The IRA ceasefire is again in danger, and not because of the recent spate of sectarian killings of Catholics. It has been possible, certainly since 1993, to discern IRA intentions from a careful reading of the statements by the IRA itself and of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness.
In 1993 and early 1994 they were clearly signalling a complete cessation of military operations by the IRA, believing that "national liberation" could better be pursued through "unarmed struggle" rather than "armed struggle".
That belief was fostered first by a perceived change in the stance of the British government - the assertion by Peter Brooke in 1992 that the British government had no strategic, economic or selfish interest in remaining involved in Ireland.
But there was also another crucial ingredient: a belief that it was then to win the support of the Irish government, of the SDLP and of nationalists generally for the pursuit of Irish unity. On the promise that there would be meaningful negotiations, shortly after a complete cessation of IRA military actions, there was an IRA ceasefire on August 31st, 1994.
The promised negotiations were stalled by an impasse over decommissioning. Towards the end of 1995 the IRA, Adams and McGuinness were signalling that the ceasefire was in trouble. In a statement issued on December 8th, 1995 the IRA said that the then British Prime Minister, John Major, was "encouraging the unionist proposition of a return to Stormont and actively reinforces the unionist leadership's refusal to engage meaningfully in the search for a negotiated settlement."
It was obvious that the IRA had lost confidence in the "unarmed struggle." The ceasefire broke down on February 9th, 1996.
The election of a new British government last May and of a new Irish Government last June encouraged the IRA to believe that the "unarmed struggle" might again achieve better results. The new Blair government made it clear that decommissioning would not be an obstacle to Sinn Fein's participation in the talks and the election of a government in Dublin led again by Fianna Fail gave rise to the expectation that the pan-nationalist alliance for Irish unity would be restored.
That led to the renewed ceasefire of July 19th last.
The political indications are that this ceasefire is far more brittle than the previous one. It is obvious that there is now a large faction within the IRA which is deeply sceptical of the "unarmed struggle" strategy. They believe that the "unionist veto" still prevails and that there will be no progress in these talks, other than cosmetic, towards Irish unity.
Recent developments will have immensely encouraged scepticism over the "unarmed struggle".
The Joint Statement by the British and Irish governments issued on January 12th represents (from a republican/nationalist perspective) a significant retreat from the Framework Document agreed between the two governments in February 1995.
The Framework Document in paragraph 25 spoke of "a North/South body . . . representing the Irish government and new democratic institutions in Northern Ireland to discharge or oversee delegated executive, harmonising and consultative functions, as appropriate."
The January 12th document waters down this proposal considerably. It speaks of "A North/South Ministerial Council . . . (to) consult, co-operate and take decisions on matters of mutual interest with the mandate of and accountable to the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Oireachtas respectively."
The "executive" remit of the North/South body is gone from the January 12th document and the body is to be specifically accountable to the Northern Ireland Assembly (as well as to the Oireachtas), which deprives it of any "sovereignty".
The Framework Document proposed a beefing up of the Anglo-Irish conference established under the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. The January 12th document would enfeeble that body.
It is not without reason that republicans regard the January 12th document as a significant retreat from positions already found insufficient for them. Far from the talks progressing towards their ideal, they seem to be regressing.
And a further alarming aspect to this (from a republican perspective) is that it is a Fianna Failled government which has resiled even on the February 1995 document negotiated with John Major by John Bruton. The belief is that a political alliance of nationalists on the island, including the Dublin government, has been undermined.
Republicans again may perceive themselves as being politically alone. And if alone politically, there is hardly any reason for not returning to "what they are best at".
In a New Year message published in the January 8th issue of An Phoblacht, the IRA has issued signals of deep disquiet over the progress of events. It states, "Many nationalists are impatient with the lack of progress in the negotiations process . . . No internal settlement can deliver justice . . . Instead of implementation of confidence building measures (the British government) have continued with the remilitarization policy of their predecessors in government . . . the primary responsibility for dealing with (the) unionist veto remains with the British government. Their failure to do so allows unionist leaders to pursue a policy of non-engagement but also contributes directly to the creation of the political vacuum in which loyalist murder gangs flourish."
In an article in the Irish News on Monday last Gerry Adams wrote that Sinn Fein had made it clear to both the British and Irish governments that the draft of the January 12th document was unacceptable and yet they went ahead and issued it. He complained, almost plaintively, about the failure to engage in confidence-building measures on the part of the British government and he reiterated that "an energetic diplomatic and political focus by the Irish government in pursuit of substantive and significant constitutional and political change is required."
Martin McGuinness has issued similar signals of distress.
It could hardly be plainer now. The ceasefire is in trouble. It is not now possible to envisage its continuance beyond next summer.
But it is not all bad news. A resumed campaign will not and could not be of the intensity of the campaign before 1994. There is willingness on the part of a majority within the republican movement to settle the issue on a deal that could be sold to the unionists (something along the lines of the Framework Document). The republicans could be jollied along with concessions that involve no surrender of principle (demilitarisation, the release of prisoners, recognition for the Irish language, a sensible and fair process on the regulation of Orange parades).
But is there the sense within either of the governments to get on with this?