THERE WERE significant defects in the information provided by Yes campaigners in the recent Lisbon Treaty referendum, but many of them did warn repeatedly that uncertainty would be the main consequence of a No vote. On that point at least, they have been proven correct.
It is now apparent that those who claim to have led the No vote were naive in their assessment of what would happen following a No result. As some of them express shock that the ratification process is continuing, one is left wondering what continent or indeed what planet they have lived on for the last eight years.
It is difficult to believe they actually thought the governments of Europe, having spent time and energy negotiating necessary reforms of the EU over the last decade, would simply abandon that project because of an Irish No vote. Many of Europe's political leaders have also expended large amounts of domestic political capital in securing ratification for Lisbon in their own countries and they are not going to allow Ireland to set it at naught at this stage.
The words of sympathy and compassion expressed to Micheál Martin and Brian Cowen this week can't hide the fact that Europe's political leaders see this as Ireland's problem to solve. The political realities are clear.
There will be no renegotiation of the treaty. Ratifications from 25 or 26 member states will be stacked up and the rest of Europe will put it up to Ireland to revisit the decision or get left behind.
They may be prepared to offer Ireland some reassuring protocols and there is an outside chance we'll hold on to a commissioner. However, whether under Lisbon or another name, the reform treaty process will go on, with or without Ireland.
If Ireland does not rerun the referendum or if a second referendum confirms the negative result, Ireland will be asked to pull into the hard shoulder, get out of the way and let our European colleagues progress with their reforms. It may require complex legal instruments for Europe to move on without Ireland, but once the other countries make the political decision, the legal mechanisms will be found to give it effect.
Cowen and his Government have just a few months to devise a strategy that minimises the consequences of this No vote for Ireland's political and economic future and need a clearer picture of why most voters voted No.
A company seeking to explain why a product failed with consumers spends money and time and employs sophisticated market research techniques to determine what went wrong before seeking to relaunch or reposition the brand. The marketplace of political ideas and campaigning has its own distinctive features, but using some market research will still be of some assistance.
It is a pity that RTÉ, which had such excellent exit polling for the last two general elections, did not repeat the exercise for this referendum. The European Commission conducted some polling in Ireland on or since last Thursday, but its true nature and extent is unclear.
Media and political parties are probably conducting post-hoc polling already. The difficulty with such polling however is that, even if conducted a few days after the event, there is a risk that respondents may latch on to a reason they have heard advanced by others if they believe their own decision is difficult to articulate or may embarrass them. Detailed qualitative research conducted with many groups composed of different types of voters is required. The sooner it is done, the more accurate it is likely to be.
In addition, the Government should commission a detailed exploration of geographic and demographic voting patterns in the referendum. Political scientists and political geographers sometimes take years to complete such studies, but resources should be provided to do it more quickly on this occasion. By looking at age as well as the social and occupational make-up of areas where the No vote was highest, it is possible to garner a picture of the factors influencing the outcome. However, the absence of detailed tally information will make this exercise more difficult.
Pending detailed research, we are left relying on anecdotal evidence and initial assessments of the voting patterns. Taken together, these suggest a bias in favour of the treaty in wealthier areas, a majority No vote in the farming community for the first time and a clear bias against the treaty in working-class areas, particularly in Dublin. It will be interesting to see if more detailed research confirms indications from canvassers that immigration was a significant issue at doors in working-class areas.
If there is any possibility of turning the result around, the Government will have to hone in on two particular cohorts of voters. The first is those who voted for the first time. The second includes voters who didn't vote in the first Nice referendum, voted Yes in the second Nice referendum and then voted No in the Lisbon Treaty referendum.
Unless there are potential switchers among these voters, there will be no second referendum and we are set for an even more uncertain future.