In his report, the Chief Constable deals in detail with the Ombudsman's sixrecommendations and draws a number of conclusions. The following is the full text of the section
Recommendation 1:
"That an investigation team led by a senior investigating officer, independent of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, should be asked to conduct the Omagh bomb investigation."
A senior detective from Merseyside Police has been appointed. He will act as an adviser to the SIO [senior investigating officer] in the Omagh investigation.
He will advise on all steps appropriate to completion of the investigation, including ensuring that all recommendations relevant to the Omagh bomb investigation contained in the review report are appropriately addressed. He will continuously "quality-assure" the investigation and be given whatever resources he needs to do so. He will have direct access to the regional assistant chief constable, to ACC Crime and to the Chief Constable. He will have unrestricted access to all material requested.
Recommendation 2:
"That an officer in overall command from an outside police force be appointed to carry out the investigation of the potentially-linked incidents identified in the Omagh bomb review report."
The argument is well rehearsed in Section 7 about the difference in the situation in England and Wales compared to how terrorist organisations operate in Ireland (in the case of this atrocity in both parts of Ireland). Notwithstanding this, the advice of the senior Merseyside detective will be sought on this issue.
Recommendation 3:
"That senior investigating officers in the Omagh bomb investigation must be given appropriate access to all relevant intelligence. (The "relevance" test being that of the senior investigating officer)."
The PSNI agrees completely that SIOs should be given appropriate access to all relevant intelligence. There is a very practical difficulty. however, with the suggested "relevance test". It is hard to see how an SIO can apply this test unless they access all intelligence relevant and possibly irrelevant. To include this as a test is to misunderstand the situation. The current PSNI policy in this regard is:
"In all cases where Special Branch obtain intelligence after the event relating to serious crime, a senior Special Branch officer should relay this to a senior CID officer as soon as practicable and without undue delay.
"Source sensitivity should not be a reason for delay (beyond the need to seek clearance from a third-party if the intelligence comes from outside the PSNI).
"CID must respect any reasonable restrictions placed by Special Branch on the exploitation of the intelligence."
Recommendation 4:
"That Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary be invited to carry out a review of terrorist-linked murder inquires with a view to reporting on structure, resources, strategies, policies, practices and processes. This should include lines of communication and sharing of intelligence between Special Branch and CID generally and also with the senior investigating officer in charge of any murder inquiry."
The PSNI has no difficulty in inviting HMIC to conduct a review of terrorist-linked murder investigations, and that this should focus on the structure, resources, strategies, policies, practices and processes underpinning such investigations. The PSNI, however, considers that the part of Recommendation 4, which touches upon the interaction between Special Branch and CID in such investigations has already been addressed in work resulting from Patten Recommendation 98, and which will be implemented over the coming months following the creation of a unitary department incorporating Special Branch and CID. HMIC and the Patten Oversight Commissioner will undoubtedly keep this under review.
Recommendation 5:
"That a review takes place into the role and function of Special Branch with a view to ensuring that, in future, there are clear structures and procedures for the management and dissemination of intelligence between Special Branch and other parts of the Police Service of Northern Ireland and that Special Branch will be fully and professionally integrated into the Police Service of Northern Ireland."
With effect from April 1st, 2001, Special Branch and Crime Branch were placed under the unitary command of an assistant chief constable. Immediately thereafter, a working group was established comprising of senior management from both disciplines to scope and determine the most effective structures. This recommendation is, therefore, some way behind the substantial progress which has been made towards giving full effect to recommendations 97-102 of the Patten Report. The Oversight Commissioner will, again, keep progress under continuous review.
The aim is to ensure that the new structures remain capable of providing an effective and efficient investigative and intelligence service to the police service, while meeting the obligations imposed by law, the Patten Report and the mandatory requirement to counter the terrorist threat.
Recommendation 6:
"That the Police Service of Northern Ireland adopts the policy of the Association of Chief Police Officers with regard to murder reviews."
This recommendation was accepted and adopted in principle by the PSNI on April 25th, 2001, following the publication of Force Order 23/2001 C(c) - Major Crime Investigations. This has been supplemented with further work commissioned in September 2001 to develop a protocol governing murder reviews. This protocol is presently awaiting approval by legal services prior to publication and implementation. The full implementation of the proposed Murder Review Procedures is contingent on the availability of adequate resources.
CONCLUSIONS
1 In her statement the Ombudsman says that she "must be able to have confidence that the Police Service of Northern Ireland and its leaders have integrity and will honestly, openly and willingly deal with requests made of the organisation by the Police Ombudsman in the exercise of her statutory powers. The PSNI agrees without reservation. It has approached the Ombudsman's investigation in this spirit. It is committed to the principle of independent supervision, which ideally should act as both an important reassurance for the public and, where necessary, a safeguard for the police. PSNI stands ready to work with the Ombudsman's office to build the kind of constructive and positive relationship which the supervisory arrangements require if they are to work effectively.
2. The Police Service in its turn is entitled to expect from the Ombudsman's office the same high standards of professionalism, rigour, openness and fairness that are expected of the police.
The Ombudsman's Omagh report has left the PSNI with genuine concerns, and a real sense of disappointment, about the procedures and processes used in compiling it. This paper identifies only some of the more important reasons for concern.
The full PSNI response, which is being presented to the Policing Board and the Secretary of State, both of whom received the Ombudsman's report, contains a comprehensive and detailed analysis, with supporting evidence.
3. The Ombudsman's report and the accompanying statements make serious criticisms of individuals who are either identified directly or whose identities can be readily determined, both by the public and by colleagues within the Police Service. None of these individuals was given a fair and reasonable opportunity to make a considered response to the draft report, or to influence the contents, findings and conclusions of the final report. The PSNI does not believe that the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedures used in compiling the Ombudsman's report and accompanying statements.
4. The result has been a report that has done a grave disservice, and caused great hurt, to the PSNI and to individual officers within it, and has inflicted unnecessary grief and anxiety on the relatives of those murdered at Omagh and those injured.
The errors, inaccuracies and misunderstandings it contains have also seriously distorted the facts about the events surrounding the Omagh bomb and its investigation, which this response has sought to rectify. The conduct of the Ombudsman's investigation has also revealed an important structural weakness in the existing arrangements, which is the lack of a formal redress mechanism to which the PSNI can have recourse in circumstances such as these.
5. In the same way that the Police Service has always recognised that it would have lessons to learn from its handling of the Omagh investigation, it hopes that the Ombudsman will accept that her office has lessons to learn from the way her own investigation was conducted.
Full text of Sir Ronnie Flanagan's resonse to the Ombudsman's report
[ http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/special/2002/flanagan/index.htm ]