Dublin considered the outcomes of an independent North, a North under UN trusteeship, and repartition of the island of Ireland, writes Deaglán de Bréadún.
The government made contingency plans in 1975 for a possible British withdrawal and the establishment of an independent state in Northern Ireland, according to State Papers released under the 30-year rule.
The possibilities in the event of a British military withdrawal are listed in a memorandum to government marked "Secret", from the office of minister for foreign affairs Garret FitzGerald, dated June, 1975.
We now know that the withdrawal option was given serious consideration at the time by Labour prime minister Harold Wilson.
The 1975 memo holds out three possible scenarios in the aftermath of a British pull-out: 1. an independent Northern Ireland; 2. Northern Ireland being placed under United Nations trusteeship; and 3. repartition of the island of Ireland.
A lengthy discussion paper prepared by an interdepartmental unit on Northern Ireland analyses the implications of negotiated independence, "meaning the establishment of an Independent State of Northern Ireland comprising the full six-county area by agreement between the British Government and representatives of Northern Ireland to whom sovereign power could be transferred".
Two different ways in which independence might come about are considered: 1. through "wholehearted" agreement between the main Northern Ireland parties and the two governments as well as "substantial" majorities in the Protestant and Catholic communities; and 2. the British, having taken a decision to withdraw, would transfer power to a Northern Ireland government, regardless of the views of the nationalist minority and/or Dublin.
"Either model could develop in positive or negative directions," the discussion paper comments. But the idea was gaining strength: "Every major loyalist politician has, over the past year, indicated either in public or in private that he would favour independence in certain circumstances."
The more moderate loyalist politicians would prefer a negotiated outcome, but "there are elements who would be prepared to seize independence if necessary".
This would have the support of loyalist paramilitaries who were brimming with self-confidence after the Ulster Workers' Council strike which brought down the power-sharing executive a year earlier.
But would the British withdraw?
"There already exists a vocal group of Labour MPs who argue the case for British disengagement but their strength appears to have remained fairly constant in the past few years."
Potential developments on the security front were more worrying: "Increased Army casualties, an increasing financial burden on an economically depressed Britain in maintaining the status quo in Northern Ireland or a renewed bombing campaign in British cities, or a combination of such factors could lead to compelling pressures in Britain for disengagement."
The British themselves had never rejected this option: "In inter-Governmental discussions, it has never been explicitly ruled out as have, for instance, integration and majority rule within the United Kingdom."
In addition, the British were implicitly committed to withdrawing, if that were the expressed wish of a majority in Northern Ireland, which need not include any Catholics.
Any formal agreement between the two communities for an independent Northern Ireland would be unlikely to last, due to "an underlying suspicion on both sides which would place the survival of the basic contract between the communities in doubt".
The discussion paper does not use the much-criticised phrase "ethnic cleansing" which would not become part of public discourse until much later, when the Balkans conflict erupted. But clearly this is what the authors have in mind if a British withdrawal appeared imminent.
"Any intimation of British withdrawal particularly in the absence of universal support for such a move within Northern Ireland seems more likely to lead to an attempt on the part of each community to consolidate territorial control by local majorities probably leading to large-scale intercommunal violence."
Essentially, this would amount to repartition, probably leading to a surge in the strength of the IRA, "and the loyalist government would take the place of the departed British as a focus for military activity on an increased scale probably with a wider degree of support within the minority community". Such a State "could only hope to survive by assuming a repressive character".
Teasing out the implications of independence, the paper notes that, should a stand-alone Northern Ireland emerge which was outside the United Kingdom, "It would then be necessary for the Irish Government to adopt an attitude to the new State."
Under Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, which still contained the controversial "claim to the North", the Government could not recognise an independent Northern Ireland without a referendum to change Bunreacht na hÉireann.
If that state were built upon mutual consensus between the two communities, then steps could be taken to hold such a referendum. If a state were established without the consent of nationalists, then a wait-and-see attitude would have to be adopted, possibly leading to de facto recognition if convincing guarantees were given to the minority population.
Such guarantees might include a "blocking mechanism" copied from another divided society, namely Belgium, allowing a significant group from either community to obstruct legislation which was considered objectionable.
But the paper warns that "such safeguards can never be adequate to provide that genuine sense of participation by both communities which is needed in Northern Ireland".
Instead, in comments echoing the failed Sunningdale experiment and the future Belfast Agreement of 1998, the document suggests that both the Government and the Northern nationalists "would presumably seek entrenched power-sharing in government".
The paper notes that some loyalist leaders had spoken of the need for "guarantees for the majority community against invasion or armed attack from the Republic". But this would depend very much on guarantees of safety for the Northern minority.
Additional external guarantees were also needed, for example from Britain, possibly acting in concert with the Republic. "There may be a role for the United Nations as an impartial guarantor."
As for military intervention by UN peacekeepers, this would almost certainly have to arise out of a joint request by the British and Irish governments.
Ideally such a "garrison" would operate in a situation where Northern Ireland was placed under UN trusteeship, whereby the world body would administer the territory on an interim basis, pending a final settlement.