As the June 30th deadline for the transfer of power to Iraqis moves closer, Michael Jansen examines the options facing the Bush administration
The Bush administration is now considering the proposal put forward on Thursday by the UN envoy, Mr Lakhdar Brahimi, for the transfer of "sovereignty" to Iraqis on June 30th and elections before the end of January 2005.
Mr Brahimi called for the dissolution of the US-appointed Governing Council and the creation of a caretaker government made up of an executive prime minister heading a cabinet of technocrats. There would be a president and two deputies, representing Iraq's main communal groupings. The UN, US and Iraqis would be consulted on these appointments.
In July, Iraqis would hold a national convention which would choose members of an interim national assembly, a consultative rather than a legislative body.
If the US accepts the Brahimi plan, Washington has two options for implementation.
The first would be to try to fit the plan into the overall strategy it has been following for the present, the transition period and the long-term.
This would mean trying to pre-empt an elected Iraqi government by laying down the the foundation of the US-Iraq relationship before the occupation regime ends in June. Washington's chief administrator in Iraq, Mr Paul Bremer, has been issuing decrees governing the operations of Iraq's central bank, investment by foreign firms, continued deployment of foreign forces in the country, and placing the Iraqi army, civil defence units and police under US military command.
These instruments will enable the US, which holds the purse strings ($18 billion has been pledged for reconstruction) and is in charge of security, to retain a large degree of political control.
This would be exercised by the new US embassy in Baghdad, staffed by 3,000 officers set to take over from Mr Bremer and his officers. The aim of this strategy is to create a regime in Iraq which would not only accept permanent US military bases but also political guidance.
Since this was the Bush administration's main war aim, it is unlikely that it will drop this option unless it has very good reason to do so. An indication of US intentions is the fact that two of the leading contenders to head the embassy in Iraq are the UN Ambassador, Mr John Negroponte, and the Deputy Defence Secretary, Mr Paul Wolfowitz, both members of the neo-conservative faction which is most identified with the war and occupation.
The second, better option - unlikely to be chosen by the Bush administration - would require it to drop the idea of hanging on to Iraq.
The US would put the UN in charge of the political process, stand by the date for elections, and boost the number of troops in the country by modest numbers.
The recruitment and training of former military personnel would have to be stepped up so Iraq's armed forces could increasingly assume responsibility for security.
The ban would have to be lifted on former Ba'athists entering Iraq's armed forces, ministries and other institutions and communal militias would have to be disbanded and disarmed. Opponents of the war and occupation - Germany, France, Russia, China, Iran and the Arabs - could be called upon to support the effort and to oversee the UN's endeavours to make certain that it is not acting under Washington's orders.
Three other options mentioned as possibilities by analysts have to be ruled out. One would be to bring in a lot of troops, use force to pacify the country, and impose a harsh US civilian or military regime.
But this is not a viable option. The US and its allies cannot occupy all sites of resistance activity because the US military is already overstretched by commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan and South Korea.
The task of stabilising Iraq could require an additional 150,000 troops and more. While the forces present in Iraq can employ massive firepower and level centres of resistance, the "collateral" civilian casualties would render such action untenable on both the Iraqi and international scenes.
The administration, wary of raising troop numbers ahead of the November election, has even shied away from dispatching an additional 7-10,000 new troops, two brigades, requested by the head of Central Command, Gen John Abizaid, to bolster the 35,000 in Iraq, and decided, instead, to extend the stay of 20,000 troops already there. Another option would involve unilateral withdrawal. But Iraq, with no security forces of its own, would be at the mercy of the communal militias which would battle each other for power at the centre, precipitating civil war.
The US has too many civilians and soldiers and too much equipment in Iraq for a rapid evacuation to be possible and a drawn-out departure would be risky.
Declaring victory and leaving - as from Vietnam - would be politically disastrous for the Bush administration.
Finally, the US could try to internationalise the occupation by bringing in NATO peacekeepers. But key alliance members have refused to take part if the US insists on remaining in command of the armed forces and the political process. If the administration would choose the second of the first mentioned options, NATO and the UN might be prepared to send forces as well as play key roles in the political process.