The US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, on her Middle East tour, might find it difficult to persuade governments that the new US plan for Iraq can succeed, writes Michael Jansen
Arab leaders, commentators and citizens are highly sceptical of the effectiveness of US president George Bush's new plan for stabilising Iraq and believe that shoring up the current Shia fundamentalist regime in Baghdad is the worst possible option.
The argument goes that it could strengthen Iran's influence in Iraq and encourage the clerics in Tehran to try to export "Islamic revolution" to other countries in the region.
Arabs do not think the Bush plan will work because earlier efforts involving surges of US and Iraqi troops into violent neighbourhoods have not ended the violence. Insurgents and criminals preying on Iraqi civilians quickly returned to districts from which they had been cleared. Shia militiamen operating independently or in the police or army have taken advantage of US-led operations to attack or cleanse Sunnis living in mixed neighbourhoods.
During and following last summer's joint security operations, violence soared, sectarian cleansing accelerated and tens of thousands of Baghdadis displaced. Last year was the most deadly since the occupation of the country in 2003. The UN estimates that 34,000 Iraqi civilians were killed in sectarian violence. Tens of thousands have found refuge in Jordan, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, all of which Condoleezza Rice is visiting.
Arabs are deeply suspicious of Washington's Shia and Kurdish allies in Iraq. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's Dawa party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), headed by Abdel Aziz Hakim, are closely tied to Tehran. Iran has given Dawa long-term political backing while SCIRI was founded by Iran, and its militia, the Badr Corps, was recruited among Shia exiles. It has been trained, armed and funded by Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Many of Dawa's leaders spent years in exile in Tehran during the rule of Saddam Hussein and the Badr Corps fought on Iran's side during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war.
Iraq's Kurdish separatists, particularly the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan headed by President Jalal Talabani, have also enjoyed Iranian support. Like the Badr Corps, Kurdish peshmerga militiamen fought on Iran's side in the Iran-Iraq war. The peshmerga is now accepted by the US and the Iraqi government as the legitimate force of the Kurdish region.
While Bush's new security plan declares as its objective the elimination of both the insurgency and sectarian militias, Arab leaders believe Sunni rather than Shia and Kurdish militants will be the main targets. While Mr Maliki may be ready to deploy military muscle against the resistance, he is unlikely to pursue militiamen of the Badr Corps, the Mahdi Army and the peshmerga who are routinely involved in sectarian killings. This is because all three militias have contributed large numbers of men to the regular Iraqi army, the police and the facility protection force in order to have control of the security forces.
The militia Washington apparently intends to target is the Mahdi Army of Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who opposed the US invasion and occupation. He remained in Iraq during the Baathist regime and, therefore, did not return on the back of US tanks like Dawa and SCIRI. His faction is the only communal grouping not tied to Iran and he opposes Iranian influence in Iraqi politics. Mr Maliki has given Mr Sadr two choices.
He can order his militia to stand and fight as it did in 2004 (when it was defeated) or it can halt attacks on Sunnis and co-operate with Dawa and SCIRI. Mr Sadr can be expected to opt for the second alternative. Thus, once the Sunni-led resistance is curbed and the Mahdi Army is tamed, Washington will claim success. If and when this happens, the Kurds will accelerate the building of their autonomy in the north while the Shias will begin to carry out their plans for a Shia Islamic state in the rest of the country or, at least, in a Shia autonomous region in the south.
In the Arab view, the US is following a contradictory policy of shoring up a pro-Iranian Shia-Kurd regime in Baghdad while seeking to contain Iran through isolation, sanctions, threats and, perhaps, military action.
From the Arab perspective, this could be a lose-lose situation.