The UN's 21-page document purporting to outline the "rules of engagement" for the proposed reinforced Unifil mission to Lebanon gives little comfort or explicit direction to potential military commanders who might be deployed there, writes Tom Clonan.
Extracts from the leaked "UN-Restricted" document that is currently being examined by military staffs from potential troop-donating countries worldwide - including Ireland - suggest a document that is as vague as UN Security Council Resolution 1701 on the specific issues of use of force, mission statement and command and control of forces.
Crucially, the newly configured rules of engagement fall far short of a UN "Chapter 7" or peace enforcement mandate.
As the rules of engagement are currently worded, the proposed multinational force would not be authorised to deploy to Lebanon on a combat footing. It would therefore - unlike a rapid reaction force or battlegroup- type formation - be unable to proactively plan for vigorous and robust operations to disrupt the activities of the belligerents in Lebanon, or to ensure sufficient force- protection measures for its own troops.
Extracts from the UN document seen by The Irish Times form a prescription for a force that would be "predominantly defensive in nature". As such, the reinforced Unifil force would continue to be a UN "Chapter 6" or peace- keeping mission. In this manner, the multinational force would only be in a position to react to events on the ground in Lebanon. As a peacekeeping contingent, its commanders would be denied the ability to take the initiative in the field and to evolve proactive strategies for the creation of a weapons-free buffer zone between the Litani river and the Israeli border.
Consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, the UN's draft rules of engagement imply that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will assume primary responsibility for the disarmament of Hizbullah and the security of Lebanon's borders.
The document copper-fastens the primacy of the Lebanese Armed Forces within south Lebanon and relegates the status of the multinational Unifil force to a strictly supporting role in the creation of a weapons-free zone between the Litani and the Blue Line along the Israeli-Lebanese border.
The document states that the multinational force would be allowed the "use of force, up to and including deadly force, while assisting the government of Lebanon, at its request, to secure its borders and other points of entry to prevent the entry into Lebanon, without its consent, of foreign forces, arms or related material". This proviso, and another authorising Unifil to use lethal force to "protect civilians under imminent threat of violence, when competent local authorities are unavailable or unable to render immediate assistance", contain within them the assumption that the LAF would at all times retain ultimate control over the rate, tempo and direction of military operations within south Lebanon - with Unifil confined to as yet unspecified supporting roles.
The rules of engagement contain within them the dangerous assumption that the LAF has the ability or willingness to evolve a concept of operations for the creation of a weapons-free zone in south Lebanon. The rules would effectively tie the hands of any Unifil commander attempting to operate meaningfully in a highly volatile and fragile security environment. Subordinated to the political will - at any given moment in a rapidly changing crisis - of the Lebanese government and its military authorities, such a UN force would find it difficult to make real-time decisions in response to rapidly deteriorating battlefield conditions. Such was the fate of the Dutch battalion at Srebrenica in July 1995, where decisions that should have been instantaneous required laborious political scrutiny - with disastrous and tragic results.
Most military commanders feel Unifil needs a robust and explicitly-stated Chapter 7 peace enforcement mandate.
The current rules of engagement represent an ill-conceived request for an international force of "human shields'" to be inserted between two bitter adversaries who are simply in the process of taking stock, regrouping and rearming for the next phase of the war.
• Dr Tom Clonan is The Irish Times Security Analyst.