The collapse of the peace process has produced a political vacuum in the Middle East and there is little expectation that this lacuna will be filled in the near future. While there is a consensus among rulers that they must distance themselves from Israel and its US ally, no one has emerged as the leader of the Arab front - or is likely to do so. Both Arab and Israeli politicians speak ominously of the possibility of regional war, which the Arabs know they would lose.
Such a conflict could involve an Israeli military campaign against "radical" Syria, sparked by Hizbullah operations against Israeli troops in south Lebanon. Radical Iraq could support Syria, widening the theatre of war. If this happens the "moderates" fear they would, ineluctably, be drawn in on the Arab side. The moderate governments are in no position to resist the intense popular pressure that would be generated by the outbreak of hostilities. They could, reluctantly, be compelled to take a dramatic stand against Israel and the US, blamed by the Arabs for the failure of the peace process.
The official Saudi daily, al-Riyadh, described the situation with unprecedented frankness. The Palestinian uprising, the Intifada, the paper said, showed that the disputatious Arabs could unite and revealed that Arab public opinion had not been "neutralised" by previous Arab failures. "Arab public opinion is a countervailing force [to Washington] that the Arab authorities and others must take into consideration in order to prevent surprises that could change the status quo" - i.e. precipitate the overthrow of existing regimes.
The paper predicted that any new regional war could involve "an Arab resistance different from that known in previous wars". It cited the example of Lebanon's Hizbullah resistance movement, suggesting that volunteers from the entire region could respond to a call to arms.
Over the past decade, the US-sponsored negotiations provided the moderates with some sort of justification for remaining in the US politico-economic camp. But the continuation of the talks without concrete results, and without end, undermined governmental and popular confidence in the peace process. As one commentator said: "We have a process but no peace." Nevertheless, until the Intifada erupted last September, moderate and radical Arab governments depended on the flawed and faltering process to keep the peace and determine their political orientation. Today, Arab leaders and opinion-makers believe there is no hope of reviving the process. They blame the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, who failed to make good on his 1999 election campaign promise to achieve peace with the Palestinians and Syria by the end of 2000. His possible succession by former right-wing prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who froze the peace process during his previous three years in office, has given rise to acute despair amongst Arab and Israeli peacemakers. Egypt, the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with the Jewish state, played a key regional role in promoting the gradual "normalisation" with Israel and resolving disputes during talks involving Israel and the Palestinians and Syrians. Cairo, the second-largest recipient of US financial assistance after Israel, is paid $2 billion (£1.8 billion) a year for its efforts. The large, undeveloped Egyptian economy has opened up to US investment. But after Israel bombed Palestinian sites in Gaza in November, Cairo was obliged to recall its ambassador from Tel Aviv and distance itself from Israel. The tightly controlled Egyptian media grew highly critical of Israel and the US.
Jordan, the only other Arab country to have a treaty with Israel, has not dispatched its recently appointed ambassador to Tel Aviv. The government is under strong popular pressure to abrogate the treaty.
Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, the effective ruler of the kingdom, is sharply critical of the US, the closest ally of the ruling family since the 1930s. In November, he called upon Arab governments to sever relations with any countries that transfer their embassies in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Since both the US Congress and the White House have committed themselves to such a move, it was clear that the prince was addressing Washington. Gulf emirs are finding it increasingly difficult to justify the US military presence in their waters and at land bases, which amounts to a protectorate in the oil-rich region. The emirs are criticised for making massive purchases of high-tech Western weapons that their armies are not capable of using. The radical Arab states, Syria and Iraq, do not want war any more than the moderates. Syria is striving to restructure its backward command economy while Iraq is battling sanctions and trying to rebuild a war-shattered and run-down infrastructure. The Palestinians simply seek to survive and, ultimately, establish an independent state.
In the absence of a firm lead from an Arab ruler, students and professional associations have seized the initiative by launching a broad boycott of US goods and services. The Washington-based National Council on US-Arab Relations reports that the boycott is likely to continue, expand and have a long-term impact upon young consumers who are encouraged to reject US purchases by teachers and mentors. Ironically, Western Internet technology is being deployed to spread the message of revolt among ordinary Arabs, while Arab satellite television beams scenes from the Intifada into Arab homes. Global technology could expand the Palestinian Intifada into a popular Arab revolt.