Both sides of the argument agree that approval of the Amsterdam Treaty will not in itself bring about a common European defence policy, or a common defence or any other development which would end Ireland's neutrality. However, its opponents say it is a step in this direction; its supporters disagree.
A formidable coalition - of Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg and Belgium - effectively proposed that the EU become a defence union during the treaty negotiations. However, their plan for a phased merger of the EU and the Western European Union (WEU) defence organisation was rejected.
There was never any chance that this would gain the necessary unanimous support. Neutral and non-aligned states such as Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland opposed the plan. The UK and Denmark opposed it for different reasons - that the US must be involved in European security, and this means European security must be conducted through NATO, not any alternative. The plan for a common defence was therefore roundly defeated.
However, opponents of the treaty do not argue that Amsterdam would in itself end Irish neutrality. Rather, they say, it is another step in a process leading ultimately to the end of neutrality. They also warn that a future government could theoretically commit Ireland to a common defence policy, without first holding a further referendum, if the Amsterdam Treaty is approved.
The claim that Amsterdam marks another subtle step towards military alignment is based on a change in Article J of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. That treaty states that the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) "shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence".
The Amsterdam text contains some alterations, saying the CFSP "shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy . . . which might lead to a common defence should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the member-states the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements".
Opponents of the treaty believe that if we pass the treaty the text above gives the European Council (composed of EU heads of state and government) the right to frame a common defence without holding a further referendum in Ireland. Supporters, however, say that any common defence would emerge from an Inter-Governmental Council of the EU, that this would require an amendment to the EU Treaties, and that there is a constitutional requirement for this to be put to a referendum. They say that the treaty therefore makes a common defence less rather than more likely, as such a proposal would be very unlikely to be approved by Irish voters.
There is also an acknowledgment elsewhere in the treaty - as in the Maastricht text - that there are member-states, including Ireland, with attitudes to security and defence which are not in accord with the European mainstream. In this regard the treaty says: "The policy of the Union in accordance with this article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member-states."
Finally, the Taoiseach and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have pledged that any future proposal to alter Ireland's policy of military neutrality would be put to a referendum.
Whatever about the tortuous text, the tone implies an ambition to move the EU and the WEU closer. As in the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU is described as "an integral part of the development of the Union". The treaty refers to the "possibility" of the integration of the WEU into the EU and says the EU and WEU should agree "arrangements for enhanced co-operation" within a year of the treaty's enforcement. And, in a section which alarms the treaty's opponents, it talks of co-operation between members in the field of armaments, but only "as member-states consider appropriate".
However, each time the treaty raises the prospect of the EU taking on a more military character, it then qualifies the suggestion and makes it aspirational rather than mandatory. The treaty therefore puts forward the idea of the EU taking on a more military character, but does not implement this idea.
The explanation put forward by those who were close to the lengthy negotiations is that the conflict between the tone and the actual meaning arises from the constant watering down in negotiations of the initial militarist proposal from the French to the text which finally appears in the treaty. The tone remains but the teeth are gone.
The only concrete change over Maastricht is the inclusion of the so-called Petersberg Tasks within the EU treaty. This proposal was put by Finland and Sweden and was supported enthusiastically by Ireland. It means that the EU can now decide to become involved in international humanitarian, peace keeping and peacemaking tasks, and can ask the Western European Union to carry out such tasks. Under the terms of the treaty, Ireland can now opt to become involved on a case by case basis in such missions, if they are mandated by the UN.
The Government was happy with the final text of the Amsterdam Treaty in the area of defence and security. The prospect that the Union would take on the characteristics of a military alliance receded. The treaty does not propose the establishment of a common European defence policy, nor does it propose the merger of the EU with the WEU.
But its opponents warn that EU treaties do to Irish neutrality what a sharp knife does to a length of salami. Cutting a slice off is hardly noticeable, but after a certain number of slices the salami is gone. They have not yet proven, however, that this particular treaty takes even a thin slice off neutrality.