In presenting the motion to remove Judge Curtin from the bench, the Minister for Justice suggested that this process was unique and not comparable to any other legal process.
He also distinguished it from the process of impeaching a president, which is described in Article 12.10 of the Constitution.
"The power vested in each House to consider and pass removal motions in the case of the judiciary is not an instance of civil or criminal justice but, on the contrary, a distinct constitutional function vested in the Houses of Oireachtas, which is sui generis," said Mr McDowell.
This means that this is a unique procedure, not only without precedent, but without any relationship to any other proceedings of any other type of tribunal.
If this is true it implies that rules and precedents established in relation to other hearings, both within and without the courts, would not apply.
It also implies that, provided fair procedures and constitutional norms are upheld, the exercise of its powers by the Oireachtas is not a matter for the courts.
Mr McDowell stressed the importance of abiding by fair procedures and constitutional norms. But that does not cover every controversial issue that is likely to arise during this process.
The most immediate of these is that raised by the plenary summons lodged in the High Court on Tuesday.
This sought a declaration that evidence gathered while breaching Judge Curtin's constitutional rights, and ruled inadmissible by Tralee Circuit Court in the criminal trial, could not be used in any other proceedings or disclosed to any third party.
The law is not black and white on this issue. It has been clearly established that evidence illegally obtained cannot be used in a criminal trial, but it is not so clear whether it can be used in any other proceedings.
This is of such fundamental importance in the present case it is unlikely that the courts will refuse to consider it.
That could well be the first challenge that the committee being set up to consider the matter will have to deal with.
It is also likely to have to deal with the issue of compellability.
The law has been amended to compel the judge to appear before the committee. However, since a case arising out of an Oireachtas inquiry into the events leading to the Arms Trial, called In Re Haughey, all those called before Oireachtas committees have the right to confront their accusers and to defend themselves.
Accused persons have the right not to incriminate themselves in relation to criminal proceedings. It is not clear whether this also applies to the process of removing a judge.
Again, it is unlikely that Judge Curtin's lawyers will allow him being compelled to give evidence to go uncontested.
Mr McDowell has sought to fence the process off from legal precedent by describing it as sui generis, and it is constantly described as "uncharted waters". Yet the whole area of judicial impeachment is not one unknown to politicians and lawyers, and it has already received considerable thought. That thought will be brought to bear on events in the days to come.
Following the Sheedy affair, when two judges of the Supreme and High Court resigned when threatened with impeachment, there was considerable discussion of the need for clear law on the matter.
Dr Gerard Hogan SC, who is now advising the Oireachtas on the Curtin case, wrote in a legal journal: "The existing provisions of Article 35 were (shown to be) entirely unsatisfactory."
He said the Constitution Review Group, of which he was a member, recommended that the process for removing a judge be brought into line with the process for impeaching a president, described in Article 12.
He also pointed out that, at a time of political pressure and media frenzy, a judge at the centre of such a storm had less protection than an employee covered by unfair dismissals legislation. "The very threat of invoking this procedure is sufficient to call to mind Gerald Ford's famous dictum concerning the impeachment process: 'You don't need evidence - you only need votes'."
The most fundamental question, according to Dr Hogan, was whether the courts would be entitled to review a final decision of the Houses of the Oireachtas to impeach a judge. But, he argued, where questions of fair procedures or the definition of "stated misbehaviour" was involved, judicial intervention might well be appropriate.