Mr Tony Blair's determination to achieve an amended Security Council resolution laying down conditions for Iraqi disarmament is admirable, in keeping with his confident performance in the House of Commons yesterday.
The same cannot be said for his continuing willingness to contemplate the use of force against Iraq if a resolution fails to gain support. Who is to judge the acceptability of Iraqi compliance? If it is decided by the United States and Britain rather than the Security Council as a whole, the United Nations' role will be undermined. In turn that would undermine Mr Blair's constructive political response to criticisms of his Iraq policy at home and abroad - notwithstanding his argument that the use of force against Iraq has already been endorsed by Resolution 1441 passed unanimously last November.
Spelling out six conditions to be met by Iraq within a defined period of time changes the parameters of the Security Council debate and may attract more votes from member-states which have up to now refused to endorse the ultimatum to Iraq proposed by Britain, the US and Spain. These tasks are capable of being responded to rapidly within a stipulated timeframe. They include: a clear statement by Saddam Hussein that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction and saying his regime will give them up; allowing scientists to be interviewed outside the country; surrender or explanation of anthrax stocks; and a commitment to destroy missiles, account for drones and surrender bio-production laboratories for destruction.
If such a resolution were to be adopted and Saddam Hussein were to respond positively, war could be avoided. A failure by him to respond satisfactorily would directly affect the outcome and make it easier for the Security Council to endorse military action. There should be no doubting the Council's determination to achieve Iraqi disarmament, or the relative success so far of its arms inspectors in making progress towards that goal. Such a political clarification of their demands, especially if the inspectors endorse it, could help transform the political and diplomatic impasse about Iraqi disarmament in coming days.
This depends crucially on who makes the final judgments. As always in such crises, naked power and interests are used in efforts to fashion Security Council majorities and avoid vetoes. This does not mean such methods always succeed. They don't - largely because many states have a greater interest in maintaining the integrity of the UN system than in capitulating to such pressure for short term advantage. Political and popular pressure on Mr Blair has made a difference and directly affected his approach. A positive outcome depends on the willingness of the US and Britain to respond constructively to criticism and recognise the integrity and legitimacy of the UN. Any use of force against Iraq must be expressly authorised by the Security Council. It cannot be sanctioned unilaterally by the US and Britain.