After last week's controversial police raids on Sinn Féin offices in Stormont, Dan Keenan, Northern News Editor, unravels the web of active spying networks - including MI5, the British army's intelligence unit, and the police service's Special Branch unit'
'Everywhere I go, the bug goes," Gerry Adams claimed this week. His complaint refers to what he says is constant monitoring of him and his whereabouts by spies. It's an accusation often directed at British security, including the police in Northern Ireland, and one which gets in the way of politics, Sinn Féin claims.
But Gerry Adams is not alone. Anti-agreement unionist MP Jeffrey Donaldson has also accused the state to which he pledges loyalty of bugging his home and keeping an eye on his political contacts.
He claims that a special unit at Thiepval Barracks in Lisburn, the British army's headquarters in Northern Ireland, had been charged with spying on anti-agreement unionists and UUP officials who voted against the agreement. The monitoring started, he claimed, in 1999, within a year of the signing of the Good Friday deal - and included phone-tapping, mobile phone bugging and the secret recording of meetings.
The claims led the then Conservative spokesman on the North, Andrew McKay, to say: "Phone tapping and electronic surveillance should only ever be used to combat terrorism and organised crime - not for political purposes in an open democracy." That's a claim that might well raise a few Sinn Féin, and even unionist, eyebrows.
The same year as Donaldson made his complaints, Sinn Féin discovered a listening device and electronic tracking transmitter carefully concealed in a car frequently used by senior members of the party including Gerry Adams.
In the political storm that followed, reports suggested the device was sophisticated, while others said it was out-of-date and fairly crude.
What is accepted is that the device, or, more accurately, devices, included listening equipment, a satellite-linked global positioning unit for tracking purposes, transmission aerials and digital enhancement facilities.
Crude, perhaps, by present-day standards, but sophisticated enough to pick up and transmit conversations while being tracked remotely without the need for those listening to keep within range of the target car. It is possible that details of each journey taken in the vehicle could be stored on a computer which would record and analyse the data while also instructing hundreds of security and covert cameras to record its journey.
It wasn't the first time bugging claims were made against British services by Sinn Féin. The party also claimed that rooms used by them at Stormont were bugged during the politically sensitive Mitchell Review of the Belfast Agreement in 1999.
In the midst of the political furore, British Prime Minister Tony Blair's spokesman said intelligence agencies operate "under the law". The UK-wide 1994 Intelligence Services Act stipulates: "No entry on, or interference with, property shall be unlawful if it is authorised by a warrant issued by the Secretary of State." But the 1996 Northern Ireland Emergency Act gives spies a freer hand.
The Northern Secretary in 1999 was Dr Mo Mowlam. She claimed she gave the go-ahead for the bugging to "save lives", adding significantly: "It was done to make sure we knew what was going on".
Gerry Adams commented with characteristic understatement that the IRA "would not be pleased" adding darkly that it was a "hugely serious breach of faith" by intelligence services who were trying to bring down the peace process.
One problem with legislation covering the deployment of spyware is that technology often outpaces it.
Legislation enacted eight years ago has been overtaken by technology which has provided pinhead cameras, micro listening devices and transmitters and security force base antennae bristling with sophisticated monitoring equipment. This leaves the intelligence agencies operating under the unwritten golden rules which state they should not get caught and that they should not be an embarrassment to government ministers. They are rules noted for their breaches as well as their observance in Northern Ireland.
In October 1982, two teenagers were shot by the RUC in a hayshed near Lurgan, Co Armagh. It was one of a series of alleged "shoot to kill" incidents in which police officers were said to have shot at suspects without observing proper procedures.
Michael Tighe (17), died in the shooting. He had no paramilitary connections. His friend Martin McCauley (19) survived. The then Deputy Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, John Stalker, was drafted in to investigate and he discovered that the hayshed had been bugged by MI5, the British domestic intelligence service.
A tape of the controversial incident containing potentially vital evidence was later destroyed by MI5, he found. A copy was also destroyed. The evidence could have proved whether or not a warning had been shouted to the teenagers before officers opened fire.
Stalker was controversially removed from the investigation and replaced by Colin Sampson. His report was understood to have called for the prosecution of police officers for peddling cover-up stories and for charges to be brought against MI5 officers for destroying the copy of the tape.
However, Sir Patrick Mayhew, the then British attorney general, told the BBC that to do so would have jeopardised the intelligence network in Northern Ireland. "A lot of intelligence matters would have been brought out that would have been deleterious to the intelligence operation that was essential in the circumstances, " he said.
Tom King, the Northern Secretary at the time, seemed to agree. Prosecutions against MI5 officers standing in the dock giving evidence on oath relating to intelligence-gathering was "undesirable", he said.
Accountability is further complicated given the diverse and sometimes competitive intelligence structure in the North. Various agencies are active, ranging from MI5, to the British army's own intelligence unit, the Force Research Unit (FRU), to the police service's Special Branch. Each runs its own network of agents and informants.
The Patten report on the future of policing called for the absorption of Special Branch, which Patten termed a force within a force, into Crime Branch and for measures to ensure that intelligence collected was properly analysed and shared with the rest of the service.
But the raid on Special Branch offices at Castlereagh last St Patrick's Day was, in the words of the new Chief Constable, Hugh Orde, a disaster for the police. The loss of sensitive and significant information at a time when intelligence structures are under review could mean that MI5 ends up with the over-arching command of intelligence gathering in Northern Ireland and not the PSNI.
According to an SDLP source, the importance of intelligence evidence is increasing all the time. The discipline of paramilitaries and their ability to operate in a "forensically cleaner" manner increases the dependence on intelligence information.
Like the state services, the paramilitaries too run their own agents and operate intelligence networks.
A well-placed political source at Stormont told The Irish Times it was accepted that "moles" and "sleepers" were used and that it was difficult to stop the practice.
Paramilitary sympathisers, with clean records and no known links, can place themselves in sensitive job situations with access to useful information and documents.
Vetting is often difficult as access can be gained via catering, cleaning or other companies employed to service government or state buildings, or through the civil service.
Even if covert activity is suspected, employment legislation makes it difficult for direct intervention unless the grounds for doing so are sound.
It is possible that this explains the delay before action was taken to stop the alleged intelligence leaks in Dr John Reid's Northern Ireland Office.
Martin McGuinness continues to insist that Sinn Féin is not involved in spying and that all such behaviour is wrong and unacceptable.
He, like Gerry Adams, says it must stop while politics is given its primacy alongside demilitarisation by British forces.
Other sources suggest, however, that paramilitary groups on ceasefire need to continue with some form of operations short of the terms of the cessation.
If true, this could help explain the continuation of paramilitary intelligence-gathering, weapons procurement and the targeting of prison officers, senior politicians and others.