AS one seasoned observer put it: "The IRA doesn't care about bad publicity."
The shock and outrage and the feeling that a sacred corner of the British - not to mention Irish - way of life has been invaded and trampled on is unlikely to bother the perpetrators very much, if at all.
They would no doubt argue that, at minimum cost and effort to itself, the IRA has put Northern Ireland on the front page all over the world and forced British party leaders to comment, however negatively, on a situation they would probably prefer to ignore.
Like the punters at Aintree, the IRA is also gambling - but in a more deadly game. Every other day its members take a chance with people's lives when they phone their coded warnings about bombs beside railway lines or motorways.
They must know what risk means because, if they are caught, they will be put away for a very long time indeed. And very few people on either side of the Irish Sea will complain or even care.
As well as being angry, many ordinary people are puzzled by the IRA's actions. They wonder what gain there could be in attacking such a popular sporting event. Indeed, if people had been blown up at Aintree, there is a strong possibility that Irish citizens, as well as others of Irish descent, would have been among their number.
In gambling terms, the republican movement has placed an each way bet. Sinn Fein carries on with its political activity, principally the fight to win seats in the Westminster election. At the same time, the IRA keeps the pot boiling with bombs and hoax bombs, creating the maximum possible disruption and keeping the Northern issue centre stage.
"It's crazy stuff", nationalist sources in the peace process said in the aftermath of Aintree. "They will lose support with that sort of carry on. It was a surefire way of getting people's backs up, because the Grand National belonged to everyone.
Whatever slim chance there had been that the British Prime Minister, Mr John Major, would take an initiative before polling day to bring Sinn Fein into talks was now virtually crushed. "Major obviously isn't going to move an inch."
Likewise, observers said Labour's Mo Mowlam, who had gone so far as to "name the day" for possible Sinn Fein entry to talks, would now find it almost impossible to elaborate on her offer, which some believe had real potential to bring about a ceasefire.
More seriously, perhaps, for the republican movement, this latest episode has reduced the room for manoeuvre of senior US politicians such as Senator Edward Kennedy, whose latest intervention came in an article for The Irish Times on Saturday morning.
If Senator Kennedy begins to feel that he is wasting his time, then it is goodbye to any prospect that President Clinton might intervene to put pressure on Britain to ensure Sinn Fein's participation in talks after an IRA ceasefire.
Close observers of the republican movement say that operations n Britain are directed from south Armagh and the Republic. These are regarded as the most militant and least politically inclined elements of the IRA. It is understood that there is little contact with BRA units "on the ground" in Britain, whose current brief is said to be to create as much mayhem as possible while avoiding civilian casualties.
Although Sinn Fein will suffer on the international diplomatic front, most independent observers said that the party would incur little damage at the polling booths in West Belfast, Mid Ulster and West Tyrone. These are the constituencies where the party is seen to have the best chance of winning Westminster seats on May 1st.
Operations in Britain, provided there are no civilian casualties, are said to be much less unpopular with the nationalist "floating voter" than bombings and shootings in their own areas. IRA attacks nearer home tend to bring the RUC and British army down on the heads of the local population by way of security alerts, search operations and general discomfort and inconvenience.
Operations "across the water", on the other hand, are more tolerable because of the widespread annoyance with the British government, even among middle class nationalists, in the wake of Drumcree, and also because of the perceived inactivity of Mr Major and his colleagues during the 17 month IRA ceasefire.
Loyalist political contacts were, like most other observers, bemused by what they called the Aintree "stunt", which they felt could prove counter productive for the Provisionals. But again, in common with other observers, they believed the episode would have little long term significance: "In a few days time it will be yesterday's news."
Meanwhile, speculation about a renewed IRA ceasefire continues unabated. Even the attacks in Britain are an echo of similar activities which took place prior to the 1994 cessation. There have been predictions of a lull in IRA violence in Northern Ireland for the duration of the election campaign, but this would not necessarily be accompanied by an immediate scaling down of operations in Britain.
"People should not panic", sources in the peace process said. But they acknowledged there was an inherent contradiction in trying to advance the republican cause by political and diplomatic means when at any time a bomb or shooting could set all the political work at naught.
In paramilitary terms, Aintree was a soft target, and the evacuation of the crowd must be seen as a hollow victory for the perpetrators. It arouses memories of the quixotic but high profile activities by the IRA in Britain during the second World War. Like the display by armed and masked members of the IRA in north Belfast last week, it proves that the organisation "hasn't gone away", but the international diplomatic fall out will be negative.
There is a republican argument that paramilitary actions are the only way to get the British to move on Northern Ireland. The point is made that Canary Wharf forced the British government to agree a date for all party talks. However, even if that was true, those talks were convened with Sinn Fein outside the loop.
Though the rest of the world may fume and rage all it likes, the republican movement will go its own way. Longtime observers said they did not expect a restoration of the 1994 ceasefire until after the Westminster election. Then, if Sinn Fein had two or three seats, its leaders would have increased leverage with the British government and would therefore find it much easier to persuade the IRA to put its guns aside and give peace another chance.