed that it is not enough. For instance, they want at a minimum the Rossville Flats cleared (5,000 people live in them and a soldier has never entered them in the history of Londonderry) and ideally the Creggan and Bogside occupied. They also wanted curfews and shooting on sight."

Mr Christopher Clarke QC, counsel to the tribunal, said the question arose from the memo as to whether Gen. Ford had been contemplating a "shoot to kill" or a "shoot to wound" policy.

In a statement to this tribunal, Gen. Ford says that in January 1972 the situation with the "Derry Young Hooligans" had reached such an impasse "that I felt that I had to explore something new". The memo he sent to Gen. Tuzo "was me looking into new dimensions to see what alternatives there were . . .

"My memorandum stated that the weapons would not be used operationally without authorisation. There was no question of implementing any such policy without proper authorisation. By proper authorisation I mean the Ministry of Defence and ultimately the Cabinet."

Counsel then introduced portions of statements submitted to this tribunal by senior military, RUC and political figures. All deny any knowledge of Gen. Ford's suggestion to shoot rioters.

Sir Graham Shillington, then chief constable of the RUC, says he does not remember any suggestion along these lines, "and I would have been horrified if this had been suggested in any meeting I attended".

Lieut. Gen. Sir Michael Jackson (then Capt. Jackson, of the Parachute Regiment) also testifies that he had not previously seen the memo. But he suggested it illustrated a general frustration over the situation in Derry at the time. This communication between two senior officers, he says, would have been part of an entirely internal discussion process, "on the lines of `What the hell do we do about Derry?'

"People should be careful not to make a ridiculous jump from a memorandum like that to an allegation that there was a deliberate policy to shoot people," Gen. Jackson says in his statement.

The then British defence secretary, Lord Carrington, also denies that Gen Ford's suggestion represented official policy. His government would never have agreed to such a plan: ". . . we would never have agreed to any course of action which involved the deliberate loss of civilian life.

"I cannot believe Gen. Ford meant this by the memorandum. He probably simply meant to indicate that, given the situation, fatalities were inevitable. . . "

"To suggest that there was a deliberate policy to shoot civilians is ludicrous and something that no politician would ever agree to," he comments.